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Abstract.
My thesis is a study of the question of politics in the work of Jacques Derrida. I focus in
particular on Politics of Friendship together with those texts most closely related to it,
including 'Force of Law,' 'Passions,' The Gift ofDeath, Specters ofMarx and Adieu: to
Emmanuel Levinas. I describe the political development of Derrida's work from his seminar
on Nationality and Philosophical Nationalism in 1983, to its culmination in the publication
of the full-length text ofPolitics ofFriendship in 1994.
The increasing emphasis applied to the word deconstruction itself over this period,
concluding in formulations such as 'no democracy without deconstruction' and
'deconstruction is justice' suggests Derrida's own increasing understanding of his work as a
political practice and accompanies the development of Derrida's seminars from the question
of philosophical nationality to the decisive issue of responsibility. By reading Politics of
Friendship within the context of this movement within Derrida's work, I consider: 1) the
relationship between deconstruction and democracy; 2) Derrida's concern with language,
nationality and responsibility; 3) Derrida's performative problematization of the political
status of his own texts.
On the basis of this analysis of how Derrida understands 'deconstruction' to be a
political practice I then proceed to answer two further questions:
The first is whether Derrida's political practice can be interpreted in such a way as to
generate a political theory. I argue that careful attention to Derrida's occasional references to
'depoliticization' and 'repoliticization,' and in particular to his work on Carl Schmitt, makes
available a theory of deconstruction as depoliticization. 1 develop this reading through a
reading of Derrida's work on undecidability, and a comparison with his work on the 're-trait'
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before contrasting Derrida's work with that of Jean-Luc Nancy and Phillipe Lacoue-
Labarthe.
The second question concerns the relationships between politics and ethics, and
between Derrida's writings and those of Emmanuel Levinas. Through a close reading of
Derrida's essays on Levinas I suggest that the difference between their work can be
understood in terms of the distinction Levinas draws between the political and the ethical. I
argue against Simon Critchley that while Derrida's work does share concerns with that of
Levinas, it may also be read as a political problematization of his understanding of the
ethical relation to the Other. Where Levinas places ethics before politics, Derrida's work
opens up the possibility of a revaluation of politics itself, while from the perspective opened
up by Politics ofFriendship ethics itself becomes politically problematic.
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Introduction
My thesis is addressed to what I perceive to be two major interpretative problems in
relation to the texts of Jacques Derrida. The first problem refers specifically to the political
dimension of Derrida's work; the second concerns our understanding of his work in general.
The first problem has suggested the central themes ofmy thesis, the second its methodology.
In this introduction I will elaborate these two problems further and situate my thesis as a
response to them.
Derrida claimed in 1994 that deconstruction is 'literally the most ethical and political
way of taking seriously what is implied by the very concepts of decision and responsibility.'1
In another interview given three years earlier he stated that deconstruction follows an
exigency 'without [which], in my view no ethico-political question has any chance of being
opened up or awakened today' [Poi 364 / 375]. Yet many commentators have refused to
accept that his work is political at all. The form of this misunderstanding is set out clearly by
Geoffrey Bennington, whose Legislations: The Politics ofDeconstruction contains detailed
refutations of many of these attacks.2 More recently, Morag Patrick's Derrida,
Responsibility and Politics has updated this defence.3 As Bennington suggests in his most
recent book, 'the political demand made of Derrida by a variety of commentators is the
demand for the concept "politics" to be placed in the very transcendental position it is self-
righteously supposed to reduce and explain, but to which it remains blind.'4 From Derrida's
1 'Nietzsche and the Machine.' Interview with Richard Beardsworth. cited in Morag
Patrick. Derrida, Responsibility and Politics. Aldershot: Ashgate, 1997. 141.
2 Geoffrey Bennington. Legislations: The Politics ofDeconstruction. London: Verso,
1993.
3
Morag Patrick, op. cit.; see also 'Excess and Responsibility: Derrida's Ethico-
Political Thinking.' Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology, vol.28 no.2 (1997).
160-177.
4
Geoffrey Bennington. Interrupting Derrida. London: Routledge, 2000. 19-20.
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point of view, not only is the deconstructive questioning of politics neither a simple rejection
of politics nor a rejection of the tradition of political thought, but it is the necessary
precondition for thinking about politics at all. My aim in this thesis is to evaluate this claim.
This project can be helpfully broken down into two subsidiary questions: 'how is
deconstruction political?'; 'what does deconstruction have to say about politics?'
By taking seriously the first of these questions and reading deconstruction as a
political practice in its own terms, I propose to answer the second question. This means
engaging with the politics of deconstruction at a level denied to those who, like Thomas
McCarthy and Simon Critchley, have condemned deconstruction for being unable to give
rise to a political practice. McCarthy, following closely the attack on Derrida made by
JUrgen Habermas in his Philosophical Discourse ofModernity, argues that Derrida's work
— while broadly political in scope — can only give rise to a 'politics of the ineffable.'5 He
takes what he calls 'Derrida's withdrawal from the specificity of politics or of empirical
social research' to be evidence of a retreat to theology or mysticism.6 Derrida's key terms are
'elastic,' 'vague' and 'ambiguous' and his 'notion of a "grammar" of responsibility is at best
an airy abstraction.'7 Having reduced Derrida's work to a 'philosophicopolitical' programme
or system, McCarthy wonders: 'is it the case, as Nancy Fraser has put it, that the politics of
deconstruction amounts to little more than the deconstruction of politics?'8 The interest of
McCarthy's thesis here is that Simon Critchley, a less impatient reader of Derrida's work,
reaches essentially the same conclusion in his Ethics ofDeconstruction, asking 'is there not
5
Jurgen Habermas. The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, trans. Frederick
Lawrence. Oxford: Blackwell, 1987. 161-210.
6 Thomas McCarthy. 'The Politics of The Ineffable: Derrida's Deconstructionism.'
in Ideals and Illusions: Deconstruction and Reconstruction in Critical Theory. Cambridge,
MA: MIT, 1991.91-117. 115.
7 'The Politics of the Ineffable.' 118; 116.
8 'The Politics of the Ineffable.' 106-7. The article by Nancy Fraser to which
McCarthy refers is 'The French Derrideans: Politicizing Deconstruction or Deconstructing
Politics.' New German Critique 33 (1984). 127-154.; Bill Readings replies to Fraser in 'The
Deconstruction of Politics.' in Lindsay Waters and Wlad Godzich eds. Reading de Man
Reading. Minneapolis: U ofMinnesota P, 1989. 223-243.
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an implicit refusal of the ontic, the factical, and the empirical— that is to say, of the space of
doxa, where politics takes place in a field of antagonism, decision, dissension and struggle?
In this sense, might one not ultimately speak of a refusal of politics in Derrida's work?' [ED
200]. This argument is circular. Critchley and McCarthy are only able to condemn
deconstruction for failing to generate a political practice by presuming a distinction between
theory and practice which is unsustainable from Derrida's perspective. It is only once we
appreciate deconstruction as a political practice in and of itself, I suggest, that we can
evaluate the contribution to be made by deconstruction to political theory.
The second problem to which my thesis responds is methodological. If we take
seriously Derrida's problematization of the relationship between singularity and the general,
we can neither reduce his work to the expression of some fundamental thesis of
deconstruction nor consider it to be a set of absolutely heterogeneous and singular
operations. It has become common, following Rodolphe Gasche's influential The Tain ofthe
Mirror: Deconstruction and the Philosophy of Reflection, to consider Derrida's work in
terms of a quasi-systematicity which recognises this problem. On this account Derrida's texts
form a series of interventions in particular contexts in which much the same thing happens
each time; the texts throw up a series of apparently transcendental terms on the basis of
which it is possible to rethink traditional philosophical problems, but which also put their
own transcendental status into question. Gasche calls these terms 'infrastructures' but it has
become more usual to refer to them as 'quasi-transcendentals.'9 The difficulty of this
approach is that it can only accommodate a rather reductive sense of the internal historicity
of Derrida's work. As Derrida insists in his 'Remarks on Deconstruction and Pragmatism,'
9
Rodolphe Gasche. The Tain of the Mirror. Cambridge MA: Harvard UP, 1986.
Reviewed by Geoffrey Bennington in 'Deconstruction and the Philosophers (The Very
Idea).' Legislations. 11-60. Bennington's own quasi-systematic reading of Derrida is set out
in 'Derridabase' in Geoffrey Bennington & Jacques Derrida. Jacques Derrida. Chicago: U
Chicago P, 1994.; Gasche supplements his account with Inventions of Difference: On
Jacques Derrida. Cambridge MA: Harvard UP, 1994.; also reviewed by Geoffrey
Bennington. 'Genuine Gasche (Perhaps).' in Interrupting Derrida. 165-171.
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his earlier work is a necessary precondition for later developments; this should serve to
remind us that deconstruction is also an attempt to take seriously the empirical historical
inscription of any theoretical discourse. For Gasche, the development ofDerrida's work is to
be considered at best contingent to its philosophical rigour, and at worst in teleological
terms; we can only understand the later work on the basis of the earlier texts in which
Derrida's own philosophical inheritance is more explicit. However, Derrida himself— and
this remains entirely consistent with his rejection of teleology— has insisted that his earlier
'more academic or philosophically more reassuring' texts were an 'irreversibly necessary
condition' for what followed; their necessity however is not logical, that of 'a fundamental or
foundational' condition [DaP 79]. Rather, I suggest, we should read Derrida's work in the
manner in which he reads. By suspending the traditional or metaphysical conception of the
history of an author's work — in which the work unfolds a central thesis or applies a
method; in which the earlier work prepares for the later or in which the later work occludes
the profound insights of the earlier; in terms of decisive breaks or revisions — we must
develop other ways of assessing the development, the mutations and the continuities, of the
discursive strategies within his work.10 This requires careful attention not only to the
systematicity of the texts, but also a persistent attention to the features of each work which
resist incorporation into such a history.
Moreover, by reducing the occasion of Derrida's work to the philosophical issue to
which he refers, Gasche obliterates any sense of a connection between Derrida's work and its
other contexts. While there can be no question of reducing Derrida's work to a symptomatic
expression or product of a particular political context, recognising the internal heterogeneity
and planes of consistency of that work must include some sense both of the relationship each
text negotiates with the other works signed by Derrida and of those so-called external
10 See for example Derrida's discussion of the concept of history in Positions, trans.
Alan Bass. London: Athlone, 1987. 56-60.
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(political, social, historical) contexts which are inscribed into Derrida's work as the occasion
for each text. Richard Beardsworth's Derrida and the Political is a good example of the
pitfalls of a relatively systematic and philosophical approach." As Bennington has argued,
the clarity and authority of Beardsworth's argument is bought at the price of a number of key
reductive decisions, and deconstruction is reduced to a set of somewhat mystifying theses
about 'the aporia of time.'12 Moreover, for Beardsworth deconstruction appears to be largely
a philosophical response to philosophical problems, as the dialectical resolution of a set of
political antinomies between Kant and Hegel, and between Heidegger and Levinas.
Yet a brief consideration of the performative context of even a short text such as
'History of the Lie: Prolegomena' suggests that its political dimension extends beyond the
philosophical.13 Aside from its more typical Derridean concerns — with the relationship
between the concepts of history and truth, with Nietzsche, with the fable, with performative
or illocutionary force, with secrecy and testimony — the essay is directly linked to some
central concerns of Politics of Friendship and can be read as a lengthy gloss on some
elliptical comments made in the final chapter on 'history qua fraternization, which begins in
a non-truth and should end up making non-truth true [...] a history of truth. A matter, more
precisely, of a trial of verification, qua the history of a becoming-true of illusion' [PoF 274 /
305], Nor can the public performance and subsequent publication of the paper, or the
broadcast of a radio interview extending the discussion, be strictly demarcated from the
political context written into the paper.14 Presented in New York, and published in the
Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal of the New School for Social Research, the paper
locates itself in a series of texts concerned with the truth written or published in New York:
11 Richard Beardsworth. Derrida and the Political. London: Routledge, 1997.
12 Geoffrey Bennington. 'Emergencies.' in Interrupting Derrida. 172-179.
13
Jacques Derrida. 'History of the Lie: Prolegomena.' Graduate Faculty Philosophy
Journal, vol. 19 no.2 / vol. 20 no. 1 (1997). 129-161.
14 'Du mensonge en politique.' Interview with Antoine Spire, in Sur Parole:
Instantanes Philosophiques. Paris: l'aube, 1999. 91-114.
14
an essay on truth and politics by Alexandre Koyre written in exile during the Second World
War; Hannah Arendt's 'Truth and Politics,' published in the New Yorker, an inaccurate
article published in the New York Times accusing Derrida and other French intellectuals of a
failure to acknowledge the 'truth' of the persecution of Jews in Vichy France; a letter in
response to this article which draws attention to Derrida's signature on a petition to President
Mitterand calling for precisely such a public recognition of French responsibility for these
crimes. As Derrida himself argued on another occasion against similar accusations, 'the text
is always a field of forces, heterogeneous, differential, open [...]. That's why deconstructive
readings and writings are [...] also effective or active (as one says) interventions, in
particular, political and institutional interventions.'15 Given both the internal historicity and
the performative force of Derrida's texts as political interventions, we should not be too
quick to conclude where their philosophical or political significance lies.
There are generally three strategies available when considering a concept such as
'responsibility' in Derrida's work. The first is to locate Derrida's treatment of the concept
alongside a set of previous philosophical responses to the same problem within the
philosophical tradition that Derrida appears to be working in; the second is to compare or
relate his work to philosophical contexts to which he does not explicitly refer; the third
assumes that his work advances more-or-less philosophical arguments which can be
abstracted from a particular context and repeated independently of the project of reading
within which they may have arisen. Keith Peterson's reading of Derrida's work on
responsibility and decision in relation to Hegel, Nietzsche and Heidegger fits the first model;
15
Jacques Derrida. 'But Beyond... (Open Letter to Anne McClintock and Rob
Nixon).' trans. Peggy Kamuf. Critical Inquiry 13 (1986). 155-170. 168. Derrida is
responding to McClintock and Nixon's attack on him in 'No Name Apart: The Separation of
Word and History in Derrida's "Le Dernier Mot du Racisme.'" Critical Inquiry. 13 (1986).
140-154., itself prompted by the publication of 'Racism's Last Word.' trans. Peggy Kamuf in
Critical Inquiry. 12 (1985). 290-299.
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Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe's attempt to relate Derrida on responsibility to
Wittgenstein on decision and rule-following fits the second; Geoffrey Bennington's work on
unpacking Derrida's 'deceptively simple' arguments tends towards the third.16 None of these
strategies is in itself inappropriate; in combination with each other they can yield powerful
and perceptive responses. In this thesis I have tended to follow the third strategy, with some
consideration of the other two; but by balancing these with a sense of the internal historicity
and performative context and address of Derrida's work I have attempted to generate a
distinctive response to the question of the politics of deconstruction.
In my first chapter, by focusing on the change of use of the term deconstruction
between 'Letter to a Japanese Friend' (1982) and 'Force of Law' (1991) and Politics of
Friendship (1994), I draw attention to the political mutation within the trajectory of
Derrida's work in order to make available an approach which does not reduce the political
dimension of Derrida's work either to the expression of some fundamental law or insight, or
to the political translation of differance.'7 Furthermore, I seek to emphasise the relative
heterogeneity of Derrida's texts by comparing two different accounts of democracy-to-come
available within his work, and on this basis argue that the politics of deconstruction does not
end in 'democracy-to-come,' but that this must itself be only a provisional and polemical
moment in a broader argument concerning the nature of politics. This leads in turn to a wider
contextualisation in chapter two of both the shift in deconstruction in its development as a
political practice, and of the implied concept of politics. I take Derrida's seminar on
16 Keith Peterson. 'Derrida's Responsibility.' Journal of the British Society for
Phenomenology, vol. 28 no.3 (1997) 287-303.; Ernesto Laclau & Chantal Mouffe.
Hegemony & Socialist Strategy. London: Verso, 1986. Derrida and Wittgenstein are also
compared in Henry Staten. Wittgenstein andDerrida. Lincoln: U Nebraska P, 1984., Samuel
C. Wheeler, Deconstruction as Analytic Philosophy. Stanford: Stanford UP, 2000. and
Martin Stone. 'Wittgenstein on Deconstruction.' in Alice Cracy & Rupert Read eds. The
New Wittgenstein. London: Routledge, 2000. 83-117.; 'deceptively simple' is Bennington's
comment in Interrupting Derrida. 25. It would however serve just as well for Bennington's
work as for Derrida's.
17 Leonard Lawlor takes this approach in 'Political Risks: On Derrida's Notion of
Differance.' Research in Phenomenology, vol. XXI (1991). 81-96.
16
nationalism and philosophy as a nominal or exemplary starting point and suggest something
of the consistency of Derrida's concern with the problem of philosophy and nationalism. On
the basis of this analysis of deconstruction as political practice, in chapter three I develop my
own analysis of the contribution deconstruction has to offer to political theory, while in
chapter four I suggest that this is a more convincing way to approach the politics of
deconstruction than that offered by ethical categories. The key text throughout is Politics of
Friendship. I do not attempt to argue for the centrality of this text in Derrida's recent work
— although I think such an argument might be convincingly made — but take it as a
provisional starting point. In choosing to focus on a particular period within the development
of Derrida's work, and to focus on those texts which contribute most to the analysis of the
theme with which I am concerned my argument risks circularity; but I take this to be a
necessary risk, and a risk that may be the chance of a productive reading — a reading that
manages to follow without repeating.18 Even if we must not try to predict the coming of the
other, we must prepare for it as best we can, writes Derrida in 'Psyche: Inventions of the
Other': 'Letting the other come is not an inertia open to anything whatsoever [...]. But one
does not make the other come, one lets it come by preparing for its coming.' In this sense, I
can only hope that my thesis will be itself deconstructive; since the other cannot be invented,
'the initiative or deconstructive inventiveness can consist only in opening, in uncloseting,
destabilizing foreclusionary structures so as to allow for the passage toward the other' [PSY
55 /53; 60/60],
18 See Paul Davies' comments on David Woods' The Deconstruction of Time.
Atlantic Highlands: Humanities P, 1989. in his review "'Postdeconstructive Temporal







At its broadest, Derrida's principal concern in Politics ofFriendship is 'to think and live
a friendship, a politics, a justice' [PoF 105 / 128]. Considered more narrowly, the book is an
investigation of the traditional conception of friendship in political philosophy. A historical
survey of texts by several major political thinkers, from Plato and Aristotle to Jean-Luc
Nancy, via Cicero, Augustine, Montaigne, Nietzsche and Carl Schmitt, amongst others, is
interwoven with a discussion and analysis of the recurrent structure and limits of the concept
of friendship in their work. On a third level, and in its most modest formulation, Derrida's
aim is merely to ask 'what is meant when one says "brother", when someone is called
"brother."' He is 'wondering [demanded that's all, and request[s] [demande] that it be asked
\demande\, what the implicit politics of this language is' [PoF 305 / 339], On the basis of the
first statement I have offered of his concerns, Politics ofFriendship would appear to be the
nearest Derrida's work will have got to being political philosophy as we usually understand
it— that is if we could ever be sure that this concern wasn't precisely the inspiration behind
18
all his books. However we would then have to account for the two refinements of this aim I
have suggested. What kind of political thought can be organised around the category of
friendship? How can an analysis of the 'implicit politics' of language lead us to 'a politics, a
justice'? Moreover, what are we to make of Derrida's provocative and apparently monstrous
identification of deconstruction with democracy itself? For in one of those scandalous
passages that has come to characterise one of the voices of his work over the last twenty
years, Derrida remarks that there is a 'self-deconstructive [auto-deconstructrice\ force in the
very motif of democracy, the possibility and the duty for democracy itself to de-limit itself.
Democracy is the autos of deconstructive self-limitation [auto-delimitationY [PoF 105 /
128], On the one hand, deconstruction is to be found at work within democracy; on the other,
democracy itself is already inscribed within deconstruction. Or as Derrida puts it in more
telegraphic fashion: 'no deconstruction without democracy, no democracy without
deconstruction' [PoF 105 / 128], My aim in this chapter is to evaluate this claim.
Even to someone who is acquainted with Derrida's work such a claim for
'deconstruction' may seem surprising. In an interview with Richard Kearney conducted in
1981 Derrida comments that 'I have never succeeded in directly relating deconstruction to
existing political codes and programmes.'1 Not only did Derrida refuse to elaborate his own
understanding of the political implications of his writing for many years, but the word
'deconstruction' itself has a complex history, and he has regularly refused to grant any
particular privilege to 'deconstruction' as a description of his work. In a famous attempt to
come to terms with the word 'deconstruction' itself, his 'Letter to a Japanese friend' dated 10
July 1983, Derrida expresses a certain amount of dissatisfaction with the word
'deconstruction.' It 'imposed itself upon me' [LJF 270 / 388], Derrida complains, and 'has
never appeared satisfactory to me' [LJF 272 / 390]: 'I do not think, [...] that it is a good
1 'Deconstruction and the Other.' Richard Kearney. Dialogues with Contemporary
Continental Thinkers. Manchester: Manchester UP, 1984. 119.
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word' [LJF 275 / 392]. More importantly, Derrida suggests that it is only one word amongst
others: 'For me, for what I have tried and still try to write, the word has interest only within a
certain context, where it replaces and lets itself be determined by such other words as
"ecriture," "trace," "difference," "supplement," "hymen," "pharmakon," "marge," "entame,"
"parergon," etc. By definition the list can never be closed' [LJF 275 / 392]. All these words
— which Rodolphe Gasche labels 'infrastructures' in his The Tain ofthe Mirror and which it
has become commonplace to call 'quasi-transcendentals' — operate within particular texts of
Derrida's in broadly comparable ways. 'Deconstruction' is one word amongst the others on
the list, rather than the transcendental guarantor of the list's identity. 'Deconstruction' is an
example of 'the trace' as much as 'the trace' is an example of 'deconstruction.' So in coming
to terms with Derrida's understanding of the relationship between deconstruction and
democracy, we will not only have to account for his use of 'democracy,' but also his use of
'deconstruction.' That his identification of the two occurs in the course of a 'genealogical
deconstruction of the political (and through it to the democratic), [through which] one would
seek to think, interpret and implement another politics, another democracy' [PoF 104 / 128]
has the consequence that: 'at stake would thus be a deconstruction of the genealogical
schema, a paradoxical deconstruction — a deconstruction at once genealogical and a-
genealogical, of the genealogical' [PoF 105 / 128]. In other words, neither democracy nor
deconstruction can escape their encounter unscathed.
To approach Derrida's statement, a preliminary sketch of the ways he has employed
the word 'deconstruction' will be helpful. If we follow Derrida's account in his 'Letter to a
Japanese friend' we can broadly distinguish three areas of meaning for 'deconstruction.'
Derrida reminds us that deconstruction is first of all a translation of two prominent words in
the philosophy of Martin Heidegger, Abbau and Destruktion [LJF 270 / 388].2 In Of
2 This relationship is analysed extensively in Rodolphe Gasche. The Tain of the
Mirror: Derrida and the Philosophy of Reflection. Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1986. ch.7
'Abbau, Destruktion, Deconstruction.' 109-20.
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Grammatology for example, Derrida speaks of 'deconstruction' when he describes his own
work, with that of Nietzsche and Heidegger, as 'inhabiting [...] in a certain way'' the
concepts ofWestern thought [Gra 24 / 39], While Derrida rarely appears as closely allied to
Heidegger as he does in Of Grammatology we cannot ignore the fact that the word
'deconstruction' must remain marked with at least a minimal reference to its translation from
the work of Heidegger.3 Indeed translations of Heidegger into both French and English now
use the term without any reference to Derrida.4 Secondly, as in the passage I have already
quoted, deconstruction can be considered as simply one in a series of terms which Derrida
has made use of in his work. Some are borrowed from other texts, some are neologisms
suggested by the structure which Derrida has found at work in the text under consideration.
However Derrida himself has often used deconstruction as a convenient name of this series
of terms, as a label for his work as a whole. Yet it is not to be considered 'an analysis or a
critique,'' nor a 'method'an act or an operation' [LJF 273 / 390-1]. Instead, and this the
third meaning, and the one to which Derrida will attach most importance, deconstruction is
what happens: 'deconstruction takes place everywhere it [qa\ takes place, where there is
something (and is not therefore limited to meaning or the text in the current and bookish
sense of the word)' [LJF 274 / 391], On this model, deconstruction can be the name both for
the object (what happens) and (somewhat abusively) the work which seeks to describe this
object (with an essential reference to Heidegger). A further complication is only alluded to in
this text, but developed at length contemporaneously in Memoires for Paul de Man, lectures
written after de Man's death in 1983.5 This is the fact that deconstruction had also become
3 See also Derrida's comments in The Ear of the Other. Christie McDonald ed.
Lincoln: Nebraska UP., 1985. 86-7.
4 For example Reiner Schiirmann uses 'deconstruction' freely to refer to Heidegger's
work throughout From Principles to Anarchy: Heidegger on Being and Acting trans.
Christine-Marie Gros & Reiner Schtirmann. Bloomington: Indiana UP, 1990., although he
presumably attributes Derrida's use of the word to his 'undeniable talent for gleaning
catchwords from Heidegger.' 352-3n.l7.
3
Jacques Derrida. Memoires for Paul de Man. trans. Cecile Lindsay et. al. New
York: Columbia UP, 1986. 15-8; 73-4; 84; 120-2.
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by this time the name for a diverse body of academic discourses, particularly in the United
States, with varying degrees of attachment to Derrida's own work.6 While Derrida
occasionally distances his own work from that of'deconstruction' in this sense, he has never
disavowed his influence, and in 'Some Statements and Truisms...' he comes to terms with
the 'necessary' academic and institutional formalization of his work as 'deconstructionism'
or a 'philosophy of deconstruction' [SST 88-9].
Given this complex linguistic background, the use of deconstruction in the statement
'no democracy without deconstruction,' as in the related claim that 'deconstruction is
justice' [FoL 15 / 35. Emphasis only in French] appears somewhat ambiguous, to say the
least. It might certainly be said to add a new dimension to our understanding of the word
'deconstruction.' My hypothesis is that this apparent change in use of the word might be
profitably linked to two other significant mutations in Derrida's work. Firstly it can be
compared with an increasingly explicit thematic attention to overtly political questions.
There is a qualitative shift between Derrida's political work prior to the period 1 am
interested in — focused largely around the question of the proper name7 and the institution
of the university — and essays such as those on Nelson Mandela and racism collected in
Psyche (1987) or the project of his seminar on philosophy and nationalism (1983-7). This
shift towards political themes culminates in the publication of Politics ofFriendship in 1994,
which recapitulates and develops many of the concerns of this period in Derrida's work.
Secondly, Derrida's attitude towards his own role as a public intellectual appears to have
changed. Despite a reticence earlier in his career to even allow photographs of himself to be
6 The case of Paul de Man's work is perhaps the most complex. As Rodolphe Gasche
points out, de Man seems closest to Derrida when he is not using the word 'deconstruction'
and furthest from him when he is. The Wild Card ofReading: On Paul de Man. Cambridge:
Harvard UP, 1998. 22.
7 See for example 'Ou commence et comment finit un corps enseignant.' in
D.Grisoni ed. Politiques de la Philosophie. Paris: Grasset, 1976. [DP 111-145] and
'Otobiographies: the teaching of Nietzsche and the politics of the proper name.' (1979) in
The Ear ofthe Other. Christie McDonald ed. Lincoln: Nebraska UP, 1985. 3-38.
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published, since the middle of the 1980s Derrida has appeared regularly to give interviews
on radio and television, as well as in newspapers and scholarly journals, three volumes of
which have been published since Positions (1972): Points de Suspensions (1992),
Echographies: de la television (1996), Sur Parole (1999). Derrida's political interventions,
which had previously been largely focused on the educational establishment,8 have expanded
to include public debate on a wide variety of issues. These political activities cannot be
considered as simply extrinsic, or contingent to the political development of Derrida's work.
To reduce Derrida's work to a set of theses and then claim to deduce its politics on that basis,
as Thomas McCarthy does, must miss the extent to which the politics of deconstruction are
bound up with its form and practice.9 As Geoffrey Bennington has suggested, we should read
Derrida's 'more or less visible interventions in concrete political situations' as 'not merely
the circumstantial acts of a philosopher elsewhere, and more importantly, developing
theories or knowledge, but continuous with each act of deconstruction from the start.'10
Derrida has been insisting on this since beginning his 1968 paper 'The Ends of Man' with
the axiom that 'every philosophical colloquium necessarily has a political significance'
[MAR 111 / 131]. In an interview in 1977 Derrida affirmed this claim: 'philosophical activity
does not require a political practice; it is, in any case, a political practice' [Poi 69-70 / 74],
Deconstruction must be understood as both a philosophico-political practice that implies a
correlative theory and as a philosophico-political theory whose elaboration is coterminous
with its consequent political practice. Derrida's provocative identification of deconstruction
with democracy will open up this discussion.
8
Many texts relating to these activities were collected in Du droit a la philosophic.
Paris: Galilee, 1990.
9 Thomas McCarthy. 'The Politics of The Ineffable: Derrida's Deconstructionism.'
Ideals and Illusions: On Reconstruction and Deconstruction in Critical Theory. Cambridge,
MA.: MIT, 1991.97-119.
10 Geoffrey Bennington. Interrupting Derrida. London: Routledge, 2000. 33.
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But while this claim in Politics ofFriendship is certainly startling, the reference to
democracy is by no means an isolated case in Derrida's work, at least since his reference to
'the form of democracy' in 'The Ends of Man' [Mar 113-4 / 134-5]. Throughout the texts
surrounding Politics of Friendship there are insistent references to democracy, and
'democracy-to-come': for example in The Other Heading [OH 78 / 76], 'Remarks on
Deconstruction and Pragmatism' [DaP 83-5], Du Droit a la philosophic [DP 70-1] and
Specters ofMarx [SoM 169 / 269], In fact, Derrida offers at least two apparently divergent
approaches to the concept of democracy. In order to respect the heterogeneity of these texts,
and for clarity, I will look at these two arguments separately. The first is the question of
'democracy-to-come' which dominates Politics of Friendship. In the first section of this
chapter, I will set out the main framework of that book, focusing in turn on the concept of
friendship and its relation to the analysis of democracy, and on what Derrida calls
'democracy-to-come' as a re-writing of differance. In the second section I will look at
Derrida's association of democracy with literature and its relation to the problem of
censorship, his analysis of the secret, and his concern with the distinction between the public
and the private sphere. In the third section I will make a provisional assessment of the utility
of Derrida's work on democracy by contrasting it with the radical democratic theory of
Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe. Does deconstruction finish in democracy? Is Derrida's
appeal to 'democracy-to-come' to be considered an end to the question of the politics of
deconstruction, the political product or outcome of Derrida's thought? Or is democracy
perhaps a familiar name on an unfamiliar path; not a necessary conclusion to the
deconstructive project but an example in an ongoing argument concerning the very nature of
politics? When Claude Lefort gave a paper to Phillipe Lacoue-Labarthe and Jean-Luc
Nancy's Centre for Philosophical Research on the Political in 1980 he threw out this
challenge addressed to his audience, which included Derrida: 'How can they handle
ontological differences with such subtlety, vie with one another in exploiting the combined
resources of Heidegger, Lacan, Jakobson and Levi-Strauss, and then fall back upon such
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crass realism when the question of politics arises? [...] They are unable to discern freedom in
democracy, because democracy is defined as bourgeois. They are unable to discern servitude
in totalitarianism.'11 If we understand Politics ofFriendship as Derrida's belated response to
Lefort, what sort of a response would it be?
1.2 Deconstruction and 'Democracy-to-come'
NOT ONLY DOES Politics ofFriendship contain the most extended analysis of 'democracy-to-
come' in Derrida's work, but the book as a whole can be read as being determined by the
relationship between democracy and friendship. In The Nicomachean Ethics it is friendship
which forms the junction for Aristotle between the question of justice and that of the proper
constitution of the city, between ethics and politics. It is there that democracy is famously
characterised as a political association modelled on the friendship between brothers [NE
209-10], Such an analogy is in no way neutral in Derrida's view, and he seeks to develop the
possibility of another reading of politics, of friendship and democracy, which would escape
the rhetoric of brotherhood, and what he calls the logic of fraternization. To understand and
assess the claim being made by Derrida we need to consider: his account of friendship and
fraternity; the relationship between friendship and democracy; his account of justice as a
political translation of differance; and the consequences for thinking about politics — or in
other words, what exactly Derrida means by 'democracy-to-come.'
11 Claude Lefort. 'The Question ofDemocracy.' in Democracy and Political Theory.
trans. David Macey. Oxford: Blackwell, 1986. 10.
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1.2.1 Friendship and Fraternization
Politics ofFriendship is structured by a discussion of the concept of friendship in the history
ofWestern philosophy. The focus of Derrida's argument is the continuity within the concept
of friendship from its canonical formulation in Aristotle to contemporary accounts such as
those of Bataille and Blanchot, and crucially, through and in spite of the apparent break in
the tradition inaugurated by Nietzsche. For Derrida this reversal is encapsulated in Human,
All Too Human when Nietzsche overturns the famous aphorism, attributed to Aristotle, 'O
my friends, there is no friend': 'Enemies, there is no enemy! shout I, the living fool.'12
However, for Derrida, this apparent reversal is not what it seems to be. Attempting to
overturn the established values and hierarchies ofWestern thought, Nietzsche succeeds only
in unveiling the conditions of possibility which have always governed and conditioned that
thought: 'Nietzsche's upheaval would [...] interrupt less than recall (and call again for) a
rupture already inscribed in the speech it interrupts' [PoF 27 / 45]. The significance of
Nietzsche's work in Politics ofFriendship is not that it introduces something absolutely new
to the tradition of thinking about friendship, but that it exposes a structure that has always
been present within that tradition, in this case, the reversibility of the relationship between
friend and enemy. Or, as Derrida describes it, a friend could not be my friend if he was not,
at least potentially, capable of being my enemy: 'the two concepts (friend/enemy)
consequently intersect and ceaselessly change places' [PoF 72 / 91]. In his essay 'Force of
Law' Derrida asserts that 'deconstruction is generally practiced in two ways [...]. One takes
on the demonstrative and apparently ahistorical allure of logico-formal paradoxes. The other,
more historical [...], seems to proceed through readings of texts, meticulous interpretations
and genealogies' [FoL 20 / 48]: here the name of Nietzsche stands for the focal point at
12 Friedrich Nietzsche. Human, All Too Human, trans. Marion Faber with Stephen
Lehmann. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1994. § 376 'About Friends.'194.
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which the structural analysis of the conditions of possibility and impossibility of the concept
of friendship intersects and interrupts the empirical history of the development of that
concept within Western philosophy.
The classical model from which Derrida begins is that of Aristotle. Yet he argues
that Aristotle's very definition of friendship is already on the verge of contradiction. For on
the one hand it is characterised by the value of reciprocity [NE 194] and equality [NE 200-1;
202-3] between those men who resemble each other [NE 196-7]. These values of equality,
reciprocity and resemblance will also found both justice and the state [NE 192-3, 207-8],
The highest form of friendship is that founded on virtue rather than pleasure or utility, and on
equality; this reciprocity distinguishes true friendship from that found in the relationship
between father and son, man and wife, ruler and subject or elder and younger [NE 203], Yet
on the other hand, Aristotle's account of friendship is interrupted by elements which threaten
the very possibility of this equality in friendship. Firstly, because for Aristotle friendship is
defined by the act of being friends with someone rather than by that of being befriended.
Friendship is active. Yet friendship by definition continues in the absence of the friend, even
in the event of their death. On the basis of a brief reference in the Eudemian, but not the
Nichomachean, Ethics, Derrida finds within Aristotle what he (Derrida) had been saying
about friendship since Memoires for Paul de Man: that the possibility of the death of the
friend inhabits the possibility of friendship itself.13 If friendship is always a priori potentially
asymmetrical, since my dead friend can never return my friendship, could there ever actually
be a perfect friendship [PoF 12-13 / 28-29]? This brings in the second moment of
disturbance in Aristotle's account. Friendship is premised on wishing the best for the friend,
but the very best would be for the friend to become a God. [NE 204-5], Three problems
follow from this: a God cannot be a friend, because of his absolute remoteness; friendship is
predicated on loving the other as he is and therefore depends on his remaining human; God
13
Jacques Derrida. Memoires. 28-9.
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needs no friend because he is self-sufficient [PoF 222-3], On this account too, even the
concept of perfect friendship would be impossible, because self-contradictory. If friendship
founded on equality is impossible, then friendship must always be irreducibly
dissymmetrical.
On this basis Derrida argues that the Greek model of friendship will always already
be inhabited by a more Judeo-Christian model: 'a problematic scansion [...] would have
introduced dissymmetry, separation and infinite distance in a Greek philla which did not
tolerate them but nevertheless called for them'' [PoF 232], Or in other words that 'the
philosophical horizon ofphilia [...] carries in its determination, in the very form of its finity
qua horizon, the potential but inexorable injunction of its infinitization, and hence also that
of its Christianization' [PoF 233], To grasp the full implications of Derrida's argument it is
important to stress this dynamic within the text. Derrida 'will not follow Nietzsche,' he
notes, nor 'Nietzsche's sons' [PoF 33 / 51]. On this basis, Derrida's concerns about
friendship would apply at least as much to the work of his post-Nietzschean contemporaries
Bataille, Blanchot, Levinas and Nancy as to Aristotle and Montaigne. Both the final section
of the book, and several explicit comments within the text make this clear [PoF 293-305 /
325-38; 46n.l5 / 56-7n.l], So 1 cannot agree with John Caputo who asserts that Derrida's
model is 'largely inspired by [...] his Jewish friends' Levinas and Blanchot.'4 Simon
Critchley's account of the text is similarly misleading since he attributes 'a crucial place in
[the] exposition and argumentation' of Politics of Friendship to Blanchot.15 Similarly,
Derrida's analysis would apply to both the Greco-Roman and the Judeo-Christian model of
friendship. A crucial change between the earliest versions of the text and its final publication
reinforces this point. Discussing the rupture in the concept of friendship, what is phrased as a
14 John Caputo. 'Who is Derrida's Zarathustra? Of Fraternity, Friendship, and a
Democracy to Come.' Research in Phenomenology, vol. XXIX (1999). 184. cf. also 189;
190; 197. Of course, Blanchot is not Jewish.
15 See Simon Critchley. 'The Other's Decision in Me.' in Ethics—Politics—
Subjectivity. London: Verso, 1999. 254-286.
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question in the earlier texts — 'shall one say that this fracture is Judeo-Christian?' [PoF(a)
644; PoF(b) 385] — becomes a statement: 'one can no longer speak here of a simple fracture
and say that it is Judaeo-Christian' [PoF 293 / 325],
What the thought of this fracture — the necessary asymmetry within friendship —
exposes is twofold. The texts on friendship, Derrida argues, are opened up to two recurrent
questions of number. The first, which responds to the paradox that 'true' (equal) friendship is
impossible, or nearly impossible, is that the texts tend to refer to a very few, legendary
friendships from which to define the conditions of friendship as such. The second is that
friendship is by definition exclusive. The paradigmatic experience of friendship, Derrida
suggests, can be seen to be determined by what he calls 'the question of number': as both the
necessity of enumerating or counting friends, and as an implicit limit to the number of
friends 1 can have. Since friendship is always defined by the act of loving, being loved is not
enough to qualify as friendship. Conversely there must be a limit to the number of people I
can (actively) love. In the Eudemian Ethics Aristotle argues that 'it is not possible for
affection to be active in relation to many at once' since it takes time to test a friendship, and
friendship is an experience reserved for humans (not immortals).16 As an active experience,
friendship is by definition an exclusive experience. I cannot be friends with everyone,
Derrida explains, 'one must choose and prefer: election and selection between friends and
things, but also between possible friends' [PoF 19 / 37], This shows up in the canonical
discourses as a recurrent question: how many friends can be true friends, how many friends
can one have? However, even if any actual (finite) friendship would be exclusive, in theory
at least, I could be friends with anyone. Derrida seeks to separate out this possibility in
friendship from its exclusive aspect, even though he knows they are inexorably connected.
What would it mean to think what Derrida calls aimance, an experience of friendship which
16 Aristotle. The Athenian Constitution, The Eudemian Ethics, On Virtues and Vices.
trans. H Rackham. Loeb Classical Library, London: Heinemann, 1935. 387.
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eluded the distinction between active and passive? This would have to be a relation without
distinction, without the exclusion of those who are not my friends. Aimance would be a
quasi-transcendental condition of friendship, a relationality prior to any activation or
instantiation in the act of befriending. The grammatical form of aimance recalls Derrida's
famous neologism 'differance,' and in his essay of that name we find the comment that: 'that
which lets itself be designated by "differance" is neither simply active nor simply passive,
but announces or rather recalls something like the middle voice, that it speaks of an
operation which is not an operation, which lets itself be thought neither as a passion nor as
an object of a subject upon an objectf...]' [Mar 9 / 9]. Aimance would be something like a
middle voice of friendship.17
Friendship for Derrida is split between these two contradictory moments. Friendship,
as election by decision, is made possible by the multiplicity of possible friends amongst
whom I choose, with whom 1 am already in a relationship of neither active or passive
affection, but aimance; but I betray this multiplicity of possible friends by preferring my
friends, even by calling them friends. The necessity of this betrayal and exclusion is what
Derrida calls the logic of fraternization, and which he claims dictates the relationship
between friendship and brotherhood. To understand the significance of fraternization for
Derrida and its consequences, we need to bear in mind his thought of responsibility. This
begins with what Geoffrey Bennington calls 'a deceptively simple' argument which I will
summarise briefly here.18 Responsibility, Derrida argues, is only responsible if it is not the
unfolding of a program or the following of a set pattern: that would simply be obeying a rule,
and in doing so I could disavow responsibility— I would only be obeying orders, rather than
acting in my own name. Yet as soon as I determine a course of action I must betray some
others, and the infinity of others — T cannot respond to the call, the request, the obligation,
17 See John Llewelyn's discussion of the middle voice in Derrida on the Threshold




or even the love of another without sacrificing the other other, the other others' [GoD 68 /
98]. I am destined to an absolute responsibility before the wholly (infinite and completely)
other which I can only transgress. This is not a responsibility which I could ever fulfil: it is
infinite not because it is a task larger than any individual could complete but because as soon
as a responsibility can be fulfilled, there is no responsibility. Responsibility is the thought of
inevitable irresponsibility; and any attempt to think responsibility in terms of obligation or
the categorical imperative, or in any limited sense, are irresponsible from Derrida's point of
view. Responsibility is infinite or it is not responsibility at all, but merely acting out of
obligation to a determined, finite set of others:
If I conduct myself particularly well with regard to someone, I know that it is
to the detriment of an other; of one nation to the detriment of an other, of one
family to the detriment of another family, of my friends to the detriment of
other friends or non-friends, etc. This is the infinitude that inscribes itself
within responsibility; otherwise there would be no ethical problems or
decisions. [DaP 86]
The principle of fraternity is what dictates the choice between others, and therefore the
becoming-irresponsible of friendship. For if friendship can be with anyone, friendship as
brotherhood contradicts it, by naturalizing the bond. 'The brother is never a fact' [PoF 159 /
184] declares Derrida, 'fraternity requires a law and names, symbols, a language,
engagements, oaths, speech, family and nation' [PoF 149 / 171]. Derrida's aim is not some
nihilistic assault on the family but to draw attention to the 'renaturalizing rhetoric' of 'the
process offraternization' [PoF 202 / 230].19 A natural bond dictates my allegiances, and thus
disables responsibility and decision: where it is a question of a debt which requires to be paid
off, I cannot take responsibility for it.
While friendship and brotherhood seem to be opposed in Derrida's account, this is
not in fact the case. The traditional concept of friendship is split between two moments, one
19 The question of the family is a recurrent theme in Derrida's work, in particular
throughout his reading of Hegel in Glas. trans. John P Leavey Jr., and Richard Rand.
Nebraska: U ofNebraska P, 1986.
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of aimance and one of fraternization, but only the latter is of the order of the possible. One
does not follow the other. Brotherhood is always already at work within friendship,
predicting my choices and cancelling my responsibility. For even if I do not privilege my
friends in any way, I will always already have preferred them simply by calling them my
friends. Aimance is not a present moment in a temporal scheme, but the necessary condition
of friendship. Without the suspension ofmy choices, and the possibility of being friends with
just anybody, I could never have any friends at all; but as soon as I have a friend, 1 have
determined him as a brother.
1.2.2 Democracy
The political implications of Derrida's reading of the concept of friendship rest on the
traditional association of brotherhood and friendship with democracy and justice. This can be
shown quite clearly in Aristotle's work, and Derrida offers several further points of
comparison. The important question for us here is whether this association is purely
linguistic — only a matter of names — or if there is a more logical or conceptual relationship
at work.
For Aristotle, not only is friendship a virtue, but it is fundamental to the welfare of
the state and to justice itself. In his Politics Aristotle describes three forms of constitution:
monarchy, the rule of one man; aristocracy, the rule of a few men; and polity {politeia\, the
rule of all. Each constitution is working well when decisions are made which benefit the
whole of the people rather than just the rulers. When this is not the case, each constitution
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becomes its own deviant form: tyranny; oligarchy; democracy.20 In the Nicomachean Ethics,
Aristotle compares these paradigmatic constitutional forms with forms of friendship.
Monarchy is said to be like the friendship between a father and son; aristocracy is compared
to the friendship between man and wife; and polity to the friendship between brothers [NE
211], There are however two complications we should note which arise from this scheme. I
take the first from Geoffrey Bennington, who has argued that the position of 'democracy' as
the least bad of the deviant constitutions makes it the best constitution, if we deny the
possibility of the ideal functioning of the state; moreover, the distinction between polity and
democracy seems to be confused from the start. How could we distinguish between the many
ruling on behalf of the many, and the many ruling on behalf of the people?2' The second
complication is introduced by the analogy with friendship. Aristotle claims that monarchy is
the best constitutional form. Yet he has also argued that friendship is vital to the well-being
of the state. From this account, polity (or democracy), modelled on the equality of the
relationship between brothers — the exemplary form of friendship — should be the best
constitution. There can be little or no justice or friendship when one man, or a few men, rule,
since there is little or nothing in common between the rulers and ruled, but when the many
have some degree of equality there will be more friendship and justice rather than less. On
Aristotle's account then, democracy is the exemplary politics of friendship and since Derrida
takes this to be an exemplary account of democracy, the founding analogy of his text is
established: 'democracy [...] is rarely determined in the absence of confraternity or
brotherhood' [PoF viii / 13].
Derrida gives several further references for this fraternal rhetoric within accounts of
democracy: 'from Plato to Montaigne, Aristotle to Kant, Cicero to Hegel, the great
20 Aristotle. The Politics, trans. T.A. Sinclair, revised Trevor J. Saunders.
Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1992. 239-40.
21 Geoffrey Bennington. 'Demo.' Paper given to the 'Deconstruction Reading
Politics' conference at Staffordshire University, 29 July 1999.
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philosophical and canonical discourses on friendship will have explicitly tied the friend-
brother to virtue and justice, to moral reason and political reason' [PoF 277 / 308], However
Derrida's argument is that there is more at stake than simply the rhetoric of republicanism. It
is the logical structure which underlies both the concept of friendship and democracy in their
traditional interpretations which Derrida is interested in, but this is a structural model which
he claims can be found from Aristotle to Nietzsche and then to Blanchot and Nancy beyond.
This raises a major problem for Derrida's readers. What is the advantage in distinguishing a
concept so broad that it can contain the whole tradition of Western political thought; and
what would this concept have to do with resolving problems in any particular state, today or
in the past? Would we not do better to focus on distinguishing between different models of
democracy, whether on a historical or a theoretical basis? How can Derrida justify making
almost no reference to contemporary analyses of the democratic state? Not only does
Derrida's strategy appear to risk effacing what may be most valuable in democratic theory,
whether theoretically or empirically based, by reducing it to the expression of some
underlying framework but would also leave Derrida open to the charge of proposing — in
Thomas McCarthy's phrase — 'a politics of the ineffable.'22 What seems a reasonable
objection cannot be answered until we have considered Derrida's analysis further. What
Derrida is interested in are the limits to the concept of democracy as such, but since any
reading of democracy must first presume the identity of the concept, these limits cannot
come into focus within those readings. IfPolitics ofFriendship is read as an attempt to bring
these limits into focus, the test of Derrida's analysis will not be how well it conforms to pre¬
existing interpretative norms, but its applicability and utility. We might say that Derrida
operates with a strategy of calculated indifference to the theory and practice of democracy, in
order to focus on what places restrictions on both. This is undoubtedly a violent procedure.
But if Derrida is correct, then any discussion of democracy which does not pass through
22 'Politics of the Ineffable.' passim.
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some form of deconstructive questioning will be guilty of either naivity or a far worse
violence.
Turning to Derrida's account of democracy, we can see that democracy is structured
around the same problematic dichotomy as friendship:
With this becoming-political [of friendship], and with all the schemata that we
will recognize therein — beginning with the most problematic of all, that of
fraternity— the question of democracy thus opens, the question of the citizen
or the subject as a countable singularity. And that of a 'universal fraternity.'
There is no democracy \pas de democratic] without respect for irreducible
singularity or alterity, but there is no democracy [pas de democratic] without
the 'community of friends', without the calculation of majorities, without
identifiable, stabilizable, representable subjects, all equal. These two laws are
irreducible one to the other. Tragically irreconcilable and forever wounding.
The wound itself opens with the necessity of having to count one's friends, to
count the others, in the economy of one's own, there where every other is
altogether other. [PoF 22 / 40.]
This passage contains within it a remarkable condensation or compression of the argument of
Politics of Friendship, so we will need to proceed slowly in unravelling it. What Derrida
calls 'the wound' in democracy is already present in the double movement which we
discerned in the structure of friendship. Friendship is instituted by a decision taken in the
context of absolute possibility — anyone could be my friend — but at the same time
friendship is guarded or restricted by a question of number — I cannot be friends with
everyone. The same goes for democracy. Democracy contains both a universal appeal —
equality for all — and necessary limits which condition and govern that appeal. These
mostly form around the question, again, of fraternization: of the naturalization of the
decision which would limit democracy and equality to the members of one state, to one set
of boundaries or one people, grounded in a spiritual identification which need not, but
always potentially could, be expressed in a violent particularism or an ideology of nation,
blood or soil.
There are three sets of problems introduced into the concept of democracy by this
structural homology with friendship, all exemplified for Derrida in Plato's Menexenus. There
democracy is described as aristocratic: 'a form of government which receives various names,
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according to the fancies of men, and is sometimes called democracy, but is really an
aristocracy or government of the best which has the approval of the many' [PoF 95 / 117].
As for friendship, so the question of democracy revolves around a question of number: 'If
the word "democracy" allies itself or competes with that of aristocracy, it is because of
number, of the reference to the required approbation of the greatest number' [PoF 101 /
124]. Derrida does not expand this point further, but it would be possible to find many of the
most dominant concerns within the tradition of thinking about democracy suggested here.
Where democracy is defined in opposition to oligarchy or aristocracy, there will remain an
uncertain borderline between 'the few' and 'the many.' Rather than try and distinguish one
from the other, or true democracy from aristocracy— and this will form the substance of the
debate within democratic theory over forms of democracy— Derrida simply insists that this
question will persist within democracy. In turn, this would make such debates as those over
representative and direct democracy23, the question of bureaucratization of the political
sphere24, and the extent of the influence of business or other interests over democratic
decision-making, not only inevitable but also necessary and interminable.
The second set of problems, on which Derrida focuses at some length, can be seen at
work within the assertion in the Menexenus that 'the basis of this our government is equality
of birth. [...] we and our citizens are brethren, the children all of one mother' [PoF 95 / 117].
In this referral of democratic equality to a principle of birth, Derrida sees the same
suspension of decision that was at work in the fraternization of friendship: 'Everything
seems to be decided where the decision does not take place, precisely in that place where the
decision does not take place qua decision, where it will have been carried away in what has
always-already taken place: at birth' [PoF 99 / 121], The law of the polis is determined in
23 See for example Paul Hirst. Representative Democracy and its Limits. Oxford:
Polity, 1990.
24 See for example Eva Etzioni-Halevy. Bureaucracy and democracy: a political
dilemma. London: Routledge, 1983. The classic formulation of this problem is that of
Weber.
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advance by a natural law: 'nature commands law, [...] equality at birth founds in necessity
legal equality' [PoF 99 / 121]. This is 'the place of fraternization as the symbolic bond
alleging the repetition of a genetic tie [...]. In more modern terms one might speak of the
foundation of citizenship in a nation' [PoF 99 / 121]. The foundation of democracy in the
naturalization of the law repeats the effect of fraternization on the thought of friendship,
locking up decision and therefore any chance of responsibility:
Such a bond between two structurally heterogeneous ties will always remain
obscure, mystical, essentially foreign to rationality — which does not mean
simply irrational, in the equally modern sense of the term. It will always be
exposed, to say the least, to the 'sophistications,' 'mystifications,' and
perversions of rhetoric. Sometimes to the worst symptoms of nationalism,
ethnocentrism, populism, even xenophobia. [...] Are we certain that
throughout all the mutations of European history (of which, of course, the most
rigorous account must be taken) no concept of the political and of democracy
has ever broken with the heritage of this troubling necessity? Made a radical,
thematic break with it? This is the question we are concerned with here [PoF
99-100/121-2],
Democracy founded on a supposedly natural bond will always be a limited or conditioned
form, and equality in this case will never be justice. Derrida draws on Nicole Loraux's work
to ground this argument in a historical analysis of the relationship between autochthony and
the Athenian state, but his assertion is that this analysis ought to be extended to every state or
democratic politics in the history of the concept.25 Any franchise based on birth will institute
inequality, just as it would if it were to be based on wealth, property or gender. A
qualification for citizenship based on a period of residence only substitutes one similar law
for the law of 'natural' birth; residence is taken to be as good as having been born to the right
bloodline, or on the right soil. Derrida's claim is that just as friendship could not be thought
without the notion of brotherhood, and that election and exclusivity were part of the
25 See Nicole Loraux. The Invention ofAthens: The Funeral Oration in the Classical
City, trans Alan Sheridan. Cambridge MA: Harvard UP, 1986., especially chapter IV 'As for
the Name... It is called a Democracy.' 172-220., and The Children ofAthens:Athenian Ideas
about Citizenship and the Division between the Sexes, trans Caroline Levine. Princeton:
Princeton UP, 1984., especially chapter 1 'Autochthony: An Athenian Topic.' 37-71.
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concept's very definition, so the concept of democracy itself must also be similarly self-
contradictory. The principle of equality and its naturalization in terms of birth can never be
reconciled.
The third foundational limit to the concept of democracy, alongside the question of
number, and the problem of fraternization as naturalization, is the question of the sister
which contributes a dominant undercurrent to Politics of Friendship as a whole. It can be
seen to develop most obviously from the association of friendship with brotherhood in the
texts of the tradition. For Aristotle, the highest model of friendship is that between men. The
relationship between husband and wife is defined as friendship between a superior and an
inferior [NE 203] and can therefore become the model for an aristocratic constitution [NE
211]; moreover there is no mention at all of the sister, or of the daughter [PoF 202 / 228],
Yet Derrida wonders what room is left for friendship between women, or between men and
women. 'This double exclusion of the feminine in this philosophical paradigm,' he writes,
'would then confer on friendship the essential and essentially sublime figure of virile
homosexuality' [PoF 279 / 311]. The exclusion ofwomen from the discourse of the tradition
on politics and friendship confirms this hypothesis. For example, Derrida notes of Carl
Schmitt that 'not even in the theory of the partisan is there the least reference to the role
played by women in guerrilla warfare, in the wars and the aftermath of wars of national
liberation [...]' [PoF 156 / 180-1]. Derrida emphasises the hegemony of a discourse which,
when it recognises the existence of the woman, neutralises her difference. For example, in
Kant's reading of modesty: 'It would equalize the sexes by moralizing them, getting the
woman to participate in universal fraternity: in a word, in humanity. The modest woman is a
brother for man' [PoF 274 / 304], The problem Derrida poses through his insistence on this
exclusion is whether politics itself, all the concepts and models we have of politics, might
not be founded on the absence of women, or at least on the neutralization of sexual
difference. In which case it would be impossible to address inequality between the sexes
within politics, except at the cost of reducing the sister to a brother. What future for
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democracy if it has always been rhetorically organised around a model which excludes the
woman, or the sister, if, as Derrida says, 'a political phallogocentrism has, up to this point,
determined its cosmopolitical democracy, a democracy, qua cosmo-phratrocentrism' [PoF
263 / 294]? This problem may not be just any problem among those of the text. Derrida
registers the importance of this question as one of 'the two major questions of
"deconstruction": the question of the history of concepts and (trivially) so-called 'textual'
hegemony, history tout court, and the question of phallogocentrism. Here qua
phratrocentrism' [PoF 278 / 309], The possibility seems to be left open here as so often in
Derrida's work that, in the form of the question set out by Paola Marrati, sexual difference is
not just one difference amongst others, or that this question must at least remain open.26
These final two questions appear to be addressed as much to any politics or any state
as they are to democracy in particular. In the latter case, the concept of politics appears to be
de facto and de jure exclusive of women. Following the logic of the former instance, any
political system which restricts political equality — or the allocation of resources, welfare,
security — to its citizens rather than its non-citizens will define itself by an act of political
exclusion, as not only limited democracy, but as injustice: if justice is a principle of equality,
can it be limited by law to the occupants of the state rather than its neighbours? The question
raised by these analyses is whether politics could ever take account of the sister, or be said to
be just. Following some reflections on the challenge posed by the figure of the sister to a
political tradition constructed on the rhetoric of fraternity, Derrida formulates this more
general problem and proposes two options for dealing with this situation. The first would be
to 'admit that the political is in fact this phallogocentrism in act [...]: political virtue [...] has
always been virile virtue in its androcentric manifestation.' If politics is by definition
founded in inequality, should we seek to displace politics altogether? The emancipation of
26 Paola Marrati. 'Le reve et le danger: ou se perd la difference sexuelle?' in Jean-
Michel-Rabate & Michael Wetzel eds. L 'Ethique Du Don: Jacques Derrida et la pensee du
don. Paris: Metailie-Transition, 1992. 194-211.
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women, 'woman's slow and painful access to citizenship' would then appear to indicate that
'politics' itself was disappearing. Our problem would then be that of thinking about what
would replace politics as such, rather than how we might modify our current political
situation, and of 'carrying oneself beyond the political, beyond the name "politics"; and by
forging other concepts, concepts with an altogether different mobilizing force' [PoF 158 /
183]. The second option Derrida formulates would be to keep the "old name" of politics, but
to 'analyse the logic and the topic of the concept differently, and engage other forms of
struggle' [PoF 158 / 183]. Not only does Derrida refuse to decide between these options, he
insists that there can no longer be a choice. Not only must we invent a new politics, as well
as a new concept of politics, but we cannot simply give up on the old concepts. We must
negotiate with them, or attempt to think them through differently. This in turn suggests that
we must read Politics ofFriendship itself in terms of this double strategy.
1.2.3 Differance and Justice.
Having examined Derrida's extension of the structural dynamics he sees at work in the
concept of friendship to democracy, we are in a position to understand Politics ofFriendship
as a 'genealogical deconstruction of the political (and through it, to the democratic)' and
what kind of way this is 'to think, interpret and implement another politics, another
democracy' [PoF 104 / 128]. This project would be equivalent to a combination of the two
options Derrida describes in the passage I have just referred to: on the one hand thinking
through the old names of politics; but on the other hand seeking to think a new concept of
politics. The focal point for this process in the book is the redescription of the traditional
concept of democracy in terms of what Derrida calls 'democracy-to-come,' which I will now
present in a relatively systematic form.
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The key to understanding 'democracy-to-come' comes in the relationship between
democracy, equality and justice as itself a question of number. For before any of the issues I
have discussed so far, which define a democratic space which must be limited in number,
constituted by exclusion, and haunted by the risk of relapsing into oligarchy or
demagoguery, it is the very question of enumerability which contradicts and frustrates the
democratic appeal: 'the question of the citizen or the subject as a countable singularity.
There is no democracy without respect for irreducible singularity or alterity, but there is no
democracy without the "community of friends," without the calculation of majorities,
without identifiable, stabilizable, representable subjects, all equal' [PoF 22 / 40]. That is to
say, it is not the empirical or theoretical contradiction of the equality which grounds
democracy which must come into question, but the very structure or possibility of equality
itself which is the problem. The limits of democracy do not begin after the question of
equality, and are not even separable from that same question. The very becoming citizen-
subject, to be a subject, a citizen, like any other, introduces already a violent imposition into
the heart of democracy. The violence of fraternity begins not when counting goes wrong, but
with the necessity and principle of counting. So far I have dealt with the problems of the
'community of friends' and of the calculation of majorities: but the relationship between
'respect for irreducible singularity or alterity' and 'the citizen as countable singularity' must
also be addressed.
Derrida's description of democracy here is directly parallel to his account of
responsibility in The Gift of Death: 'responsibility [...] demands on the one hand an
accounting, a general answering-for-oneself with respect to the general and before the
generality, hence the idea of substitution, and, on the other hand, uniqueness, absolute
singularity, hence nonsubstitution, nonrepetition, silence and secrecy' [GoD 61 / 88-9]. The
concept of responsibility is structured by the same dilemma as that of democracy: on the one
hand, the undeconstructible condition of justice [FoL 14-15 / 35-6] is the demand for
absolute respect for each and every other, as other; on the other hand, there is the necessity
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of law, which can only address the singular as an example of a general rule. In the passage
above, this continuity of structure is confirmed by Derrida's concluding words: democracy is
violence, 'there where every other is altogether other' [PoF 22 / 40]. This is a translation of a
phrase which Derrida analyses at some length in The Gift ofDeath as a compact expression
of the dilemma of responsibility, the sentence 'tout autre est tout autre' [GoD 68 / 98; 82 /
116; 87 / 121]. There is no easy translation of this sentence, although David Wills' 'every
(one) other is every (bit) other' is clear enough. The phrase states an equivalence between
two undecidable phrases, which might refer to absolute alterity (the wholly other) or every
(individual) alterity. This suggests an unstable equivalence between the absolute alterity of
each other and the being alike in being other of every other. Derrida pushes this to paradox
by replacing the absolutely other with the name of God, and apparently demonstrating that
every other is God, or that God is every other [GoD 86-7 / 120-1], Responsibility only
begins in this situation of infinitization, as we have seen, where my duty is owed
unconditionally to each and every other, rather than to some others rather than others —
whether this restriction is based on family, nation or state allegiances — or to my friends.
That 'democracy-to-come' is infinite responsibility follows from that moment (although not
strictly temporal) in which I could be friends with just anyone, in the multiplicity of possible
friends, and Derrida's attempt to think an experience of aimance prior even to the distinction
between active or passive. This is an experience or condition rather than a logical or
historical situation, irreducible to language or discourse. This law of 'irreducible singularity
or alterity' for Derrida names democracy as democracy. It is the recognition of absolute and
infinite responsibility, responsibility for every other as wholly other. It is a paradoxical law
prior to and irreducible to all law.27 This is not a thinking of equality as such, but something
like an equality beyond equality; for to claim equality with the other is to reduce the other to
27 See Richard Beardsworth's Derrida and the Political. London: Routledge, 1996.
1-45. for a full discussion of the law in Derrida's thought.
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the same: 'It would therefore be a matter of thinking an alterity without hierarchical
difference at the root ofdemocracy' [PoF 232 / 259],
This critique of the concept of equality is undertaken in the name of justice as a
hyperbolic and excessive form of equality itself. In fact, this passage between 'irreducible'
and 'countable' singularity takes us towards one of the more persistent themes throughout
Derrida's recent writing, 'justice as the undeconstructible condition of any deconstruction'
[SoM 28 / 56; cf. FoL 15 / 35], As Geoffrey Bennington has suggested, to consider justice in
terms of this impossible aporetic — 'an alterity without hierarchical difference'' [PoF 232 /
259] — can be seen as a translation of the early concept of difference.28 For one of Derrida's
central concerns has been the relationship between singularity and totality, the possibility of
thinking difference without reducing it to the same. A singularity is only singular to the
extent that it cannot be described as being like anything else; yet as soon as it is a singularity,
it must always be, at least minimally, like something, and ultimately everything, else, even if
only by virtue of being singular. This is Derrida's peculiar twist on conditions of possibility:
the condition of being a singularity depends on not being a singularity, its possibility on its
impossibility. Were there to ever be anything absolutely singular it would be unrecognisable.
Thus there can only be non-singular singularities and non-absolute difference. If each
difference is even minimally distinguished from every other difference, they might all be
said to be nothing but the traces of all the other differences. However these differences, or
singularities, are still different, or singular, and thus cannot be accounted for or named in
terms of anything else. Something will always remain or resist, whether the order of
questioning is logical, ontological or ethical.
In his essay 'Difference' Derrida refers to several of his own texts, as well as sources
in Levinas, Nietzsche and particularly in Heidegger, in order to propose 'difference' as the
name for this field of non-absolute differences which is itself neither a word nor a concept.
28
Interrupting Derrida. 44-45, 12.
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However 'difference' cannot be a final name, since the word is only another one of the non-
absolute differences, and can only provisionally claim to name them. Derrida often suggests
that this can be understood in terms of exemplarity. Effectively, any mark, or a difference
capable of functioning as a mark (even a blank) signifies not only itself, but also its own
condition as mark, as being like, but unlike, every other mark, that is every other thing. On
the one hand the mark is unique, on the other it is a copy of every other mark. Thus each
mark, each event, each decision, is exemplary, according to the fortuitous compression of
meanings in that term: both the model and only a sample, the paradigmatic case, and only a
typical one. Transferring this to the question of the citizen-subject, we could say that the
identity of the subject can never be exhausted by his being-citizen, that something will
escape. However this 'something' is nothing interior, not a residue of consciousness or
subjectivity. What escapes is the inexhaustibility of the reference to every other subject, or
difference that constitutes the subject. However just as difference is only a provisional or
strategic name rather than a 'truth' — 'strategic because no transcendent truth present
outside the field of writing can govern theologically the totality of the field' [Mar 7/7] —
so in thinking about politics and responsibility we are forced to rely on names which cannot
be entirely satisfactory. Derrida asks 'in what sense may one still speak of equality— indeed
of symmetry — in the dissymmetry and boundlessness of infinite alterity? What right does
one have to speak still of the political, of law, and of democracy?' [PoF 233 / 260],
Like friendship, Derrida argues, democracy is to be thought in terms of a double
movement. On the side of its appeal to equality and to the rule of the many, rather than the
few, democracy has an emancipatory value: but there can be no democratic state or
democratic theory which will not limit this appeal by grounding it in an association of
citizens organised around a naturalising principle which locks up and neutralises the
possibility of political responsibility. The very structure of the concept of democracy implies
that there can be no full democracy in the terms of the ideal which determines the concept,
there will be no democracy which does not sustain an anti-democratic current, no democracy
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worthy of the name. For the concept of friendship, Derrida tentatively distinguished aimance
from fraternization. For democracy, Derrida separates out the principle of what he calls
'democracy-to-come.' Democracy-to-come is what makes democracy what it is — the
principle of equality or emancipation attested to by the name of democracy — but like
aimance, it is immediately effaced. It can never be made present or presented as such; the
'to-come' indicates that it is permanently deferred. Yet it provides a principle against which
any state which claims to be democratic may be judged. The arithmetic of friendship — not
only the quantification of true friendship evident in the traditional texts, but the fact that it is
necessarily structured by a drawing of limits, by an act of exclusion — is analogous to
democracy considered as a matter of calculation. Before all the classical difficulties of
defining democracy — how many people defines the 'rule of the many'; how to protect the
rights of the minority from the will of the majority; how to calculate the opinion of the
people; how to preserve the rule of law from the dictatorship of the many— the difficulty of
democracy will be a question of number. For every citizen must be considered as equal
under the law, as being equivalent to one another, as being precisely subject to a law of
generality; as countable, and counting equally. Not only will a democracy have to consider
its own limits, criteria for membership (a democracy is not the rule of just anyone, but its
own citizens), but in arraigning its subjects as subjects it is already inflicting injustice on
them. 'Irreducible singularity' resists calculation.
It should be clear by now that Derrida must not be taken to be arguing for an ideal
of democracy to which no actual or empirical democracy will live up to, or which a
democratic theory could describe. The mutual co-implication of 'democracy-to-come' and
democracy as fraternity are not merely the result of a gap between the empirical and the
ideal, but an inexorable necessity. Democracy, and perhaps politics itself, can be nothing
other than the negotiation within countable categories, in the name of an undeconstructible
limit which is nicknamed justice, or 'democracy-to-come.' Derrida remarks of his attempt to
think another friendship, that it would have nothing to do with community, being 'of the
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order neither of the common nor of its opposite, neither appurtenance or non-appurtenance,
sharing or non-sharing, proximity or distance, the inside or the outside, etc.' This friendship
would have nothing to do with 'community':
Not because it would be a community without community, 'unavowable'
or 'inoperative', etc., but simply because it would have nothing to do, with
regard to what is essential in that which is called friendship, with the slightest
reference to community, whether positive, negative, or neutral [PoF 298 /
331].29
A community must always presuppose a decision as to who is or who ought to form part of
it. We can assume that the same strictures might apply to democracy, and that Derrida is
attempting to think something which would not be recognisable democracy, but whose
promise may be found to be contained within democracy. If Politics ofFriendship operates
in the terms set out at the end of the last section, we might expect 'democracy-to-come' to
function as both a name for a concept of politics thought beyond politics; and the conditions
of a prolonged negotiation with actual existing democracy. It is this compression which
informs Derrida's recurrent query: 'would it still make sense to speak of democracy when it
would no longer be a question (no longer in question as to what is essential or constitutive)
of country, nation, even of State and citizen — in other words, if at least one still keeps to
the accepted use of this word, when it would no longer be a political question?' [PoF 104 /
126-7], Derrida's use of 'democracy-to-come' would serve as a strategic intervention which
combines both a reference to actual political conditions; and an attempt to think towards
something which would exceed the order of politics — or at least the conventional use of it.
However, having set out the structure of what Derrida calls 'democracy-to-come,' his choice
of the term remains to be explained. As I have suggested, there can only be a strategic
29 Derrida refers here to Jean-Luc Nancy. The Inoperative Community trans. Peter
Connor. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 1991., and Maurice Blanchot. The Unavowable
Community, trans Barry Joris. Barrytown NY: Station Hill P, 1988. I have discussed this
debate at length in 'Against Community: Derrida contra Nancy.' Michael Strysick ed. The
Politics ofCommunity. Aurora CO: Davies, forthcoming 2001.
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justification for this, rather than an absolute one. The reference to democracy is fairly clear
however, so what requires explanation is the reference to futurity written in to the 'to-come,'
Derrida's displacement of the French word avenir (future) into a-venir (to-come). This is the
final element we require to begin to assess Derrida's deconstructive genealogy as a politics
of the promise.
1.2.4 The Promise of Politics.
In the 1981 interview to which I referred at the opening of this chapter, Derrida specifies a
double strategy with regard to politics:
the difficulty is to gesture in opposite directions at the same time: on the one
hand to preserve a distance and suspicion with regard to the official political
codes governing reality; on the other, to intervene here and now in a practical
and engage manner whenever the necessity arises. This position of dual
allegiance, in which I personally find myself, is one of perpetual uneasiness. I
try where I can to act politically while recognizing that such action remains
incommensurate with my intellectual project of deconstruction.30
Adapting this suggestion to the terms of Politics of Friendship I have suggested that
Derrida's intervention in that text consists in re-writing one of 'the official political codes
governing reality,' democracy, in terms which attempt both a political transformation in the
here and now, and to gesture to the necessity for a continual re-thinking of the basic concepts
of politics itself. Just as the neologism 'dififerance' should be accorded no special privilege in
reading Derrida's work, but located as a strategic response to his institutional and theoretical
surroundings — roughly the hegemony of a structuralism (and of a structuralist Marxism)
informed by a crude Hegelian reading of the relationship between difference and identity—
30 Dialogues with contemporary Continental thinkers. 120.
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so the phrase 'democracy-to-come' is coined in an attempt to effect a certain kind of
transformation. What remains to be clarified is the nature of this as a form of political
practice. The answer lies not so much in the word 'democracy' as in the 'to-come.'
Derrida's account of democracy-to-come seems extremely ambiguous from the point
of view ofmore conventional political theory. It proceeds neither from analysis of the history
of the democratic state form, nor from the observation of what democracy means in the
contemporary world. Nor does it consist in constructing practical and pragmatically oriented
normative models for the functioning of a political democracy, or of adapting such models to
local conditions. While Derrida clearly expresses a hope that there will be more democracy
rather than less in the future, on the condition that 'democracy' is understood not as one state
form amongst others, but something like a principle of equality and emancipation, he is
unable to make any concrete suggestions as to how this might be brought about. Instead what
Politics of Friendship establishes is: 1) the possibility and the necessity of criticising any
current form of democracy in the name of an ideal principle of 'democracy-to-come'; 2) the
necessity of attempting to think toward a political relation which would be more
'democratic' than any democracy imaginable — but could for these reasons perhaps no
longer be called democracy or even political. All this is signified by Derrida's qualification
that democracy remains 'to come.' Strictly speaking, however, deconstruction prohibits any
prediction as to whether in fact there will be any more or less of what we call democracy in
the future, nor whether another form of political system or thinking will emerge or not. The
futurity of the 'to-come' is of another order:
For democracy remains to come; this is its essence in so far as it remains: not
only will it remain indefinitely perfectible, hence always insufficient and
future, but, belonging to the time of the promise, it will always remain, in each
of its future times, to come: even when there is democracy, it never exists, it is
never present, it remains the theme of a non-presentable concept [PoF 306 /
339],
Rather than 'democracy-to-come' Derrida might have chosen to insist that there is no
democracy worthy of the name; or that democracy, like justice, is an experience of the
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impossible. None of these descriptions is not true of democracy in Derrida's terms, but in
attesting to a 'democracy-to-come,' Derrida also affirms something within democracy that
does confirm the possibility of there being more democracy rather than less.
This is the dimension of the promise within democracy. Insisting on it reinforces not
only the fact that what we call democracy can never be fully present; but that something of
democracy is already present here and now. While stripped of any specific content, this
affirmation remarks something within democracy, the gap between the two logics which
makes necessary the negotiation. This negotiation is the possibility of there being greater
justice, a more equitable distribution of resources or power; but it must also be the risk of the
opposite being the case. This is not a Utopian social thought.31 For it locates the promise of
'democracy-to-come' in the past as much as in what we call the present, and gives no
grounds for thinking that it will or will not come to pass in the future. 'Democracy-to-come'
is what opens to the future, but it is not the future thought in terms of a future-present.
Without this opening to the future there would be no democracy at all. Beyond democracy,
we are called to imagine another experience of democracy, or of friendship, of equality. But
we can only imagine this as monstrous, frightening and disturbing, as 'absolute danger'
[GRA 5/14]. Any promise, Derrida insists, is indissociable from a threat, since the necessary
condition of a promise is that it might not come true.32 So the structure of democracy is
caught between the promise of emancipation, of there being more democracy, more justice,
more equality, and the threat of there being less democracy, of the disappearance of the
democratic moment in its fraternal recuperation. The 'futurity' of the 'to-come' in
'democracy-to-come' is not of the order of something for which an arrival could be
predicted; nor is it to be associated with a teleology — it is entirely possible that there have
been 'more' democratic societies in the past. What Derrida is describing is more like a
31 Even in the sense in which Drucilla Cornell finds an 'unerasable moment of
utopianism' in Derrida. The Philosophy ofthe Limit. Routledge: London, 1992. 10.
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principle of disruption which opens democracy as we know it to the possibility of something
else happening. Because this 'something else' cannot be specified, it could be 'good' or
'bad' — more equality or less equality. What is clear is that it must not be thought of as the
arrival of 'democracy-to-come' itself. What Derrida also calls 'justice,' a condition of
absolute respect for every singularity in its singularity is not just difficult to describe, but is
also potentially the worst violence, since law, politics, and democracy, the mechanism of
negotiation between different injustices would no longer be possible. To think 'democracy-
to-come' is also in some sense to hold off this threat; to defer the possibility of the worst
violence, the violence which would abolish politics, while seeking to negotiate for a less
violent politics in the here and now.
In seeking to reaffirm this democratic promise, but without resigning the right and
the necessity of negotiating an improvement in what we now call democracy, Derrida's text
is structured as a re-enactment of that promise. The book's heavily marked performative
dimension draws attention to this. By repeating so much of the traditional conceptualisation
of friendship and of democracy, Derrida does not dismiss it, but confirms its necessity and
importance. Derrida does not reject the tradition, but places his work within it or alongside it.
In particular, by repeating the traditional apostrophe 'O my friends there are no friends' he
underlines the structure of any communication:
We would not be together in a sort of minimal community — but also
incommensurable to all others — speaking the same language or praying for
translation against the horizon of a same language, if only to manifest
disagreement, if a sort offriendship had not already been sealed, before all
contracts[...]: a friendship prior to friendships, an ineffaceable friendship,
fundamental and groundless, one that breathes in a shared language (past or to
come) and in the being-together that all allocution supposes, up to and
including the declaration ofwar [PoF 236 / 264],
32 This is dealt with at length by Derrida in 'Avance,' a foreword to Serge Marcel's
Le Tombeau de Dieu Artisan. Paris: Minuit, 1995. 34-40.
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Aimance, preceding and making possible any so-called friendships, bears witness to the
possibility of friendship, just as Derrida, in writing about the texts of the tradition repeats not
only their sense of the importance of friendship, but their assumption of responsibility for the
experience and the theory of friendship and of politics.
1.3 Democracy and Literature
DERRIDA'S ANALYSIS OF 'democracy-to-come' in Politics of Friendship proceeds on the
basis of the deconstructive genealogy of one concept of the political, which seeks to derive it
as a form of political association defined in terms of a mode of relation between citizens,
specifically the traditional association of democracy with brotherhood. In this section of the
chapter I will draw out another set of analyses in which Derrida is concerned with two rather
different political concepts, but still within the horizon of the question of democracy-to-
come. If Derrida's discussion in Politics ofFriendship might be said to focus on the idea of
equality, then this second analysis relates to democracy defined by freedom of speech, and to
the concept of politics derived from a distinction between the public and private sphere. As a
starting point I take Derrida's essay 'Passions.' There Derrida explicitly links democracy and
literature. 'Literature [...] ties its destiny,' he writes, 'to a certain noncensure, to the space of
democratic freedom (freedom of the press, freedom of speech, etc.) No democracy without
literature; no literature without democracy' [PAS 28 / 65]. In making this connection, Derrida
again appears to be linking democracy with deconstruction, since a concern with literature





phenomenological study of the literary work.33 However the status of literature in
deconstruction is complex. By examining the fate of literature in deconstruction, I consider
more closely Derrida's assertion of the relationship between literature and democracy.
Following this, I turn to Derrida's closely related work on the secret and its relation to the
distinction between public and private.
1.3.1 Deconstruction and Literature.
A version of 'Passions' was first published as Derrida's own contribution to Derrida: A
Critical Reader,34 Given this context, not only is Derrida's essay playful and humorous in
tone, but he seems particularly interested in playing on his audience's expectations of him—
for example editor David Wood's suggestion that he contribute 'an oblique offering.' After
satirising and questioning the situation of the book, likening it to a sacrificial ritual, and
commenting on the perceived ethical turn in deconstruction, Derrida confesses that he wants
to tell his readers a secret. But the secret turns out to have been given away all along. For
Derrida confesses that 'all I wanted to do was to confide or confirm my taste (probably
unconditional) for literature, more precisely for literary writing' [PAS 27 / 63], This may
have been a open secret, for Derrida's passion for literature has always been well known,
from both the essays collected in Dissemination, the two essays on Jabes in Writing and
Difference, and his interest in and texts on writers like Joyce, Ponge, Blanchot, or Celan.35 In
33 'The Ideality of the Literary Object.' See Derrida's discussion in 'The Time of a
Thesis: Punctuations.' trans. Kathleen McLaughlin, in Alan Montefiore ed. Philosophy in
France Today. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1983. 37-38.
34 David Wood ed. Derrida: A Critical Reader. Oxford: Blackwell, 1992.
35 See Ulysse Gramophone: deux mots pour Joyce. Paris: Galilee, 1987; Signeponge
Paris: Seuil, 1988.; Parages. Paris: Galilee, 1986.; Demeure. Paris: Galilee, 1999.;
Schibholeth: pour Paul Celan. Paris: Galilee, 1986.
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fact Derrida has been often accused of liking literature too much, or of reducing philosophy
to literature,36 as he acknowledges when he explains: 'Not that I like literature in general, nor
that I prefer it to something else, to philosophy, for example, as they suppose who ultimately
discern neither one nor the other. Not that 1 want to reduce everything to it, especially not
philosophy. Literature I could, fundamentally do without, in fact, rather easily' [Pas 27 / 64],
Derrida goes on to emphasise that what he likes in literature is not a matter of aesthetics, nor
is it simply a question of preferring novels to other forms of prose. Instead his preference for
literature is its connection with democracy, and freedom of speech:
I have often found myself insisting on the necessity of distinguishing between
literature and belles-lettres or poetry. Literature is a modern invention,
inscribed in conventions and institutions which, to hold on to just this trait,
secure in principle its right to say everything. Literature thus ties its destiny to
a certain noncensure, to the space of democratic freedom (freedom of the press,
freedom of speech, etc.) No democracy without literature; no literature without
democracy [PAS 28 / 68],
This apparently offers us the possibility of a more historically-based account of democracy
within deconstruction than the conceptual exploration of 'democracy-to-come' in Politics of
Friendship but it also raises two immediate difficulties. The first problem is the fact that
Derrida has offered several answers to the question 'what is literature?' The second is that at
least one of those definitions has questioned the existence of literature at all: is the literature
which is tied to freedom of speech that same literature of which Derrida notes that 'there is
no — hardly any, ever so little— literature' [DlS 223 / 274]? On the one hand Derrida tells
us that 'literature is a public institution of recent invention, with a comparatively short
history, governed by all sorts of conventions connected to the evolution of law, which
allows, in principle, anything to be said' [DaP 80] but on the other hand it is a distant
possibility, perhaps impossibility itself.
36 See Jiirgen Habermas. Philosophy and the Discourse of Modernity. Oxford:
Blackwell, 1990. 185-210.
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Perhaps we should not try too hard to reconcile Derrida's statements on the subject
of literature, as perhaps on other topics. As Rodolphe Gasche puts it, 'Since what we might
call Derrida's "performative turn," such plurality appears to be inevitable,'37 since each
statement is necessarily bound to its context and to its own singular structure as a response.
However in this case, turning to Derrida's well-known early essay 'The Double Session' can
help us clarify his comments on the relationship between democracy and literature. In this
essay Derrida comes closest to posing what he described in his thesis defence as one of the
key questions of deconstruction:
What is literature? And first of all what is it 'to write'? How is it that the fact
of writing can disturb the very question 'what is?' and even 'what does it
mean?' To say this in other words— and here is the saying otherwise that was
of importance to me — when and how does an inscription become literature
and what takes place when it does? To what and to whom is this due? What
takes place between philosophy and literature, science and literature, politics
and literature, theology and literature, psychoanalysis and literature? [...] Why
am I so fascinated by the literary ruse of the inscription and the whole
ungraspable paradox of a trace which manages only to carry itself away, to
erase itself in marking itself out afresh, itself and its own idiom, which in order
to take actual form must erase itself and produce itself at the price of this self-
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erasure.
In 'The Double Session' Derrida poses the question of literature, as he puts it, 'between Plato
and Mallarme' [DlS 183 / 225], He proposes one reading of mimesis based on Plato, and
then juxtaposes it with another interpretation of mimesis which he finds to be both at work
and thematised within Mallarme's text 'Mimique.' However, as with his reading of
friendship from Aristotle to Nietzsche, this does not mean that Mallarme invents or discovers
a new version of mimesis, which overturns or disproves Plato's arguments. In the early
pages of his text Derrida sets this out quite clearly. These 'proper names,' he notes, 'are not
real references but indications for the sake of convenience and initial analysis' [DlS 183 /
225], What Derrida finds in Mallarme is a general possibility within mimesis as such, but
37
Rodolphe Gasche. 'A Relation called "literaiy."' in OfMinimal Things: Studies on
the Notion ofRelation. Stanford: Stanford UP, 2000. 233.
38 'The Time of a Thesis: Punctuations.' 37-38.
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which a traditional interpretation of Plato has dismissed — we might think of this as a
Mallarmean moment already present within Plato's writing. This moment also passes
between philosophy and literature, but to show that there is a 'literary' moment within
philosophy's account of the relationship between image and copy, truth and fiction, is not to
privilege one account (philosophical or literary) of this relationship. While literature is able
to pose questions to philosophy which might not be available within its history [DaP 80],
literature is in its turn a philosophical concept. If a certain avant-garde literary practice
exposes this dimension of mimesis more readily than other texts, this does not make it an
experience restricted to these texts.
Traditionally, a mimetic object is either considered to be a transparent copy, to be
judged according to the truth of the thing imitated, or it is considered qua copy, and judged
according to the truth of its re-presentation of the object copied; mimesis is the performance
of a 'truth.' In 'Mimique' Mallarme describes the scene of a performance which imitates
nothing except itself, and which might be considered as a mimetic act which escapes the
order of copy and original. Derrida argues that this possibility already inhabits, not only
every so-called copy, but everything which is capable of being copied or imitated. Thus the
order of truth is subsequent to the order of imitation: there is repetition before the unique,
and non-absolute difference before either singularity of difference, self or other. Around a
thematics of the hymen, as that which both separates and joins, Derrida advances the
possibility of thinking an 'in-between' which cannot be organised around oppositions such
as inside / outside, truth / falsehood [Dis 212-222 / 261-274]. This argument within the text
is doubled by the second section of 'The Double Session.' Here Derrida argues that the
structure of what he calls the 're-mark' resists any attempt to exhaust the meaning of
Mallarme's work by thematic criticism. Writing in the context of Richard's analysis of
Mallarme in which the blank, or whiteness is proposed as the exemplary theme of his
writing, Derrida shows that the blank, the possibility of distinction between two terms in a
series, must remain a term within that series, and thus cannot be considered the ultimate
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theme, any more than any of the other terms in the series can. Each mark, in fact, is both an
exemplary member of the series of all marks, and a mark on its own. It refers both to itself,
and to the fact of its being distinguished from all other marks: this is the structure of
differance. The re-mark is an attempt to formalise a structure inherent in every mark
whereby it not only functions as a mark, but is doubled, since it also marks its own status as
a mark. The mark is in other words divided, since this structure introduces a gap or delay
between the moment in which the mark labels itself as a mark, and in which it marks
whatever it refers to. This also defeats any attempt to idealise a mark, since it will never be
complete in itself, referring to every other mark.
This structural restance (remainder), exemplarity, differance, re-marking, effect of
the hymen, supplement, contamination, is what Derrida likes in literature — and wherever
else it might be found. It is this, rather than any other code which he relates to democracy,
except under the guise of the fortunes of literature as a historical set of institutions and
definitions, defined legally or generically within a culture. The significance of the truth /
fiction opposition is not only that it determines the traditional account of the relationship
between philosophy and literature, but the account of all meaning and of all events of
meaning (events as meaning). It therefore determines the very possibility of assigning a
meaning to such terms as 'literature':
If this handbook of literature meant to say something, which we now have
some reason to doubt, it would proclaim first of all that there is no— or hardly
any, ever so little — literature; that in any event there is no essence of
literature, no truth of literature, no literary-being or being-literary of literature.
And that the fascination exerted by the 'is,' or the 'what is' in the question
'what is literature' is worth what the hymen is worth — that is, not exactly
nothing — when for example it causes one to die laughing. All this, of course,
should not prevent us — on the contrary — from attempting to find out what
has been represented and determined under that name — 'literature' and why
[DIS 223 / 275],
The literary signifies that there is something within any text which opposes or resists, and is
certainly irreducible to any thematic description. 'This handbook of literature' refers both to
Mallarme's text, and the work of Derrida's which describes it and becomes in its turn a
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handbook of literature. Thus Derrida proposes two tasks. Firstly, we must pursue the
structural or deconstructive analysis of the concept of literature, and secondly its historical or
genealogical aspect — 'what has been represented and determined under that name.' Two
things are at stake. Derrida is proposing both the possibility of thinking the entire heritage of
metaphysics otherwise — whether conceived in terms of an opposition between truth and
fiction; of critique as unveiling; of philosophy as truth against literature as fictionality; or of
history against myth — and the genealogy of the historical codification of this possibility.
The irreducible literary moment or trace within a text is thus the deconstructive moment
which shows not only that the oppositions on which philosophy and everything that
participates in it (even those disciplines to which philosophy is opposed, which must
therefore be contaminated by it) are not natural, but depend on a more general structure, for
example, that of difference, or 'democracy-to-come.' The literary moment is impossible to
the extent that it shows itself only through its effects, but is in itself only a principle of non¬
closure, of the impossibility of the complete analysis of a text, of reducing it to transparency
— that which remains. On this basis we can see that the 'literary' also undermines the
stability of a final opposition between literature and philosophy. Both 'philosophy' and
'literature' supervene on this field of undecidability, and are effects of more or less historical
stabilizations of that undecidability.
The relationship Derrida perceives between democracy and literature operates on
both the two levels we have distinguished. Not only is there a relationship between literature
and freedom of speech in a certain tradition of law, cast as the right to say anything,
pseudonymously or anonymously, but this legal apparatus testifies to a less transient, but
more opaque structure. This is not a necessary connection, and Derrida calls it a 'great good
fortune' [DaP 80], In fact, of course, the right to free speech, to say anything as literature, is
limited. If free speech is a condition for what we call democracy then a correlate of this must
be that there will always be censorship of literature. There must always be some code, if not
of censorship, then another's right to privacy or a law against libel or slander, which
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regulates what can be said in the public sphere. Even if this is not externalised in a legal
requirement, it is a responsibility which comes with writing; the possibility of a self-
censorship by the author. Again we might understand this in terms of the hyperbolic
experience of absolute responsibility again: the irresponsibility of being able to say anything
precedes and is the very condition of the responsibility which is imposed upon it to limit it.
We cannot imagine a democracy without a debate on the possibility or the need for
censorship. Without this debate, we would no longer be in a democracy: the society which
did not debate censorship would no longer be democratic. Yet at the same time, on Derrida's
account, 'each time that a literary work is censured, democracy is in danger' [PAS 28 / 65],
Derrida has given several interviews in which he has discussed the role of the media
in contemporary society, which illustrate this paradoxical situation. In an interview published
as 'Another Day for Democracy,' Derrida reflects on the relationship between 'democracy-
to-come,' public opinion and the question of the media. This makes apparent that the
relationship between democracy and freedom of speech is subject to constant negotiation and
demands the most extreme vigilance. For example he specifies that a free press should also
allow a 'right to reply'; 'France is one of the rare countries which recognises the [...] right of
response. It's a fundamental right.' However Derrida goes on to suggest that this right is so
attenuated as to be threatened: from interpretative violence, abusive simplification,
insinuations, which 'most often go without an immediate and public response, on the radio,
on the television, and in the newspapers. [...] To the extent that the right to reply does not
receive its full extension and its effectiveness (again, an infinite task), democracy as such
will be limited. Only in the press? Certainly, but the press is everywhere today [...].'39
Within the fundamental opening of democracy, guaranteed or accompanied by freedom of
speech, what we might call hegemonic or anti-democratic forces are at work. Derrida speaks
39
Jacques Derrida. L 'Autre Cap: suivi de la Democratie Ajournee. Paris: Minuit.,
121-122
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approvingly elsewhere in interviews of the diversification of the media, and of the dangers
posed by monopolization of the press. To the extent that speech is free, not just as a right
enshrined in law, but in terms of economic and social conditions, we might speak of
democratization; to the extent that it is conditioned or limited, anti-democratization. These
forces can never cancel each other out: there can never be 'full' or 'present' democracy, but
nor can the restriction of the freedom of speech ever crush the very possibility of speaking
without any controls. Or as Derrida puts it in his 'Remarks on Deconstruction and
Pragmatism,' 'it is obvious that if democracy remains to come, this right to say anything,
even in literature, is not concretely realized or actualized' [DaP 80], The title of the
interview to which I have referred brings out this problem: the published translation bears
the name 'Another Day for Democracy' but it might equally have been translated as
'Democracy adjourned' We see the same sense of deferral and promise that structured the
concept of democracy-to-come in Politics ofFriendship.
1.3.2 The Politics of the Secret
Throughout the period of Derrida's reflections on 'democracy-to-come' and often in the
same texts, an association is made between literature and 'the secret.' In this section I will
describe this association, and argue that it enables us to think of democracy-to-come as in
part a problematization of the public / private distinction on which the concept of politics is
often founded, particularly in the tradition of liberal political thought.
Derrida's use of the term 'secret' can be directly connected to the questions of
exemplarity and differance which 1 have already described. Derrida gives a long account of
the secret in 'Passions,' and it is possible to read this description as articulating precisely the
connection between literature (the trace, the remark), or differance, and democracy that we
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have been following. Derrida combines the modes of affirmation or testimony ('there is
something secret') and indication ('there is something secret'), based on the close
relationship between the French phrases '// y a la secret' and 77 y a la un secret.' Mixing the
two modes of address (claiming both that 'there is a secret' and that 'there is a secret') gives
the text a performative dimension which precedes and overflows the apparently apophatic
presentation [pas 24 / 56], For the secret is approached entirely in terms of what it is not.
The secret is not an art hidden within the human, either that of artistic genius or of the
transcendental imagination, nor is there a question of election for anyone who knows the
secret [pas 24 / 56-7]. The secret is not an unconscious representation, whether recoverable
or reconstructible by psychoanalysis. It is not of the order of subjectivity, nor of the
resistance to the Hegelian system, neither existential nor Kierkegaardian; nor is it either
sacred or profane [pas 24-5 / 57-8]. The secret is not an effect of religious revelation. It
belongs 'no more to the private than to the public' [Pas 25 / 58-9]. The secret is not any
form of interiority, but a structural effect, irreducible to the conceptual distinction between
inside and outside. It is not of the order of secret as we understand it in terms of possible
revelation — any secret which could be revealed is not an absolute secret in Derrida's sense.
The secret withholds itself from the order of truth as either adequation or unveiling. The
secret must remain foreign to 'knowledge and of historical narrative, and outside of all
periodization, all epochalization' [pas 27 / 62]. In other words, the secret is another word for
the experience of singularity — for what resists all categorization or generalization, but
cannot be recognised by any law.
Translated into political terms, Derrida draws on the secret — this principle of
absolute singularity — to affirm a dimension of privacy which could be thought beyond the
opposition between the public and the private, and perhaps therefore irreducible to any
politics: 'I have attempted to think an experience of the secret and of singularity to which the
public realm has no right and no power' [DaP 81]. It is worth bearing in mind here that the
distinction between public and private has been used on the one hand to reserve a realm of
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experience from a political intervention — often in the liberal tradition, economic activity,
religious belief or morality — while on the other hand it registers a boundary which can
always be crossed by the state: the private person as citizen is already wholly bound to the
law. The non-absolute secret, a secret which can be passed on or revealed, from which
Derrida distinguishes his own account of the secret, would be equivalent to this right to
privacy; a right which has been violated in advance, as a revocable concession made on the
basis of a prior public claim to know everything. This is again clear from Derrida's
'Remarks on Deconstruction and Pragmatism':
this secret is not something that 1 keep within me; it is not me. The secret is not
the secret of representation that one keeps in one's head and which one
chooses not to tell, it is rather a secret coextensive with the experience of
singularity. The secret is irreducible to the public realm — although 1 do not
call it private— and irreducible to publicity and politicization, but at the same
time, this secret is that on the basis of which the public realm and the realm of
the political can be and remain open [DaP 81].
The secret is not a question of any particular or possible content, but of a political limit. This
limit would entail both a desirable restraint on the power of the state, but also a limit which
generates political responsibility as such. Only to the extent that each citizen is not a citizen
— that is, in the terms of our previous discussion, is not a countable singularity — is there
any need for calculation, for negotiation. Only once there is infinite responsibility is there
any responsibility at all. The secret may not be anything, but the principle of the secret is
irreducible if there is any politics at all. It is perhaps in this sense that the secret, literature
and freedom of speech are found to be the necessary conditions of democracy, rather than
through an accident of history. In 'Passions' Derrida proposes just this, linking the secret to
'a hyperbolic condition of democracy which seems to contradict a certain determined and
historically limited concept of such a democracy, a concept which links it to the concept of a
subject that is calculable, accountable, imputable and responsible' [PAS 29 / 66-7]. What
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Derrida describes as the exemplary secret of literature is that of a principle of restance —
that which remains— on which might be articulated a thought of resistance.40
1.4 Deconstruction and Radical Democracy
I BEGAN THIS chapter with Derrida's provocative identification of deconstruction and
democracy. After considering Derrida's account of 'democracy-to-come' and his discussion
of the relationship between literature and democracy, we can provisionally formulate some
conclusions. Derrida is attempting to think something like a constitutive flaw in the concept
of democracy, which generates on the one hand 'democracy-to-come' as an ideal of justice
which democracy can never reach, beyond enumeration and equality; but on the other hand
which opens the possibility of an analysis or a criticism which would permanently bear
witness to this gap, and seek to reduce it, without claiming to know how to do so. Derrida
calls this situation 'democracy-to-come,' but it is a structural effect of what he elsewhere
calls deconstruction. Deconstruction would also name the approach which best claims to
represent or think this situation, proposing this critique of any existing form of democracy,
while stressing a principle of ruin within the concept itself which rules out proposing an
ameliorative program or solution. Derrida's work on democracy has a certain amount in
common with a heterogeneous body of political theory which it is convenient to group under
the label of radical democratic theory. This is broadly left-wing in political affiliation and
40 Derrida suggests this connection with explicit reference to 'the secret of literature'
in Resistances: de laPsychanalyse. Paris: Galilee, 1996. 38-41.
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characterised by a rejection of revolutionary practice in favour of a commitment to furthering
the critique of liberal democracy within the democratic system. In particular, radical
democracy calls for a re-evaluation of the space of politics in terms of opposition and
dissensus rather than a search for consensus and agreement — for an 'agonistic' (Chantal
Mouffe) or 'antagonistic' (William Connolly) democracy rather than what Bonnie Honig has
called the traditional aim of political theory, the displacement of politics itself.41 Radical
democratic theorists have been prepared to accept the incommensurability of competing
political claims rather than seeking to reconcile such claims within a broader rational
discursive horizon or an overarching political theory or theory of society. In her introduction
to Dimensions of Radical Democracy, Chantal Mouffe identifies as typical concerns of
radical democratic thought: a dissatisfaction with both liberal and communitarian theory; a
suspicion of rights as masking historical and ideological or economic interests of particular
groups; an attempt to distinguish political and economic liberalism; an interest in active
citizenship dissociated from a theory of national identity or unity. In similar terms to
Derrida's, Mouffe concludes: 'our understanding of radical democracy [...] postulates the
very impossibility of a final realization of democracy. It affirms that the unresolvable tension
between the principles of equality and liberty is the very condition for the preservation of the
indeterminacy and undecidability which is constitutive of modern democracy. [...] Radical
democracy also means the radical impossibility of a fully achieved democracy.'42 In this
section I will attempt to evaluate Derrida's work on the concept of democracy by comparing
it with the notion of radical democracy, in particular as it is advanced in the work of Ernesto
Laclau and Chantal Mouffe. Through this comparison, and a discussion of Claude Lefort's
analysis of the relation between democracy and totalitarianism, I will be able to formulate
41 Chantal Mouffe. The Democratic Paradox. London: Verso, 2000.; William
Connolly. Identity and Difference. Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1991.; Bonnie Honig. Political
Theory and the Displacement ofPolitics. Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1993.
42 Chantal Mouffe. 'Introduction.' to Mouffe ed., Dimensions ofRadical Democracy.
London: Verso, 1992. 13-4.
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both the constitutive limits of radical democratic thought and the alternative offered by the
deconstructive thinking of democracy.
1.4.1 Hegemony and Deconstruction
The work of Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe has been possibly the only sustained
attempt from within the discipline of political theory to negotiate with deconstruction.43 Not
only does their theorisation of radical democracy, first proposed in Hegemony and Socialist
Strategy, predate Derrida's own turn to the question of democracy, but in formulating their
theory they draw explicitly on his writing. Hegemony and Socialist Strategy attempts three
things at once. Grounded in a re-reading of the Marxist tradition intended to draw out an
alternative logic for the Left — without discarding the Marxist heritage — and in particular
to adopt and adapt Gramsci's theory of hegemony, their book proposes both 1) a diagnosis of
the political and historical situation of the last two hundred years and 2) of the contemporary
scene in terms of radical democratic emancipation and neo-conservative reaction to it; and 3)
also a rethinking and redirection of socialist strategy on the basis of the first two objectives.
This last aim is met by two criteria. Firstly, by embracing post-structuralist thought to help
theorise the field of the social and to recognise the limits of political intervention, and
secondly by the widening of traditional left-wing politics. Laclau and Mouffe drop the notion
of a unified working class as the motor of revolution; accept that economic conditions may
not necessarily be primary; and seek to establish what they call a chain of equivalence
between various otherwise distinct political struggles — between ecological and feminist
43 See Bennington. Legislations. 6n.6.; Interrupting Derrida. 198n.4. For a general
account of Laclau and Mouffe's work see Anna Marie Smith. Laclau & Mouffe: The Radical
Democratic Imaginary. London: Routledge, 1998.
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politics as well as more traditional socialist struggles, for example. Importantly, where
traditional political theory has either worked from empirical observation or a projected ideal
of a political body, Laclau and Mouffe place their emphasis very heavily on method rather
than on conclusions; they attempt to think of politics as unending. Where most political
theory has proposed endpoints or utopianism, or at least an end to politics, Laclau and
Mouffe want to pass on a mobile conception of politics in terms of strategic gains and
demands rather than universal, often disabling, conceptions of aims and means, 'the two
extremes represented by the totalitarian myth of the Ideal City, and the positivist pragmatism
of reformists without a project' [HSS 190]. The theory of hegemony, they emphasise, offers
a way of thinking contingency rather than historical necessity [HSS 3; 6],
The socialism the two authors put forward is subordinated to a wider project, of
maintaining and working within what they call 'radical democracy.' In relation to this end,
'socialism is one of the components for a project of radical democracy, not vice versa' [HSS
178], This drastic reformulation of the role and aims of socialism, traditionally seen as the
absolute transformation of both the political sphere and of civil society — including the
abolition of such a distinction — on the basis of the internal contradictions of capitalist
economics, depends largely on the diagnosis of the theoretical and empirical-historical
situation which Laclau and Mouffe put forward. This is where deconstructive and other post-
structuralist thought comes into the equation. For it is from post-structuralism that Laclau
and Mouffe come to their major premises: the social is to be taken as 'the constitutive
ground or "negative essence" of the existing, and the diverse "social orders" as precarious
and ultimately failed attempts to domesticate the field of differences' [HSS 95-6], They
follow Hindness and Hirst's influential critique of Althusser, and in particular their attack on
determination and causation: 'The social formation is not a totality governed by an
organizing principle, determination in the last instance, structural causality, or whatever'
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[HSS 100-1].44 From Derrida they take the impossibility of fixing meanings, although they
correctly see that there must be partial fixings of meaning, interventions, which they call
articulations (and these articulations imply a relation in which both elements are
transformed): ' The practice of articulation, therefore, consists in the construction of nodal
points which partially fix meaning; and the partial character of this fixation proceeds from
the openness ofthe social, a result, in its turn, of the constant overflowing ofevery discourse
by the infinitude ofthe field ofdiscursivity' [HSS 113]. Radicalising Gramsci, they claim that
we need to think of a plurality of political spaces, which are not to be totalised into one
political claim or struggle.
A radical thinking of democracy attempts to recognise both the space of emergence
of new political subjects and the conflictual and antagonistic nature of the social sphere. The
competing claims of various political particularisms represent for Laclau and Mouffe both a
response to the fragmentation of the social sphere and resistance to its subsequent
homogenisation, articulated within the historical legacy or residue of the liberal-democratic
egalitarian imagination. The task of the New Left is to deepen and radicalise this
egalitarianism — against any essentialism, including that of a class-based socialism — with
a commitment to a political pluralism. To this end they supplement the demand for equality
with a demand for liberty [HSS 184]. This pluralism is called for and made possible by the
nature of the social sphere as they conceive it: 'It is to this plurality of the social that the
project for a radical democracy is linked, and the possibility of it emanates directly from the
[...] displacements which take place within that plurality' [HSS 181]. Laclau and Moufife
recommend a strategy whereby separate political struggles are articulated together, not so
much as alliances but through a process of mutual transformation: a logic of equivalence
must be established between the distinct conflicts ('anti-racism, anti-sexism, and anti-
44 See Antony Easthope. British Post-structuralism. London: Routledge, 1988.;
Robert Young. White Mythologies: Writing History and the West. London: Routledge, 1990.
for partial accounts ofHindness and Hirst's work and influence.
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capitalism' [HSS 182], for example) which entails a dissolution of the autonomy of the
spaces in which each of these struggles is constituted. All must become 'the equivalent
symbols of a unique and indivisible struggle' [HSS 182]. Laclau and Mouffe oppose the
notion of each struggle being autonomous, since this would imply a closed totality, and
instead demand political logics which intervene in the constitution of identity, but refuse to
dominate or produce an 'ultimate foundation' of the social. Acknowledging these multiple
spaces of struggle constitutes their vision of radical democracy as 'pluralist' [HSS 184],
Even on this brief account it is apparent that there is a basic compatibility between a
deconstructive and a radical democratic approach. However, before comparing the two
strategies, I will set out three reservations with regard to Laclau and Mouffe's account. The
first concerns the status of radical democracy itself. There seems to me an ambiguity within
the logic ofHegemony and Socialist Strategy which is not clarified in the later work of either
author. Either radical democracy is the objective of radical democratic practice — a
'radicalization of democracy,' for which, as Laclau puts it in a later text, contemporary social
struggles 'create the preconditions'45 — or it is the dimension of democracy as already in
existence which makes such a radical democratic practice possible. To put it another way,
having argued for a model of politics considered as unending struggle to replace both the
liberal teleology of progress towards consensus and revolutionary socialism, does a more
sophisticated, but equally teleological model of the ends of politics creep in: the ideal social
and discursive conditions for such a political process? Or is radical democracy a re-
description of the relationship between politics and the social sphere — akin to recent work
on civil society — designed to recognise a radical potential already at work within
democracy, which forms the preconditions on which a better socialist project is to be built,
with the objective of'the abolition of capitalist relations of production' [HSS 192]?
45 Ernesto Laclau. New Reflections on the Revolution ofOur Time. London: Verso,
1990.
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My second reservation concerns the logic of equivalence by which specific
oppositional political struggles are to be articulated. In Hegemony and Socialist Strategy
Laclau and Mouffe insist that 'the discourse of radical democracy is no longer the discourse
of the universal' [HSS 191] but also that through the category of equivalence, different
political struggles may be articulated. But are these two claims compatible? The possibility
of a radical incommensurability between political struggles or demands cannot be dealt with
in these terms; indeed it is ruled out in advance. Laclau and Mouffe's first formulation of
equivalence appears to return the universal under another name, as the universal right to
contribute to the socialist struggle. The argument that 'For the defence of the interests of the
workers not to be made at the expense of the rights ofwomen, immigrants or consumers, it is
necessary to establish an equivalence between these different struggles' [HSS 184] may have
been borne out by the apparent equivalence of the contradictory demands made on behalf of
economic and trade protectionism, workers' rights, anarchism, and environmentalism by the
disparate elements of the recent anti-capitalist and anti-globalisation protests around the
globe. But it still seems uncertain both in theory and in practice whether the formal
equivalence between these demands is not merely an effect of their opposition to an ill-
defined status quo. Laclau has subsequently offered a revised account, which appears to
accept this criticism. The logic of equivalence is now to be understood in terms of
universalism and particularism.46 Any particularist demand — for higher wages or against a
minimum wage, for freedom of the press or for formal privacy laws, for cheaper food or
against the influence of supermarket chains — makes a universal claim at the same time, and
that this universal logic of each particular claim makes it available for articulation with other
struggles: 'there is no logic of pure particularism.'47 However the possibility that demands
46 For example in Judith Butler, Ernesto Laclau and Slavoj Zizek. Contingency,
Hegemony, Universality: Contemporary Dialogues on the Left. London: Verso, 2000. 302-
303.
47
Contingency, Hegemony, Universality. 305.
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might be irreconcilable cannot be dealt with within this schema: in fact, the future for the
left depends on precisely this universal articulation of emergent particularisms, but the
foundation of this universal remains not 'an empty signifier,' as Laclau wishes, but an anti-
system or anti-State stance.48
My third reservation about Laclau and Mouffe's account of radical democracy can
be more clearly related to Derrida's work, and in particular to the confrontation between
Claude Lefort and Derrida's philosophical friends involved in the Centre for Research into
Philosophy and Politics to which 1 referred in the introduction to this chapter. Lefort's work
plays a crucial role in Hegemony and Socialist Strategy and I will argue that the difficulties
of his analysis of democracy are carried over into the radical democratic project.
1.4.2 Democracy and Totalitarianism
Laclau and Mouffe draw on Claude Lefort to draw together several arguments, which
although they do not emphasise this fact, are vital to their project in Hegemony and Socialist
Strategy. In particular they depend on Claude Lefort's distinction between democracy and
totalitarianism. Firstly, this distinction serves to guarantee the radical potential of democracy
itself. They recognise an inherent danger in their own account, 'from the moment at which
this space of equivalences ceases to be considered as one political space amongst others and
comes to be seen as the centre, which subordinates and organizes all other spaces' [HSS
186], This danger is of a final closure of the space of the political which has 'paradoxically'
been made possible by 'the very logic of openness and of the democratic subversion of
48 For a rigorous attempt to deal with such irreconcilable demands see Jean-Francois
Lyotard. The Differend: Phrases in Dispute, trans. Georges Van Den Abbeele. Minneapolis:
U Minnesota P, 1988.
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differences' [HSS 186], The name for this closure is totalitarianism. Without this point of
reference, the specificity of their account of democracy would lose its purchase, and they
would be simply describing the nature of politics as such, rather than being able to draw
specific strategic recommendations within the general field of politics. Secondly, Lefort's
account of the historical development of totalitarianism, grounded in the attempt of the
Socialisme ou Barbarie group to draw a line between their own socialism and that of the
Soviet Union, at a time when other left-wing intellectuals were defending or ignoring the
failings of existing State-Socialism, both distances Hegemony and Socialist Strategy from
less reputable socialist forms and injects a sense of crisis into the text: once liberal
democracy has become no longer the target for socialism but its very foundation,
totalitarianism becomes not only the enemy, but also an ever-present menace. Thirdly,
Lefort's account of the empty space at the centre of democracy provides a reassuringly
philosophical and historical account to which they can refer.49 However, in relying on
Lefort, Laclau and Mouffe neutralise the radicality of their own project, as we shall see.
Lefort's influential account of democracy can be summarised in the claim that under
a modern democratic regime, 'the locus of power becomes an empty place.' This is, he
claims, its 'revolutionary and unprecedented feature' and implies 'an institutionalization of
conflict. [...] Democracy is instituted and sustained by the dissolution of the markers of
certainty. '50 The historical roots of democracy lie in the loss of the identification of the body
of the monarch with the body politic, the liberal detachment of the individual from society,
and the disengagement of civil society from the state. These conditions combine to generate
a form of society in which the place of power is contested, and some form of balance of
49 For an account of Lefort's work see Bernard Flyna 'Claude Lefort: The Flesh of
the Political.' Political Philosophy at the Closure of Metaphysics. Atlantic Highlands:
Humanities P., 1992.
50 Claude Lefort. Democracy and Political Theory, trans. David Macey. Oxford:
Blackwell, 1988. 17; 19.
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forces is necessary.51 By contrast, totalitarianism— 'the major fact of our time' — is defined
by 'the development of the fantasy of the People-as-One, the beginnings of a quest for a
substantial identity, for a social body which is welded to its head, for an embodying power,
for a state free of division.'52 Under such a regime, 'it is denied that division is constitutive
of society.'53 The importance of such a distinction for Lefort is that it opens up a possibility
within socialism to criticise certain forms of State socialism, but also that it provides a
principle of a certain kind of political realism. As he argued when presenting his paper 'The
Question of Democracy' to the Centre for Philosophical Research on the Political in 1980, it
no longer becomes possible to summarily dismiss democracy as 'bourgeois.'54 To attempt to
present democracy as in some way concealing subtle forms of totalitarianism becomes at
best naive, at worst dangerous and cynical. There are some curiosities about Lefort's
account, as we shall see, not least the free intermingling of psychoanalytic, historical and
political arguments, but it has been drawn upon by a number of recent theorists, including
not only Laclau and Mouffe, but also Phillipe Lacoue-Labarthe and Jean-Luc Nancy, for
example in their paper 'The Re-treat of the Political.'55 However, their account develops the
logic which Lefort seems determined to resist, but which was immediately raised against him
when he gave the paper: 'Does not present-day democracy conceal a totalitarian threat? Is
not democracy another, perhaps more subtle, form of totalitarianism?'56 What Lacoue-
Labarthe and Nancy do share with Lefort is a concern with the representational or imaginary
dimension of the political sphere; when considering his arguments from Derrida's point of
view, however, there is less common ground.
51 Claude Lefort. The Political Forms ofModern Society: Bureaucracy, Democracy,
Totalitarianism. Oxford: Polity, 1986. 301-3.
52 Political Forms ofModern Society. 292., Democracy and Political Theory. 20.
53 Political Forms ofModern Society. 297.
54
Democracy and Political Theory. 10.
55 Phillipe Lacoue-Labarthe and Jean-Luc Nancy, ed. Simon Sparks. Retreating the
Political. London: Routledge, 1997. 122-134.
56 This account of this encounter comes in Simon Critchley. The Ethics of
Deconstruction. Oxford: Blackwell, 209-210.
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If we read Politics ofFriendship as a response to Lefort, there is indeed little room
for dialogue. For the logic of democracy-to-come, as I argued in relation to the issue of
freedom of speech, is precisely an attempt to distinguish between democratizing and
totalitarian (anti-democratic) movements within the so-called democratic state itself. Indeed,
Derrida's concern to distinguish between the promise of equality within democracy —- but a
paradoxical equality which would exceed or ruin the very boundaries of the state, taken to its
limit — from the reductive dependence of citizenship on some principle of autochthony,
from the naturalization of the political decision, can be productively read as a blurring of the
distinction between totalitarianism and democracy, considered as conceptual forms. The very
possibility of partially disentangling the logics suggests that the opposition may still be
maintained, up to a point, as a useful historical category. But the essential task for Derrida is
clearly not to fortify the boundaries of democracy by threatening it with the spectre of the
totalitarian, but to provide a principle against which democracy might also be judged.
Lefort's historical derivation of the categories in question itself runs into trouble. For while
his model claims to be historically aware, it must remain unable to account for historical
change. If totalitarianism is effectively the end of politics, if we could ever imagine a full
totalitarianism, we would be unable to conceive of political resistance to that system.
Attempting to answer this dilemma, concerning the political success of civil society in
Poland, Lefort argues that 'the vulnerability of the totalitarian system in a crisis situation
stems from the fact that the internal social divisions are subordinated to a general division
between the sphere of power and that of civil society.'57 But if civil society can offer a
principle of resistance, it must already be at least potentially politiciticized. Lefort has no
apparent solution to this problem. At one point he refers to 'forms of resistance to the
totalitarian project' which while not 'conscious, political resistance' are 'social relations that
57 Political Forms ofModern Society. 310.
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elude the grip of power,'58 but elsewhere he provides the only possible convincing resolution
of the problem, which is to argue that no totalitarianism is ever total, in emphasizing the
logic of totalitarianism,' Lefort admits, 'I do not at all wish to suggest that it is
insurmountable.' We must distinguish between what totalitarianism 'ideally' is and what it is
'in actual development.'59 Lefort's psychoanalytic vocabulary, in which the social body is
the site of an imaginary identification, obscures the extent to which his categories depend on
an idealised dualism. If no totalitarianism is ever total, the opposition with democracy will
not hold: rather than an ideal of totalitarianism, we are left with an ideal opposition, which
risks, as Simon Critchley argues, leaving Lefort as an apologist for liberal democracy [ED
211-2],
This difficulty of keeping the concepts of democracy and totalitarianism distinct in
turn sheds some light on Derrida's work on democracy. As I have argued in this chapter,
both what Derrida calls 'democracy-to-come,' the effect of a twist within the logic of
democracy which leads it to contradict its own promise, and his more historical reading of
the relationship between literature and democracy, might lead us to the conclusion that there
is no democracy, or 'or hardly any, ever so little.' If Derrida is read as offering a genealogy
of the type which Laclau and Mouffe undertake, this would render his work either self-
contradictory, or effectively useless. However, the deconstructive genealogy of the concept
has a quite different effect. The problem of defining democracy as a concept is twofold:
internally, democracy is always contradicting its own promise; externally it can never be
rigorously separated from other political forms. But these structural or conceptual problems
provide a kind of ground for both a continual critique of democracy — no democracy ever
lives up to its name, so there can be no temptation to be satisfied with democracy as we have
it— and a point of opposition to the kind of historically-based political theory which serves
~8 Political Forms ofModern Society. 300.
59 Political Forms ofModern Society. 313.
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to justify and naturalise actually existing democracy, or indeed, any imaginable democratic
politics. But this is also done in the context of an affirmation of the positive content of the
concept of democracy (equality, freedom of speech) without any triumphalism, and an
extension of the possibility of positive political effects to both civil society and the state
apparatus. For if the opposition of democracy to totalitarianism on which Laclau and Mouffe
depend does not hold up, their dogmatic opposition to the power of the state can be
questioned, and the interminable strategic and contingent negotiations with the political as
we experience it can begin.
1.4.3 The Limits of Radical Democracy
We are now in a position to formulate the principal differences between Derrida's work on
the concept of democracy and that of Laclau and Mouffe. Mouffe suggests in her
introduction to Dimensions ofRadical Democracy that 'the problem [...] is not the ideals of
modern democracy, but the fact that its political principles are a long way from being
implemented.'60 However for Derrida the problem is not just the distance of modern
democracy from the ideal of democracy, but an internal dehiscence in the concept and ideal
of democracy itself. Whereas Laclau and Mouffe are able to formulate strategic models
based on the principle of narrowing the gap between the reality and the ideal of democracy,
— even if they do not wish to reduce that gap altogether and project an end to politics— for
Derrida such work, however necessary, requires a supplementary project. That project would
be the deconstructive concern with the limits inscribed within the concept of democracy
itself and which cannot be diagnosed as the effect of historical circumstances; nor resolved
60 Dimensions ofRadical Democracy. 1.
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by strategic and historical intervention. In this section 1 will demonstrate the difference that
Derrida's conceptual analysis makes for thinking about politics, and the importance of
insisting on that difference.
For Laclau and Mouffe the historical existence of democracy is the necessary
precondition for radical political action. This necessity is bolstered in their argument by the
spectre of totalitarianism and functions to guarantee both the historical pertinence of their
work (which they distinguish from normative or prescriptive theorising) and its pragmatic
realism. As I have argued however, for Derrida the opposition between totalitarianism and
democracy cannot be made absolute on a historical basis, but is closer to being the effect of
an internal contradiction within the concept of democracy itself. Because this problematizes
the possibility of defining democracy in contrast to other historical political regimes,
democracy must in some sense also function within Derrida's work as a name for politics as
such. In Politics of Friendship Derrida writes of attempting 'to think, interpret, and
implement another politics, another democracy' [PoF 104 / 128]. Throughout this chapter I
have assumed that 'democracy' is the name of that particular political system which Derrida
has been seeking to think. But the syntax is ambiguous and another interpretation can be
suggested. What if politics and democracy are synonymous? Once we accept that we cannot
rigorously tell the friend from the enemy, or the self-interest of the many from the good of
the many, and moreover, that this is not a reversal but the very foundation of the logic of
friendship and of politics, wouldn't democracy not only be the political form par excellence
but also the very name of politics as such? 'We are dealing here, as regards number,'
Derrida suggests 'with an analogy between friendship and the polis, between friendship and
what constitutes the political as such' [PoF 212 / 239]. The difference between Laclau and
Mouffe and Derrida would on this account appear to be that the former offer a historically
situated political theory while the latter is attempting to rethink the concept of politics itself.
This opens up the possibility of a critique of the ideal of democracy which would no
longer keep the name democracy. While Derrida may choose to retain the name here, in his
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formulation of a 'democracy-to-come' his work presumes the possibility that in another time,
in another space, the term could be disregarded or jettisoned. However the strategic options
for Laclau and Mouffe remain more limited, since their argument depends on the affirmation
of the existence of both an ideal and a reality of democracy. Derrida leaves open the
possibility of a more radical political theory or practice, even if maintaining that possibility
requires considerably less detail to his strategic political suggestions, as is certainly the case
in Politics ofFriendship. Simon Critchley has argued that 'what the infinite ethical demand
of deconstruction requires is a theory of hegemonization, that is, an account of the political
conceived in terms of strategy and tactics, power and force [...] and most importantly, the
question of identification, of social movements, and the credibility of the party form. The
logics of deconstruction and hegemony need to be soldered at this point, I think, in a
reciprocal relation of supplementarity.'61 However what he is calling for is a theory of
political deconstruction as the symptomatology of political movements and a political
programme based upon it; or in other words, the development of rules, and precisely the kind
of naturalisation of the decision which restricts the possibility of a democracy-to-come. The
rethinking of the space of politics which Derrida announces under the guise of a genealogical
deconstruction of the concepts of democracy and friendship may not be strictly incompatible
with the project of radical democracy, but it overflows it and exceeds it. Radical democratic
thought would be inscribed within the space of politics whose possible understanding is
opened up by deconstructive thought.
This is not how Laclau and Mouffe see things. For their account depends on the
possibility that deconstruction can be subordinated to their account of hegemony. They tend
to reduce deconstruction to a theory of the 'constitutive outside' which provides one tool for
their analysis of the incompleteness of the social sphere. It is for this reason that Chantal
Mouffe can only reflect on a political approach which would be 'informed by
61 Critchley. Ethics—Politics—Subjectivity. 283.
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deconstruction' rather than accepting that deconstruction is already both political theory and
practice.62 In responding to some comments by Ernesto Laclau, Derrida has made much the
same point. While agreeing with most of Laclau's analysis, Derrida emphasises that there is
something missing from it, something which deconstruction offers, but the theory of
hegemony or of radical democracy cannot: 'there is, in the opening of a context of
argumentation and discussion, a reference — unknown, indeterminate, but none the less
thinkable— to disarmament.' Politics as violence 'can only be practised and can only appear
as such on the basis of a non-violence, a vulnerability, an exposition.' Moreover,
This is not the dream of a beautifully pacific relation, but of a certain
experience of friendship perhaps unthinkable today and unthought within the
historical determination of friendship in the West. This is a friendship, what I
sometimes call an aimance, that excludes violence; a non-appropriative
relation to the other that occurs without violence and on the basis of which all
violence detaches itself and is determined [DaP 83],
Like the secret, which opens the possibility of a resistance to all politicization while
disrupting any opposition between the public and the private, so aimance interrupts while
keeping open the closure of politics as necessary violence. (Contra Mouffe, deconstruction is
not simply 'hyperpoliticizing' but also interrupts politics.63) Politics as violence is to be
thought on the basis of aimance rather than vice versa. But this suggestion is itself political,
and therefore violent in its turn. The relationship between aimance and political friendship is
not based around the opposition of 'a beautifully pacific relation' to violence. Hegemony and
Socialist Strategy, while perhaps a necessary form of political violence, lacks the concern of
deconstruction for this impossible moment of non-violence. It is this concern which makes
deconstruction a more radical political theory than that of Laclau and Mouffe, as 1 will
briefly suggest.
The performative dimension of democracy-to-come enables Derrida to think
affirmatively, without programming the future in terms of a particular historical
62 Mouffe. 'Deconstruction, Pragmatism and Democracy.' 1.
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configuration of forces. The promise of democracy is to be found not only in so-called
democratic regimes, but in every political situation, and as in the case of the foundation of
politics on the distinction between public and private, the definition of political space is
greatly extended by deconstruction. This would mean that there is a promise of democracy
within the apparatus of the state, as well as outside it, and a promise of change within every
oppositional or conservative social or political movement, which does not depend on the
establishment of a chain of equivalences, but which can include the recognition that
opposing demands may be radically incommensurable. Repressive state structures can be
thought of as only temporary 'stabilizations of power' [DaP 83]: conversely there will be no
state structure that is not 'repressive' in this way. As Derrida remarks: 'In order to continue
to pose the question of the political, it is necessary to withdraw something from the political
and the same thing for democracy, which, of course, makes democracy a very paradoxical
concept' [DaP 85]. Derrida's work offers a less certain and more disconcerting account of
both politics and democracy than Laclau and Mouffe can. Ultimately I suspect that to the
extent that their objectives are identified with a particular political system (that of 'radical'
democracy), rather than with any external criteria, Laclau and Mouffe remain unable to
negotiate between rival political claims within that space, except in terms of their
politicality: the degree to which they affirm and maintain the plurality of democracy. Derrida
however, despite the extreme asceticism of his political thought, can maintain criteria for
distinguishing the totalitarian and democratic tendencies within any political system, even if
any such distinction must remain a provisional judgement, and can never be absolutely
upheld. This gives Derrida's work its distinctive affirmative dimension. As he describes his
own strategy in Politics ofFriendship,
63 'Deconstruction, Pragmatism and Democracy.' 9.
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the apostrophe 'O my friends' also turns toward the past. It recalls, it points to
that which must indeed be supposed in order to be heard, if only in the non-
apophantic form of prayer: you have already marked this minimal friendship,
this preliminary consent without which you would not hear me. Otherwise you
would not listen to my call, you would not be sensitive to the element of hope
in my complaint [PoF 236 / 264].
The paradox of deconstruction as political practice is that while taking the form of a
'complaint,' as an interminable work of mourning or of bearing witness to disaster, it is able
to maintain an element of hope, the promise of something different. In this, deconstruction is
perhaps more radically democratic — open to whatever happens to come to pass [arrive] —
than any theory of radical democracy.
1.5 Conclusion
IN HIS ESSAY on 'Derrida and politics' Geoffrey Bennington helpfully formulates the
relationship between deconstruction and democracy as one of exemplarity: 'Deconstruction
then, on the one hand generalises the concept of politics so that it includes all conceptual
dealings whatsoever, and on the other makes a precise use of one inherited politico-
metaphysical concept, democracy, to make a pointed and more obviously political
intervention in political thought.'64 Bennington makes clear the duality of the deconstructive
approach to politics. 'Deconstruction' names both a rethinking of politics as such, both its




political moment; these are inseparable. It is clear however that the boundaries between these
two movements within deconstruction are also variable, and that it may not be possible to
distinguish them so precisely. I have argued in this chapter that from at least two points of
view, 'democracy' for Derrida labels the possibility of politics as such. Both in terms of its
classical roots and the structure of democracy's appeal, democracy names the space of
politics and justice itself. Considered in terms of the secret, as a constitutive disruption of the
opposition between public and private, democracy again names the possibility of the
foundation of politics. This understanding of democracy clearly exceeds such distinctions as
that made between the democracy and the totalitarian in radical democratic theory. But does
this in turn mean that Lefort was correct to accuse Derrida and his friends of being 'unable to
discern freedom in democracy, because democracy is defined as bourgeois [and] unable to
discern servitude in totalitarianism'? Is the concept of democracy as Derrida understands it,
as McCarthy claims, 'ineffable'? Would this confirm our lingering suspicions that a
messianic politics is a politics that waits for an interruption that could only come from
outside the system within which that politics functions?
Only by bearing certain factors in mind can we avoid rushing to such a hasty and
dismissive conclusion. The first is to do with context. Politics of Friendship offers a
deconstructive genealogy of the concept of democracy. This is clearly not the same thing as
a critical analysis of the various historical and theoretical forms that the concept of
democracy has taken. But such an analysis is not ruled out by Derrida's work; indeed, in
some sense, it is both required by it and called for at the same time. For if the necessary
prerequisite for action in any particular situation is as much knowledge as possible, even if
that knowledge can never make a decision, without programming it, and if a decision must
be made without submitting to a theoretical rule— democracy should take this or that form
— we are obliged to undertake the closest possible historical and empirical study. But we
must do so without expecting that this will take away the decision itself. Rather than
rejecting history in favour of philosophy, Derrida has often insisted on the necessity of more,
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and more sophisticated, historical work. This would be historical work that did not seek to
submit the example to the rule (waves of democratization, a theory of modernity or post-
modernity, globalisation). The second factor we should bear in mind is that the performative
dimension of Derrida's text re-marks it as a contingent contribution. To assess his account of
democracy-to-come as a political strategy would require detailed analysis of the public space
in France, of the reception of the book, of the effects of the original seminar 'Politics of
Friendship' on those who attended it, on the after-life of the book, an after-life which has yet
to begin, in some senses. We would also have to read the book in more detail as a response
to Nancy, Blanchot and perhaps also Levinas.65 If an appeal to democracy seems politically
naive now that 'democracy' has become the rule not the exception (but is this the case, what
kind of criteria would define democracy?) wouldn't the possibility of renewing the criteria
forjudging democracy be an important counterbalance to a certain democratic triumphalism?
The third significant factor is that as I have attempted to underline throughout, Derrida's
intervention on the concept of democracy is not a final end or destination for deconstruction
(if not for politics itself, as Bennington acknowledges): but that this intervention is only one
of the (infinitely) many possible, more or less political, deconstructive operations. It is also
in some sense an attempt to describe what is happening. This means a constant affirmation of
a potential for democratization, and risk of the totalitarian at work everyday, everywhere, not
a holding out for a revolutionary transformation by some external force.
The risk of Bennington's account, and this can be seen to some extent in the many
politically quiescent receptions of Derrida's work, is that while deconstruction is certainly
considered to be political, the deconstruction of political thought and of politics as such is
forgotten: if democracy-to-come is the answer, what work is there left to do? Derrida
65 I have begun to do so in the article I have already cited, 'Against community:
Derrida contra Nancy.' and in chapter 4 below.
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chooses to maintain the name of democracy at one point, in one 'here and now.' Our
response to Derrida, the response called for by his re-inscription of the democratic appeal —







IN THE PRECEDtNG chapter I argued that Derrida's work on democracy must be understood as
both an attempt to intervene in a specific political and historical context, under the name of
democracy, and an attempt to think the limits, and therefore the possibility of a
transformation, of the concept of politics itself— but perhaps so extensive a transformation
that none of the old names would be appropriate, and for which 'democracy-to-come' is only
one of the possible names. However this leads to a potential confusion in the terms of the
discussion. Since it is generally understood as a label for a particular state form, re-thinking
'democracy' risks restricting the scope of politics to the questions which relate to the
management and allocation of resources within a state, ruling out in advance the possibility
of a political appeal beyond the borders of the state, perhaps even beyond what is
conventionally understood as the domain of international relations. As Derrida argues, 'the
foundation of modern citizenship in a nation' repeats the foundation of democracy in a legal
principle of equality symbolically tied to a natural equality based on birth. This is 'the place
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of fraternization as the symbolic bond alleging the repetition of a genetic tie' [PoF 99 /121 ].
This restriction of political power or social goods to citizens of one state rather than another
(leaving on one side the case of those without state to which we will return) is a
programming of politics; there can be no question of political responsibility when the
decision is naturalised, when it is predicted in advance along set criteria. The apparently
natural location of politics within the state is in and of itself unjust. The institution of the
boundaries of the state is an act of exclusion, a performative discrimination between political
friends and enemies. The demand of justice calls instead for a politics thought beyond the
boundaries of the state. My suggestion in this chapter is that one strand in the development
ofDerrida's work between the 'Letter to a Japanese Friend' and the publication of Politics of
Friendship may be considered an attempt to focus and refine precisely this problem.
I will extend my reading of Politics of Friendship by locating it in the context of
Derrida's seminars. Derrida's seminar work, 1 argue, provides a reasonably consistent basis
on which to examine any putative development of Derrida's work, and thus suggest how we
might read the three developments in his work which I identified in the 'Introduction' to my
first chapter: a thematic shift in emphasis; an increasing engagement with the role of a public
intellectual; a polemicization of the word 'deconstruction' itself. More specifically, by
focusing on his seminar of 1983 on philosophical nationalism I will demonstrate that Derrida
considers all discursive practices to presuppose a certain kind of political decision. Derrida's
discussion of the implicit relationship between philosophy and nationalism works through an
over-determined example of what must remain an irreducible structure of any theoretical or
other communication. This brings us to another dimension of the 'implicit politics of
language' [PoF 305 / 339], The concepts of politics are all grounded in particular languages;
but so is their deconstruction. My claim is that some of the more peculiar aspects of
Derrida's work must be seen as the result of a particular concern to draw attention to and
negotiate with the irreducible political decision which is presupposed by virtue of simply
writing in one language rather than another. Accordingly I will show that Politics of
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Friendship must be read as, at least in part, a work addressed to a specifically French
national philosophical context. Derrida's work on Heidegger of this period raises the same
issues, and the form of his complex text Of Spirit evinces the same political negotiation.
Crucially for any reading ofPolitics ofFriendship, I argue that the apparently supplementary
essay 'Heidegger's Ear: Philopolemology (Geschlecht IV)' must be considered as central to
the wider work. In the final section I conclude by arguing that the work which Derrida
pursues later in the name of hospitality may be read as a further development of this same
political negotiation (and intervention) for which deconstruction has become the name.
2.2 Philosophical Nationalism.
Derrida himself suggests that the sequence of investigations conducted in his seminars might
provide a revealing context for Politics ofFriendship. In the 'Foreword' he notes:
I count on preparing for future publication a series of seminar studies
within which this one actually finds it place, well beyond this single opening
session, which thus presupposes its premisses and its horizon. Those that
immediately preceded it, then, if it is anything but useless to recall the logical
development at this point, were centred on: Nationality and Philosophical
Nationalism (1. Nation, Nationality, Nationalism [1983-84]; 2. Nomos,
Logos, Topos [1984-85]; 3. The Theo-logical Political [1985-6]; 4. Kant, the
Jew, the German [1986-87]); and Eating the Other (Rhetorics of
Cannibalism) [1987-88]. Subsequent seminars concerned Questions of
Responsibility through the experience of the secret and of witnessing [1989-
93] [PoFvii/11].
My hypothesis is that this sequence can help us understand not only Politics ofFriendship,
but also the development of Derrida's thought over the period with which I am concerned.
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The significance of Derrida's seminars has rarely been recognised: perhaps because so few
sessions have been published in their original form. Politics ofFriendship itself is the most
extensive work to be attributed to the seminar, although in a greatly revised form, as a
prolonged preface or introduction to the seminar itself — while the second version,
published in American Imago, is described as two single seminar sessions [PoF(b) 390], the
final book is introduced by Derrida as a distended exposition of a single session: 'this work
replays, represents, only the first session [...] less a first act than a sort of preview' [PoF viii
/ 12]. Elsewhere, only the first of his seminars on nationalism (1983-4), and two of a much
later course on hospitality (1995-6) have been published verbatim. Yet many of Derrida's
published conference papers, articles, interviews and essays bear traces of his seminars, as I
show in this chapter, through a discussion of several of Derrida's key texts both before and
after the publication ofPolitics ofFriendship itself.
In this first section I focus on Derrida's four year study on 'Nationality and
Philosophical Nationalism.'1 Not only does Derrida draw attention to it as the starting point
for the sequence which leads to Politics of Friendship, but he returns to the material
discussed in this seminar on a regular basis, and presumes its conclusions throughout his
subsequent work: for example in his recent addresses to UNESCO (1996) and to the
European Parliament (1997).2 More importantly perhaps, grasping the central argument of
this seminar is crucial to understanding Derrida's account of responsibility and decision, as I
will show with reference to The Gift of Death. On this basis we can both appreciate the
importance of the national philosophical dimension of Politics ofFriendship, and assess the
re-formulation of deconstruction as political practice.
1 Whereas in Politics ofFriendship Derrida dates this seminar from 1983 [PoF vii /
11], in Du Droit a la Philosophie he suggests that it was a 'necessary development' of the
1983-4 seminar of that title [DP 53n. 1],
2 Derrida, Jacques. Le Droit a la philosophie du point de vue cosmopolitique. Paris:
Verdier-Unesco, 1997, Cosmopolites de tous les pays, encore un effort. Paris: Galilee, 1998.
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2.2.1 Nationalism, Cosmopolitanism, Exemplarism.
The first session of Derrida's seminar on 'Nationality and Philosophical Nationalism' has
been published as 'The Onto-Theology of National Humanism: Prolegomena to a
Hypothesis.' Its central claim is deceptively straightforward. Derrida proposes that there is a
significant connection between philosophy and nationality:
The national problem, as we shall have ceaselessly to verify, is not one
problem among others, nor one philosophical dimension among others. Even
before any elaboration of the concept of nation and of philosophical
nationality, of idiom as national philosophical idiom, we know at least this
much — it's a minimal but indubitable predicate — namely that the
affirmation of a nationality, or even the claim of nationalism does not happen
to philosophy by chance or from the outside, it is essentially and thoroughly
philosophical, it is aphilosopheme [ONH 10].
Nationalism — or the thinking of the nation — belongs to philosophy, just as philosophy
belongs to the nation. This claim will turn out to have implications both for our
understanding of the nation, and for our conception of philosophy. For once worked through
to its conclusion, what Derrida is proposing is that via the question of idiom philosophy is
already national — and therefore already political. This irreducible political dimension of
any philosophical (or other) utterance is what we are concerned with here. It is irreducible
because the question of idiom -— what Derrida describes as both 'a scandal' and 'the very
chance ' [ONH 3] of philosophy— is unavoidable for philosophy. Philosophy cannot happen
without language:
in so far as the only possibility for a philosophy, for philosophy itself to speak
itself, to be discussed, to get (itself) across, to go from the one to the other, is
to pass through idioms, to transport the idiom and translate itself via or rather
in the body of idioms which are not closures or enclosings of self but
allocutions, passages to the other [ONH 4].
To make clear what Derrida is suggesting here, it is worth bearing in mind the general
understanding of philosophy which he inherits from Husserl, as he acknowledges in several
places [SoM 74-5 / 125-6; SST 91-2; DaP 81-2], Following Husserl's arguments in Ideas I,
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Derrida underlines the 'necessity of posing transcendental questions in order not to be held
within the fragility of an incompetent empiricist discourse [...] it is in order to avoid
empiricism, positivism and psychologism that it is endlessly necessary to renew
transcendental questioning' [DaP 81].3 Husserl argues against 'sciences of the dogmatic
standpoint' which 'take their start from the primordial givenness of the facts they deal with
(and in the testing of their ideas return always to these facts).'4 Such sciences — and
naturalism, historicism and psychologism in particular, as Husserl argues in 'Philosophy as a
Rigorous Science'5 — are unable to account logically for their own premises. In the essay to
which Derrida devoted his first major published work, 'The Origin of Geometry,' Husserl
asserts that 'all [merely] factual history remains incomprehensible because, always merely
drawing its conclusions naively and straightforwardly from facts, it never makes thematic the
general ground of meaning upon which all such conclusions rest, has never investigated the
immense structural a priori which is proper to it.'6 However Derrida proceeds to turn
Husserl's own arguments against him. Derrida's own study of 'The Origin of Geometry'
suggests that the possibility of even the most abstract and universal science — geometry —
both requires a finite origin within the world, and depends on a necessary passage through
language or some form of inscription: 'Historical incarnation sets free the transcendental,
instead of binding it. This last notion, the transcendental, must then be rethought.'7
Deconstruction presumes the questioning which philosophy as a universal science or a
3 For a full account of Derrida's relation to Husserl see Paola Marrati-Gueroa La
Genese et la Trace: Derrida lecteur de Husserl et Heidegger. Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1998.
4 Edmund Husserl. Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology, trans. W.R.
Boyce Gibson. London: George Allen & Unwin, 1931. 96.
5 Edmund Husserl. 'Philosophy as a Rigorous Science.' trans. Quentin Lauer. in
Phenomenology and the Crisis ofPhilosophy. New York: Harper & Row, 1931.
6 Edmund Husserl. 'The Origin of Geometry.' in The Crisis of the European
Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology, trans. David Carr. Evanston: Northwestern
UP, 1970. 371.
7
Jacques Derrida. 'Introduction to The Origin ofGeometry.' trans. John P. Leavey,
Jr. in Edmund Husserl's 'Origin of Geometry': An Introduction. Lincoln: U Nebraska P,
1989. 77.
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science of the universal can put to any discourse of empirical facts, but also presumes that
philosophy in its turn can never escape its own inscription in the empirical and contingent,
and moreover, that this inscription is the very condition of possibility of philosophy.
The very condition of philosophy, 'its chance' in Derrida's words, is its idiomatic
passage through language. That this is also a 'scandal' for philosophy will help us
understand Derrida's point: 'A scandal: i.e. what makes philosophy trip and fall, what stops
it in its tracks if the self-styled philosopher considers that philosophy is essentially universal
and cosmpolitan, that national, social, idiomatic difference in general should only befall it as
a provisional and non-essential accident that could be overcome' [ONH 3], In his later essay
presented to a UNESCO conference, Derrida puts it this way: 'philosophy names at the same
time here a discipline which is part of the "humanities" and that which claims to think,
elaborate, criticise, the axiomatic of the "humanities", singularly, the problem of their
humanism and their presumed universalism.'8 While Derrida is apparently subordinating the
natural or human sciences to philosophy understood as universal knowledge, as Greater
Logic in the Hegelian sense, there is a sense in which Derrida at the same time challenges
this very transcendental claim in the name of the empirical remainder that has always, within
philosophy, named that which cannot be philosophy. Derrida clarifies this in 'The Onto-
Theology ofNational Humanism':
So if I insist on this problem — on the fact that the situation of the
philosophical international I'm talking about is not determinable on the basis
of a social or human science — this is not in order to reconstitute a higher
critical, transcendental or ontological authority over the human or social
sciences, but also in order to problematise a certain authority of the same type
that a given social science might claim over the treatment of this problem, and
as to its competence to deal with it [ONH 8],
The return or challenge of the empirical would be the observation that no philosophy is
outside of one language or idiom or another, which will be in turn be overdetermined or
8 Le Droit a laphilosophie dupoint de vue cosmpolitique. 8.
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inflected in relation to one national language or another. Derrida argues that 'I have tried to
show how in apparently regional scientific practices, in ontologies that philosophy says are
regional, one can find general deconstructive movements, where the ground falls way or
shifts, disorganising or calling into question the beautiful order of dependence between a
fundamental ontology and regional ontologies' [ONH 8], A further objection might be that
Derrida's use of idiom is too vague. In Monolingualism ofthe Other, one of the voices of the
text objects to a similarly broad claim that 'a language is no idiom, nor is the idiom a
dialect.' The other voice replies: 'I'm not unaware of the necessity of these distinctions.
Linguists and scholars in general can have good reasons for upholding them. Nevertheless in
all rigor and stretched to their extreme limit, I do not believe them to be tenable' [MON 8 /
23]. Language for Derrida is a diffuse and heterogeneous system in which particular idioms,
dialects or languages can only be isolated by means of an ethico-theoretical decision.
There are two consequences of Derrida's claim, one for thinking about the nation,
and one for philosophy as such. Since a nation is a philosopheme, it can never be accounted
for on the basis of the kind of evidence available to the human sciences: it is not the possible
object of an ethnography, a discourse of racial characteristics, a linguistic or social analysis.
No such discourse can examine the nation without presupposing in advance a definition of
the nation. This definition is philosophical: 'the self-positing or self-identification of the
nation always has the form of a philosophy which, although better represented by such and
such a nation, is none the less a certain relation to the universality of the philosophical'
[ONH 10]. Nationality is no 'thing' but a spiritual or cultural concept. There is nothing
'natural' about the nation. Conversely, philosophy, whether it openly theorises its relation to
nationality, will always already be engaged in such a relation, by virtue of happening in
language. Nationality, Derrida writes, 'can never be an object of study, meaning by that a
theme or a problem that one has before one and in which one is not really and gravely
situated, circumvented, precomprehended, in what is precisely a historical and philosophical
situation with respect to which no overarching view is possible — and in the first instance
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for the obvious reason that the question is set out in a language, in an idiom, and with certain
features of the national idiom' [ONH 5]. Derrida's choice of example also requires some
qualification. To demonstrate that philosophy is national and that nationality is philosophical
he turns to Fichte's Addresses to the German Nation, a set of public lectures given in Berlin
over the winter of 1807 to 1808 which explicitly address these questions and whose
significance is much debated — as Etienne Balibar puts it, 'the ambivalence of Fichte's
political philosophy is one of the great commonplaces of our culture.'9 Derrida's choice of
Fichte is designed to exemplify his own principal claim, since even Fichte's overtly
nationalist philosophy is not concerned with any 'German naturality or factuality' [ONH 13].
As an idealist philosophy, it is concerned with truth as such, rather than with a particular
'German' truth: 'This nationalism does not even present itself as a philosophy, but as
philosophy itself, philosophy par excellence' [ONH 13], Fichte serves to illustrate this
structure of exemplarism which Derrida sees as being central to both nationalism and
philosophy.
Derrida's main interest in Fichte is that within the Addresses to the German Nation
there is no apparent contradiction between the national spirit of philosophy and Fichte's own
cosmpolitanism, which he inherits from Kant (compare, for example, 'Toward Perpetual
Peace' with Fichte's 'Outline of the Right of Nations and Cosmopolitan Right'10). Fichte
speaks of a 'German philosophy' which is 'strictly, earnestly and inexorably opposed to any
foreign philosophy that believes in death'11 but which is not based on any racial or ethnic
characteristic. The 'true criterion' for being German is whether 'you believe in something
absolutely primary and original in man himself, in freedom, in endless improvement, in the
9 Etienne Balibar. 'Fichte and the internal Border: On Addresses to the German
Nation.' in Masses, Classes, Ideas. London: Routledge, 1994. 61.
10 Immanuel Kant. 'Toward Perpetual Peace.' trans. Mary J. Gregor. in Practical
Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1996. 317-51.; J.G.Fichte, Foundations ofNatural
Right, trans. Michael Baur. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2000. 320-334.
11 J.G. Fichte. Addresses to the German Nation, trans. R.F. Jones & G.H. Turnbull.
Chicago: Open Court, 1922. 127.
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eternal progress of our race.'12 Fichte's is a philosophy of spirit, which he opposes as a
philosophy of life to any foreign philosophy of death. But this lends a certain equivocality to
both nationality and philosophy. Derrida argues: 'you can see quite clearly that everything
that ought thus to withdraw it from reappropriation into a Nazi heritage (Which is
biologising, racist, etc.) remains in essence equivocal' [ONH 16]. Even a spiritual
nationalism can provide criteria on which to combat enemies of the state or 'enemies within,
the false Germans, who even though they speak German, are Germans living on the German
soil, are essentially less authentically German than certain 'foreigners' who, etc.' [ONH 16].
In his seminars Derrida traces the development of this relationship between the German
language, the German nationality, and philosophy. Derrida refers not only to Fichte,
Nietzsche ('inexhaustible on this subject' [ONH 17]) and Heidegger, but also to Arendt
[Mon 84-90 / 100-109; HOS 89 / 83] and Adorno: 'at the very moment when the latter
opposes all philosophical nationalisms, Heidegger's Jargon der Eigentlichkeit ['Jargon of
Authenticity,' the title of Adorno's book on Heidegger. AT], he nonetheless reiterates in his
'Reply to the Question: "What is German'" [...] the affirmation of a "metaphysical character
of the German language'" [ONH 22-3],13 In the 1986-7 session, 'Kant, the Jew, the German,'
described in 'Force of Law' as concerning 'the varied but insistent recurrence of the
reference to Kant, indeed to a certain Judaism in Kant, on the part of all those who, from
Wagner and Nietzsche to Adorno, sought to respond to the question "Was ist DeutschT"
[FoL 65n. / 72], writers covered also include Cohen, Buber, Rosenzweig, Scholem and
Benjamin. However, Derrida's interest is not only in German national philosophy. He
comments in 'Interpretations At War: Kant, the Jew, the German' that 'the spiritualist
determination of national exemplarity does not belong to the German nation only. What
would one say were it to be stated that it does not belong to it except in an exemplary
12 The German Nation. 125.
13 Theodor Adorno. 'On the Question: What is German.' trans. Henry W. Pickford.
in Critical Models. New York: Columbia UP, 1998. 212-3.
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manner?' [KJG 89], and in Monolingualism of the Other he imagines a larger study, entitled
''The Monolingualism of the Host: Jews of the Twentieth Century, the Mother Tongue, and
the Language of the Other, on Both Sides of the Mediterranean.' [MON 78 n.9 / 91]. In
'Interpretations at War: Kant, the Jew, the German' Derrida also refers to Renan [KJG 88-
91] and a 1984 paper addresses Descartes' use of French rather than Latin [DP 283-341],
Derrida's interest in this problem is not a matter of historical curiosity. Nor is he
attempting to reveal nationality as an ideological component which could be stripped away
from philosophy; although he does refer to Marx as a philosopher whose interest in the
problem takes this form [ONH 18]. Rather, Derrida is seeking to expose one symptomatic
effect of a wider structure, which he calls 'the exemplarist logic in which we have
recognized the profound strategy of all nationalisms, patriotisms or ethnocentrisms' [PoF
237 / 265], Here is a lengthy account of this structure taken from The Other Heading:
The value of universality here capitalizes all the antinomies, for it must
be linked to the value of exemplarity that inscribes the universal in the proper
body of a singularity, of an idiom or a culture, whether this singularity be
individual, social, national, state, federal, confederal, or not. Whether it takes a
national form or not, a refined, hospitable or aggressively xenophobic form or
not, the self-affirmation of an identity always claims to be responding to the
call or assignation of the universal. There are no exceptions to this rule. No
cultural identity presents itself as the opaque body of an untranslatable idiom,
but always, on the contrary, as the irreplaceable inscription of the universal in
the singular, the unique testimony to the human essence and to what is proper
toman [OH 72-3/71-2],
Derrida's point is that there is no assertion of an identity which doesn't claim also to be an
identity like any other. This would be the case whether the identity in question was that of a
single individual, of a family or of a nation. But as soon as I claim to be an individual like
every other, or like any other, I am also making a presumption about a certain universality of
the concept of the individual. The historical and global extension of the concept of the
'nation' from its place of origin bears witness to the portability of the philosophical claim
made in the French and American Revolutionary constitutions to bear witness to the
universal right of national self-determination. Every nationalism is also then a humanism
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since it implies that the proper political essence of man is to associate in nations. Like every
other form of association or political collectivity, it is an exemplarism.
The overdetermined relationship between political identity and nationality suggests
that philosophy is inscribed with a political (at least passively polemical) value as soon as it
happens in one language rather than another, as an effect of the impossible but insistent
identification of the universal with the singular. In the next section I turn to some further
texts of Derrida's both in order to show the continuity of their concerns with those of the
seminar, and also to reinforce what may seem a exaggerated assertion that political violence
and responsibility begin with the use of language itself.
2.2.2 Language and Responsibility.
The continuity between the question of language or idiom, national or otherwise, and that of
responsibility could be demonstrated by reference to any one of a number of Derrida's texts.
1 will focus on two: The Gift of Death, which casts the problem in theoretical terms, and
Monolingualism of the Other, to be discussed in the following section (2.2.3), which both
enact the problem performatively and begin to offer suggestions as to how it may be handled
in general. Both texts have their origins in the period 1991-2 and both are quite plainly
concerned, at least in part, with the political negotiation of the question of idiom.
In fact, not only does the second half of The Gift of Death demonstrate the
importance of the problem of language in Derrida's thinking of responsibility, but the
question of language can help us read this difficult text. Derrida is concerned with
Kierkegaard's reading of Abraham's sacrifice of Isaac, with what Kierkegaard calls the
teleological suspension of the ethical. Abraham's decision can be understood by no-one,
since no-one else can take his place. This discussion follows a lengthy reading of the fourth
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of Patocka's Heretical Essays on the Philosophy ofHistory in which Derrida has suggested
that the Czech phenomenologist's account of Europe as responsibility deploys a radicalised
Christian account which can puncture Heidegger's own thinking on responsibility.14 With the
turn to Kierkegaard in the second half of The Gift ofDeath Derrida appears to be drawing his
own account of responsibility from Fear and Trembling. Indeed, some commentators have
taken this as revealing the extent of Derrida's own debt to Kierkegaard.15 Responsibility,
Derrida argues, must be infinite or it is not responsibility at all. The infinitization of
responsibility is what begins or makes possible any responsibility at all, but also which
disables the possibility of being able to claim to have done one's duty: 'Guilt is inherent in
responsibility because responsibility is always unequal to itself: one is never responsible
enough' [GoD 51 / 77], Derrida presents this as an extension (but this is also a revision) of
Kierkegaard's understanding of Abraham's impossible decision to sacrifice his son towards
an account of the decision in general. What is for Kierkegaard the exceptional decision of
Abraham is for Derrida the kind of decision that must be made every day if there is to be any
responsibility at all.
For Kierkegaard, the paradox of Abraham's position is that as a singular individual
he is required to disregard the universal law of ethics in order to fulfil his absolute duty to
God, or as Derrida puts it, that 'the ethical can therefore end up making us irresponsible. It is
a temptation, a tendency or a facility that would sometimes have to be refused in the name of
a responsibility that doesn't keep account or give an account, neither to man, to human's, to
society, to one's fellows, or to one's own' [GoD 61-2 / 89]. Derrida's radicalisation of the
14 Robert Bernasconi overstates the case when he speaks of Derrida's 'reliance' on
Patocka's account. 'What Goes Around Comes Around: Derrida and Levinas on the
Economy of the Gift and the Gift of Genealogy.' in Alan D. Schrift ed., The Logic of the
Gift. London: Routledge, 1997. 256-73. Derrida's strategy appears to be similar to that of his
early essays: he introduces Patocka's work in order to problematise the possibility of such a
genealogy.
15 See John Caputo. The Prayers and Tears of Jacques Derrida. Bloomington:
Indiana UP, 1997. Caputo had already proposed this resemblance in Radical Hermeneutics:
Repetition, Deconstruction and the Hermeneutic Project. Bloomington, Indiana UP, 1987.
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concept of responsibility suggests that there can be responsibility only where duty is
absolute. If a duty is only the enactment of a finite set of obligations there is no question of
responsibility. If the absolute is identified with alterity as such, rather than with the absolute
alterity of God, we must transgress this obligation all the time. The sacrifice of ethics for an
absolute duty to the other is not simply what deconstruction may attempt to do but is 'the
most common and everyday experience of responsibility [...] isn't this also the most
common thing?' [GoD 67 / 97], A generalised duty or obligation precedes ethics or ethical
duty. In the terms we encountered in Politics of Friendship, a duty to the incalculable
precedes any calculable responsibility. Calculable responsibility in its turn, betrays and
sacrifices responsibility itself. Derrida's examples walk a fine line between melodrama and
pathos. There is his cat, to which he will return in a later paper: 'How would you ever justify
the fact that you sacrifice all the cats in the world to the cat that you feed at home every
morning for years, whereas other cats die of hunger at every instant? Not to mention other
people'[GoD 71 / 101].16 Yet Derrida continues, 'How would you justify your presence here
speaking one particular language, rather than there speaking to others in another language?'
[GoD 71 / 101]. There can be no question of responsibility without the necessary adjunct of
such apparently excessive or absurd questions. Infinite responsibility, the ordeal of the
undecidable choice between coming to the assistance of one other rather than another, is the
necessary condition of responsibility.
David Wood, in particular, has questioned not only Derrida's example, but the
structure of his argument at this point in his work. In an interview he comments:
16 Derrida returns to his cat in 'L'animal que done je suis.' in Marie Louise Mallet
ed. L 'Animal Autohiographique: Autour de Jacques Derrida. Paris: 1999.
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A very important truth is being obscured by an exaggeration. We do not have
obligations to each and every other cat in the universe. My special obligation
to 'my' cat is actually part of what teaches me about obligation to cats in
general. 1 may have an obligation to any other cat in the universe, but not to all
other cats in the universe. There is a true negative form of this principle, which
is that I would not be able to justify turning away any cat that turned up at my
door; but I would be justified in closing the door if an entire army of cats
descended upon my house.17
Wood's point is that while Derrida is right to point out that the excess of responsibility must
always destroy a claim to have done enough, the satisfaction of good conscience, the
emphasis on the incalculable ignores the real and apparent practical constraints on individual
responsibility — I am not a health care organisation, or an animal sanctuary. Wood is right:
the calculable notion of responsibility cannot be enough from Derrida's point of view: within
the horizon of the incalculable, everyone must (and does) negotiate with their calculable
responsibility. There is also perhaps a sense in which understanding responsibility as
excessive or transgressive, as unfulfillable, renders any lesser concept of duty, or doing
good, uninteresting or naive: why bother to do something for one other, if by doing it I am
still doing harm to the other others? 1 think this is indeed one of the questions raised by
Derrida's account, but I suspect that this is, at least in part, his intention. Wood worries that
there is 'a paradox in the insistence on avoiding good conscience: Might not anxiously
avoiding good conscience offer a back road to ... a good conscience.'18 It seems to me that it
is this very paradox with which Derrida is most concerned when in 'Passions' he expresses
his concerns about an ethical deconstruction [PAS 15 / 38].
What is important here is to emphasise that Wood has taken Derrida at the level of
his rhetoric, rather than at the level of the structure of his argument. In other words, this is
17 interview with David Wood, 'Time, Space, Deconstruction, Plagues of Cats,
Apocalypse, etc.' U Vanderbilt. (1999). <http://www.vanderbilt.edu/AnS/philosophy/
Faculty/Interviews/Wood.html>; See also 'Responsibility Reinscribed (and How)', in Pli:
Warwick Journal of Philosophy vol. 6 (1997), 103-13.; 'Comment ne pas manger:
Deconstruction and Humanism', in Animal Others: On Ethics, Ontology and Animal Life, ed.
H. Peter Steves. New York: SUNY, 1999. 15-35.
18 'Time, Space, Deconstruction'.
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not about what a subject can do. The decision is not taken by a subject, but for a subject. The
decision is already inscribed within the subject; it would be more appropriate to suggest that
the subject is taken by the decision. In fact, as Derrida puts it in Politics ofFriendship-. 'A
theory of the subject is incapable ofaccountingfor the slightest decision' [PoF 68 / 87]. So
this is not an ethics, a prescription that we must act out of concern for all the cats in the
world, but a statement of a structural condition which precedes us each time that we think we
have decided, or have acted responsibly. Derrida's question 'how would you justify being
here speaking one language?' demonstrates this. As well as being about choices a subject
may have made, or may think they have made, this excessive, non-subjective dimension of
Derrida's account of responsibility is also about those choices which they cannot possibly
have made; which is brought into focus neatly by the issue of national or philosophical
idiom. As Derrida also writes in The Gift ofDeath:
By preferring my work, simply by giving it my time and attention, by
preferring my activity as a citizen or as a professorial and professional
philosopher, writing and speaking here in a public language, French in my
case, I am betraying at every moment all my other obligations: my obligations
to the other others whom I know or don't know, the billions of my fellows
(without mentioning the animals that are even more other others than my
fellows), my fellows who are dying of starvation or sickness. I betray my
fidelity or my obligations to other citizens, to those who don't speak my
language and to whom I neither speak nor respond [...] [GoD 69 / 98-9. My
emphases].
If by speaking in one language rather than another, I am already betraying my responsibility,
Derrida does not imply that we should not speak — staying silent would be a worse crime.19
My argument is that this is a relocation of the argument from the realm of ethics, in which 'I'
may make a decision, to the realm of politics. It is our involvement in a public sphere, which
extends beyond that narrow public realm which is defined against the private, in a public
decision taken as to which language we are able to engage in, to think in, in which we have
19 On the impossibility of a non-response, see 'Comment ne pas parler: Denegations'
in Psyche: Inventions de I'autre. Paris : Galilee, 1987. 535-95.
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been born and come to consciousness, which makes us pre-originarily irresponsible, already
friends with some others rather than other others. It is the public space itself, 'to which I
sacrifice my so-called private space' which renders my language exclusive, since 'each of
those who listen or read, and to whom I neither respond nor address myself in the proper
manner, that is, in a singular manner' is already sacrificed, even in my supposedly private
moments [GoD 69 / 99]. Communication — a response or an address — is already a matter
of political responsibility.
The discussion of tout autre comme tout autre which I touched on in the first chapter
returns, precisely in the form of 1) a translation of Derrida's arguments about
communication, the structure and iterability of the mark and 2) a reinscription of
exemplarism as the principle not just of identity politics in its worst sense, but as the
principle of the relation of identity to politics in the widest possible sense, from the moment
that I articulate myself in language, or even when I respond by not responding. Both within
the state and in the relations of the state to its neighbours, a structural principle of
exemplarism is at work as soon as I identify myself, that is as soon as I am idiomatic. This is
why Derrida must also draw attention to the impossible situation in which the very idiomatic
nature of the phrase 'tout autre est tout autre' is already irresponsibility itself, a statement of
its own inadequacy to describing the situation it seeks to draw attention to:
The essential and abyssal equivocality, that is, the play of the several senses of
tout autre est tout autre or Dieu est tout autre, is not, in its literality (that of
French or Italian, for example), universally translatable according to a
traditional concept of translation. The sense of the play can no doubt be
translated by a paraphrase in other languages; but not the formal economy of
the slippage between two homonyms in the language that can here be called
singularly my own [...] We have here a kind of shibboleth [...] like a secret
within one's so-called natural or mother tongue. One can regret such a limiting
function or on the contrary take pride in it; one can derive some national
prestige from it but either way there is nothing to be done or said about such a
secret of the mother tongue. It is there before us in its possibility, the
Geheimnis of language that ties it to the home, to the motherland, to the
birthplace, to economy, to the law of the oikos, in short to the family and to the
family of words derived from heim — home, heimlich, unheimlich, Geheimnis,
etc. [GOD 87-8/121-2].
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The etymological relationship between oikos and economy, to which Derrida often returns,
highlights two important points. 1) Derrida continually refers to etymology not in order to
appeal to an original meaning for any particular word, but to insist on the material or
empirical origin of languages, words and concepts. 2) The rethinking of politics, the politics
to come which Derrida calls for or hopes for in Politics of Friendship, is a thinking of
politics beyond the polis, or beyond the state, but it must also therefore be thought beyond
both the bond with a family, metaphorical or literal, or an attachment to a homeland or other
place of origin. The danger Derrida takes, since he must write in one language that is
'singularly his own' is that of privileging the language into which he was born, even if not
the state or place. In turning to another example, Derrida's strange and violent text
Monolingualism of the Other, I will show this impossible negotiation — how to think
beyond the home, or beyond economy read as the law of the home or the hearth— at work.
2.2.3 Deconstruction in France.
Monolingualism of the Other can be taken to be a performative demonstration of the
structure that Derrida gives a more conventional account of in 'The Onto-Theology of
National Humanism' and The Gift ofDeath', that language conveys a political responsibility
which precedes and exceeds the subject who speaks. Written predominantly in the first-
person, and in an impatient and angry tone, it is structured as an apparently perverse
criticism ('without wishing to hurt [his] feelings' [MON 12 / 29]) of the poet Abdelkebir
Khatibi, whom Derrida describes as an old friend [MON 10 / 26]. Referring to their common
French Algerian background, Derrida makes a claim to be the exemplary Franco-
Maghrebian present at the conference on bilingualism at which the first version of the text
was read, held in Louisiana in 1992. In order to 'decipher the essence of the Franco-
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Maghrebian from the paradigmatic example of "the most Franco-Maghrebian," the Franco-
Maghrebian par excellence'' [Mon 11 / 27] Derrida imagines himself saying: 'I therefore
venture to present myself to you here, ecce homo, in parody as the exemplary Franco-
Maghrebian' [MON 19 / 39],
The text is accordingly based around the exposition of one central aporetic phrase,
Derrida's assertion that T only have one language, it is not mine' [MON 1/13], Or, in an
expanded form, that
We only ever speak one language— or rather one idiom only.
We never speak only one language— or rather there is nopure idiom.
[MON 8 / 23]
Derrida describes some of the events of his childhood, focussing in particular on his
appreciation of linguistic differences, and the relation between Algiers and Paris — and
indeed, France as a whole — across the Mediterranean. He suggests there was a more
powerful sense of marginality to growing up in Algiers than there would be between another
province such as Brittany and Paris. His understanding of French culture is both as a colonial
culture and as his so-called mother tongue. This he claims makes him a more exemplary
Franco-Maghrebian than his friend, who can always have recourse to a language which was
not colonising. Whereas Khatibi has never been a French citizen, Derrida has been: not only
that but in 1943, along with all the Jewish French citizens of Algeria, his French citizenship
was removed by the Vichy French government. Citizenship for Derrida 'does not define a
cultural, linguistic, or, in general, historical participation. It does not cover all these modes of
belonging. But it is not some superficial or superstructural predicate floating on the surface
of experience' [MON 14-5 / 33]. In other words, like nationality, it is an idea, rather than the
possible object of an empirical science, but it is not simply a contingent intrusion on a
universal subject. Like nationality, it is also inherited at birth, and therefore precedes the
subject. As in Politics ofFriendship, citizenship implies a politics of the birth-place, of the
autochthony which is at stake here; but so does a maternal language: 'Birth, nationality by
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birth, native culture — is that not our theme here? [...] the language called maternal, [...]
birth as it relates to soil, birth as it relates to blood, and birth as it relates to language, which
means something entirely other?' [MON 13 / 30-1], That 'language is not mine' implies a
pre-original dispossession of language against which a linguistic purism or nationalism will
always be a defensive reaction. That 'I only have one language' means that I must
continually negotiate with the political privilege I cannot help but ascribe to it.
But Derrida's aim is not to reconstitute his personal experience as the basis for an
argument ('not the beginning of some autobiographical or anamnestic outline, nor [...] an
intellectual bildungsroman' [MON 70 / 131]), nor simply to offer a model by being the
'most' non-identical, or the most displaced person. The text must be read as a performative
provocation based around the central quasi-logical proposition: what Derrida describes as his
own neurotic cultivation of the French language, his desire to write, in particular, absolutely
accurate, non-provincial French. Derrida here complicates what might be an assumed re¬
valorisation of the linguistic situation of the colonised subject — and this is the significance
of his reference to Khatibi's work on bilingualism, and also to Eduoard Glissant's work on
the French Antilles — by situating himself both at the margins and at the centre of French
language and culture: 'Though the "non-mastery [...] of an appropriated language" of which
Glissant speaks qualifies, above all, more literally and more sensitively, some situations of
"colonial" alienation or historical servitude, this definition [...] also holds for what would be
called the language of the master, the hospes, or the colonist' [MON 23 / 44]. All language is
colonial, we might say. This 'constitutive' lack or alienation however is not negative, since it
is the very condition of our 'possessing' anything, including ourselves. Furthermore, there is
perhaps the basis of some form of resistance being elaborated here as well:
102
[...] the master is nothing. And he does not have exclusive possession of
anything. Because the master does not possess exclusively, and naturally, what
he calls his language, because, whatever he wants or does, he cannot maintain
any relations of property that are natural, national, congenital, or ontological,
with it, because he can give substance to and articulate [dire] this appropriation
only in the course of an unnatural process of politico-phantasmatic
constructions, because language is not his natural possession, he can, thanks to
that very fact, pretend historically, through the rape of a cultural usurpation,
which means always essentially colonial, to appropriate it in order to impose it
as 'his own.' [...] [MON 23-4 / 45].
Derrida describes himself as having been dispossessed not just of the language of authority,
but the so-called maternal language too, and this is to be taken as exemplary of the situation
of every subject. Every subject is first of all hostage to the language of the other, every home
is already opened to the other, every state is already the place of the other— 'what is proper
to a culture is not to be identical to itself writes Derrida elsewhere [OH 9 / 16]. The
recognition of this 'universal structure' [MON 63 / 121] does not produce the impossibility of
politics, but its vital condition: and it calls for the recognition of the difference within this
structure, to recognise and denounce or combat the most violent forms of exemplarism, in a
general economy which is unavoidably that of exemplarism, and of violence. 'This debate
with monolingualism,' Derrida writes, 'will have been nothing other than a piece of
deconstructive writing. Such writing always attacks the body of this language, my only
language, and what it bears the most or in the best way, namely the philosophical tradition
that supplies us with the reservoir of concepts I definitely have to use' [MON 59 / 115. First
emphasis Derrida's, second emphasis mine]. In Derrida's case, then, deconstructive writing
must be first and foremost an attack on, or a negotiation with, the French language.
In the light of this discussion, of deconstruction as the negotiation with the language
of the other, of that language which is my only language and yet is not mine, another way of
reading Politics ofFriendship is opened up. One of the many startling comments in his essay
on monolingualism is Derrida's remark that the French dispossession of their Algerian
Jewish citizens 'taught me the disasters toward which incantatory invocations of the mother
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tongue will have pushed humans headlong.' 'My culture' continues Derrida, and we must
also hear the implied sense of'your culture' or 'every culture' in his words,
was right away a political culture. 'My mother tongue' is what they say, what
they speak; as for me, I cite and question them. I ask them in their own
language, certainly in order to make them understand me, for it is serious, if
they indeed know what they are saying and what they are talking about.
Especially when, so lightly, they celebrate 'fraternity.' At bottom, brothers, the
mother tongue, and so forth pose the same problem [MON 34/61].
Here Derrida announces the project of Politics ofFriendship itself, the interrogation of the
value attached to brotherhood. But rather than being just any political problem, of a problem
of political philosophy as such, given this context, it becomes clear that Politics of
Friendship does not have just any relation to the language in which it was written. To
question the value of 'fraternity' in the tradition is explicitly to challenge a French tradition
of philosophy. Just as Politics ofFriendship is a negotiation with thinkers whom we might
presume to be Derrida's philosophical friends, so it must also be read, at least in part, as
Derrida's negotiation with the culture, language and philosophical tradition which he has
inherited: which is his only culture, but yet not his. This is made plain in a parenthetical
aside, in which he writes that
This book set itself up to work and be worked relentlessly, close to the thing
called France. And close to the singular alliance linking nothing less than the
history of fraternization to this thing, France — to the State, the nation, the
politics, the culture, literature and language which answer for the name
'France' and, when they are called by this name, answer to it [PoF 264 / 295],
It is precisely the French revolutionary slogan with its equation of liberty, equality and
fraternity which Derrida has in mind, as well as the apparent repetition and celebration of
that fraternity in the work of his friends Blanchot and Nancy on community. This would also
account for Derrida's reference, in the very first chapter of the work, to Montaigne as
'another reader hailing from my homeland' [PoF 2/18]; for his discussion of Michelet's
'andro-gallo-fraternocentrism' [PoF 236-9 / 265-7]; for the section on Victor Hugo [PoF
264-7 / 295-9]. Yet, because Politics ofFriendship is written first of all in French, the book
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may not be taken as a simple disavowal or rejection of its own national-linguistic
philosophical context. Just as democracy and friendship are both criticised but reaffirmed in
the book, so the book must also be considered a national affirmation, as a result of the same
structure which Derrida has identified in 'The Onto-Theology of National Humanism.' In
other words, Politics ofFriendship can only proceed by thinking through its own national
situation; an intrinsic part of its project must be the political questioning of this implied
politics of language. Like Monolingualism of the Other, and by extension, all of Derrida's
work, it must be read as a performative self-problematization of the status of deconstruction.
When he suggests a one line definition for deconstruction in a set of Memoires for another
friend, Paul de Man, Derrida proposes 'plus d'un langue.' This idiomatic French phrase
means both more than one language, and not one language. By being written in French, and
by virtue of being both translatable, but not being absolutely translatable (the condition of all
linguistic utterance), the phrase acts out its own meaning.
In this first section of the chapter I have argued, on the basis largely of Derrida's
seminar on nationality and philosophy, that because I am within language, political decisions
precede me. This is a concept of the decision as something for which I am responsible, even
if I could have done nothing about it, and with the violence of which I must negotiate, as
soon as I inherit a language which is not mine. Deconstruction, it is beginning to appear,
might be the name for the exemplary vigilance which keeps watch over this violence. In this
light I will turn to Derrida's readings of Heidegger over the same period. Not only do these
also stem from the seminar on nationalism, but they also put deconstruction itself into
question. Finally, they culminate in an essay entitled 'Philopolemology: Heidegger's Ear
(Geschlecht IV)' which is bound with Politics ofFriendship in its French edition, and is a
crucial supplement for understanding both that book, and Derrida's political thought as such.
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2.3 Derrida and Heidegger: Spirit and Nation.
DESPITE SEVERAL CRITICAL works on the subject, it remains somewhat unclear what
position we can ascribe to Derrida's thought in relation to that of Heidegger.20 My intention
in this section is not to attempt to settle this question once and for all. Instead I wish to focus
on the particular position of Heidegger within the modulation of Derrida's thought that I am
pursuing in these first two chapters, in which the deployment of 'deconstruction'
accompanies both a consistent attention to questions of politics, and the re-valuation or
reinscription of some of the names of politics. To recall some of these for a moment:
democracy, as 'democracy-to-come'; nationalism as an inescapable horizon of thought and
language, which renders both a priori political; responsibility, thought against itself. When I
discussed the various meanings of deconstruction on which Derrida draws in the last chapter,
I emphasised that the term at least in part must remain a translation or a borrowed word from
Heidegger— a French, and now English, substitute for Abbau and Destruktion. Reading this
later work, in which Derrida deploys and manipulates the vocabulary of deconstruction in an
explicitly provocative and political manner, we should take care not to forget that this
reference is always implied. So when Derrida claims, for example, that 'deconstruction is
justice' [FoL passim] we must presume this to imply at least a minimal reference to
Heidegger. Since this revaluation of the word 'deconstruction' accompanies the apparent
'politicization' of Derrida's thought, it seems necessary to devote some space to considering
the significance of this in relation to the place of Heidegger in his work. The issue is given a
further twist in the context of the so-called Heidegger Affair, in which Heidegger's own
20 See in particular, Hermann Rapaport. Heidegger and Derrida. Lincoln: U
Nebraska P, 1989., Rodolphe Gasche. The Tain of the Mirror. Cambridge MA: Harvard UP,
1986., David Wood ed. Of Derrida, Heidegger and Spirit. Evanston : Northwestern UP,
1993. See also David Wood. 'Heidegger after Derrida.' Research in Phenomenology, no. 17
(1997). 103-116.; Geoffrey Bennington 'Derridabase.' 302-310; Marc Froment-Maurice
That is to Say: Heidegger's Poetics, trans. Jan Plug. Stanford: Stanford UP, 1998. ch. 9 'The
Different Step: From Heidegger to Derrida.' 195-221.
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political affiliations were raised once again in the most public fashion in France and the
United States.21
This is not to say that Derrida's work does not stand in a critical relation to that of
Heidegger. On the contrary, Derrida has continued to question at length the political
dimension of Heidegger's texts, both in seminar work and in published texts, and moreover,
most of the work to be discussed here had been set in motion before the renewed controversy
over Heidegger's own political involvement. In this section I will examine one thread of
Derrida's Auseinandersetzung (critical debate or dialogue) with Heidegger, that which
centres most explicitly around the question of nation and politics. Just as Monolingualism of
the Other may be read as a performative negotiation with the political responsibilities of a
language which is inherited rather than chosen so I will suggest that Derrida's reading of
Heidegger bears a significant, and politically significant, performative dimension. From this
perspective, I will conclude, the inclusion of a long essay on Heidegger in the French edition
of Politics ofFriendship must be read as an important supplement to the movement of the
main body of the text: its absence in the English edition is a major omission. The essay
appended to Politics of Friendship bears the sub-title 'Geschlecht IV.' Two other essays
have been published under this title, and all three can be considered as supplementary to or
coextensive with the aims of Derrida's seminar on 'Philosophical Nationality and
Nationalism.' Derrida has described the first as a 'short preface' [OS 7 / 22] or 'an
introduction' [GES II 161 / 416] to that seminar, the trajectory of the second is announced
within it [ONH 13]. A third instalment was at one point circulated as a photocopy by
21 For Derrida's comments on the Heidegger affair see the interview entitled
'Heidegger, the philosopher's hell' [POI 181-90]. There are further comments on this subject
in the other interviews in the collection [POI 193-5; 286-7] and in the English translation
only, another interview dealing with Derrida's own entanglement in the argument: 'The
Work of Intellectuals and the Press' [POI 422-54].
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Derrida but has not been published [Ges II 183 / 439; 188 / 446].22 Derrida's major work on
Heidegger of this period, OfSpirit, is not directly a part of the series, but takes its bearings
from the same texts of, and the same questions addressed to, Heidegger [OS 7 / 22]. I will
give a brief account of these texts, in which it should become clear how the question of
nation is situated with regard to Derrida's work on Heidegger, and how I take Derrida's own
work to be responding to this question, before discussing the relationship between
'Heidegger's Ear: Philopolemology (Geschlecht IV)' and Politics ofFriendship.
2.3.1 Geschlecht.
At the heart of Derrida's Geschlecht series of essays lies the interpretation of one highly
ambiguous word in German, found not only in Heidegger but also in Fichte's account of the
nation [ONH 13], Geschlecht. In Derrida's first essay on the subject, 'Geschlecht: sexual
difference, ontological difference,' his interest in this word is already apparent. In the essay,
Derrida focuses on Geschlecht as a term for sex, whether male or female, and Heidegger's
apparent ascription to Dasein of an asexuality. By examining closely a seminar course given
shortly after the publication ofBeing and Time Derrida clarifies what is nowhere made clear
within the published book, that not only is Dasein neutral in sexual terms, but that this is not
the traditional assumption of philosophical discourse that being is to be understood from the
normative standpoint of masculinity. Instead, by choosing the word Dasein rather than
Mensch (man) Heidegger deliberately implies that sexual difference is not essential to
Dasein — but at the same time the possibility is raised that sexual difference cannot be
reduced to the object of an anthropological or ethical discourse, from which Heidegger has
22 See also the reference in John Sallis. 'Flight of Spirit' in OfDerrida, Heidegger,
and Spirit. 148n.l. David Farrell Krell refers to 'that third generation of "Geschlecht" which
he has promised and we will not allow him to forget' in 'Spiriting Heidegger.' 36.
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already distinguished the project of fundamental ontology. By insisting on the neutrality of
Dasein, moreover, Heidegger implies that Dasein must be thought prior to the binary
distinction between sexes, beyond the either-or implied in neuter (ne-uter), rather than as
simply being without sex; or even, read carefully, prior to negativity or the logic of dialectic
and opposition, as such. From this Derrida teases out the possibility of thinking a pre-
original sex, neither male nor female, which would not be asexual, but 'a predifferential, or
rather a predual, sexuality — which does not necessarily mean unitary, homogeneous, or
undifferentiated, as we shall see later' [GES I 387-8 / 402], What would be at stake in
pursuing this reading is the possibility of thinking sexual difference without thinking
opposition.
The difficulty in general is that Dasein is only in dispersion. Being is not an essence
prior to beings themselves, it is nothing other than its own distribution amongst them. As
Heidegger puts it in Being and Time, 'Dasein's facticity is such that its Being-in-the-world
has always dispersed \zerstreut] itself or even split itself up into definite ways of Being-in.'23
It is announced in the pre-ontological analytic, but cannot be removed from Dasein as
existents, as being there in the world. The consequences of the argument are not drawn out at
this stage. In 'Geschlecht II,' however, Derrida begins to Till out the implications of
Heidegger's use of Geschlecht, and in particular in his reading of Trakl, which he has hinted
at in 'Geschlecht I' ('Much later, at any rate thirty years later, the word "Geschlecht" will be
charged with all its polysemic richness: sex, genre [genre], family, stock, race, lineage,
generation' [GES I 385 / 400]) and pursued as part of the nationalism seminar [GES II 161-5 /
415-20]. Reading Trakl, Heidegger calls forth the full range of meanings of Geschlecht, as
the name for the Dasein of Mensch:
23 Martin Heidegger. Being and Time, trans. John MacQuarrie & Edward Robinson.
Oxford: Blackwell, 1962. 83
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the word "generation" [Geschlecht] here retains the full manifold meaning
mentioned earlier. For one thing, it names the historical generation of man,
mankind as distinct from all other living beings (plants and animals). Next the
word "generation" names the races, tribes, clans and families of mankind. At
the same time, the word always refers to the twofoldness of the sexes.24
Derrida locates this in the context of a summary of the results of his seminar ('the
paradoxical but regular association of nationalism with a cosmopolitanism and with a
humanism' [GES II 162 / 416]), and suggests the filiation between Heidegger and Fichte, but
also Heidegger's adherence to the schema ofwhat he has already suggested might be thought
of as a national humanism. As Fichte did with the concept of the nation, Heidegger is careful
to distinguish the Geschlecht of mankind from a 'biological fact.' The consequence is a
difficult balance between the original dispersion and the unity implied by Geschlecht as 'one
generation [in which] there is a unifying force.'25
Derrida is concerned to show that there are metaphysical axiomatics which intrude
into the attempt to think pre-ontologically: that the being Geschlechtlich of Dasein is not
contingent but originary and inescapable. So for example, the word Geschlecht itself has an
'irreducible bond to the question of humanity versus animality, and of a humanity whose
name, as the bond of the name to the "thing", if one can say that, remains as problematic as
that of the language in which the name is written' [GES II 165 / 419], It is the hand, in this
case, by which man is to be distinguished from the animal. The hand, Heidegger claims in
'What is Called Thinking,' is that which is proper to man; in distinction from every other
Geschlecht, including the ape. The analogy made by Heidegger between poetry and thought
and authentic handiwork (Handwerk) gives rise to a discourse of authentic, non-technical
activity, lifted from the realm of utility, profit, calculation, trade or commerce. Heidegger
binds thinking to a thought or situation of the body, and especially of the hand. He will also
24 Martin Heidegger. 'Language in the Poem.' On the Way to Language, trans. Peter
D. Hertz. New York: Harper Collins, 1982. 195. The other passage to which Derrida refers at
length is at 170.
25 ibid.
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claim that his discourse on technics is not only a protest, but an act of resistance against the
professionalization of university under the Nazi regime; the submission of philosophy to
imperatives of technical productivity. Derrida notes that this argument has 'equivocal
effects: it opens up to an archaistic reaction toward the rustic artisan class and denounces
business or capital, notions whose associations then are well known' [Ges II 172 / 427]. Just
as Fichte seeks to understand the nation in terms which are not simply those of an empirical
discourse, but spiritual, so too Heidegger refuses to draw on the biologist's account of the
hand as a hand that grips, or uses tools. Instead for Heidegger the human hand is
distinguished from that of the animal, and in turn this human hand comes to distinguish the
animal from the human as such. This, like the ascription of national exemplarity, may be an
unavoidable distinction, but it is one that should not be taken for granted. Is it necessary to
insist again that Derrida's aim is not to confound the differences between concepts, beings,
human and animal, but precisely to think those differences in a more diffuse manner? Such
borders blur themselves, Derrida claims: 'Elsewhere I have tried to show that, as every
opposition does, this absolute oppositional limit effaces the differences and leads back,
following the most resistant metaphysico-dialectic tradition, to the homogeneous' [ges II
174/429],
The implicit consequences are taken on to seminar and other work: can Dasein for
Heidegger be thought prior to Geschlecht, that is division into sexes, generations, humanity,
nations. Derrida's questioning tends to take two forms. On the one hand, as in the discussion
of animality, he is concerned to show that Heidegger makes metaphysical choices or
decisions. Derrida would prefer to think a regime of differences without such oppositions as
that between man and animal, or man and woman. In 'Geschlecht II' he distinguishes his
'dissemination' from Heidegger's 'polysemy,' still governed by an original principle.
However once we bear in mind that these decisions are unavoidable from Derrida's point of
view, the other form his questioning takes becomes obvious. Rather than convict Heidegger
of failing to escape metaphysics, Derrida seeks to see what elements within his text do
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gesture towards something else. The potential for thinking another, a third, sex, beyond or
prior to the binary division into male and female would be one of these moments in which
Derrida finds resources in Heidegger for thinking (beyond) the constitutive failures of
metaphysics.
2.3.2 Of Spirit.
Given the extensive interest in the political implications of Heidegger's work, it is
unsurprising that Derrida's reading of Heidegger in OfSpirit, elaborated before the so-called
Heidegger affair had become a cause celebre, has also attracted a fair amount of
commentary. In view of this, and of the complexity of the text itself, I will confine myself
here to those observations which seem most pertinent to the argument I am pursuing in this
chapter. In particular, I am interested in what distinguishes the singular performance of this
reading, originally a paper presented to a conference at Cerisy, both from the two earlier
essays on Geschlecht, and from some remarks made by Derrida at an earlier colloquium at
the University of Essex, to which he refers in the text [OS 8 / 23] and from which both an
outline of Derrida's comments and a transcript of the ensuing discussion have been
published.26
At the Essex colloquium Derrida had raised four points: the privilege attached to
questioning in Heidegger's work; the privilege attached to essence (for example when 'the
essence of technology is nothing technological' in 'The Question of Technology'); the
structure ofDasein in relation to animality; and the problem of epochality as a principle of
26 'On Reading Heidegger: An Outline of Remarks to the Essex Colloquium.'
Research in Phenomenology, vol. XVII. (1987) 171-85.
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gathering. The same themes guide OfSpirit, and as with the Geschlecht essays (in which the
theme of Geist is announced: from [Ges II 192 / 450]: 'the ambivalence of the fire or the
flame of the spirit, which is at once the Good and the Evil'), the pivotal text for reading
Heidegger becomes again the 1953 writings on Trakl. What marks out Of Spirit is its
systematic account of the use of the word 'spirit' in Heidegger's work, around which the
other points are organised. Derrida finds three stages in the trajectory of 'spirit': at first, in
Being and Time, Heidegger refuses spirit as a category, but later in the Rectorate discourse,
spirit returns, held in quotation marks, and associated with the political problems of destiny
and the nation. Derrida's reading at this point runs in parallel to his work on Fichte which I
have already discussed. On the one hand 'spirit' takes us beyond an empirical or biological
discourse of race; but on the other hand, it is still attached to a nationalist affirmation:
Heidegger 'confers the most reassuring and elevated spiritual legitimacy on [...] National
Socialism.' Yet 'by taking the risk of spiritualizing nazism, he might have been trying to
absolve or save it by marking it with this affirmation' [OS 39 / 64], In the third step of this
path, Heidegger's Trakl commentaries seek to reinstate the word spirit, but stripped of its
Christian and metaphysical connotations.
The situation Derrida finds played out in Heidegger's words then, is that which we
have seen to characterise the discourse of national philosophical humanism as such: if these
texts are read as the attempt to avoid the worse violence, the violence of an allegedly
biologically determinate racism, they may only do so by the path of the universal, yet even
the supposedly universal is already marked as a national affirmation, a political decision, as
violence. This path is also the path of the return of spirit as a humanism, as Derrida argues in
connection with Heidegger's thinking of Dasein as human not animal, and of a privilege
granted, once again, to the German language: spirit may only be truly spoken in German.
Derrida queries both of these assumptions, but the fundamental problem of the text is that of
the unavoidability of passing through spirit, of some form of spiritual determination. While
he can draw attention to the metaphysical decisions which foreclose on the distinction
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between human and animal, and privilege one language over another, Derrida cannot escape
the problematic affirmation of philosophy and spirit, which are already not only Occidental
but national. I will quote two crucial passages from the text to show the centrality and
ineluctability of this problem.
Because one cannot demarcate oneself from biologism, from naturalism, from
racism in its genetic form, one cannot be opposed to them, except by
reinscribing spirit in an oppositional determination, by once again making it a
unilaterality of subjectivity, even if in its voluntarist form. The constraint of
this program remains very strong, it reigns over the majority of discourses
which, today and for a long time to come, state their opposition to racism, to
totalitarianism, to nazism, to fascism, etc., and do this in the name of spirit, and
even of the freedom of (the) spirit, in the name of an axiomatic— for example
that of democracy or 'human rights' — which, directly or not, comes back to
this metaphysics of subjectify. All the pitfalls of the strategy of establishing
demarcations belong to this program, whatever place one occupies in it. The
only choice is the choice between the terrifying contaminations it assigns.
Even if all forms of complicity are not equivalent, they are irreducible. The
question of knowing which is the least grave of these forms of complicity is
always there — its urgency and its seriousness could not be over-stressed —
but it will never dissolve the irreducibility of this fact [OS 39-40 / 65-6],
This is the same problematic structure to that which Derrida has set out in his seminar on
philosophical nationality. The discourse of the social or human sciences cannot be opposed
except on the basis of transcendental gestures, however provisional or short-lived (or quasi-
transcendental), which by restoring philosophy as a universal explanatory force rest on
metaphysical foundations, however carefully these are qualified or subjected to ironic
presentation. Spirit returns. This is unavoidable:
I do not mean to criticize this humanist teleology. It is no doubt more urgent to
recall that, in spite of all the denegations or all the avoidances one could wish,
it has remained up till now (in Heidegger's time and situation, but this has not
radically changed today) the price to be paid in the ethico-political
denunciation of biologism, racism, naturalism, etc. If I analyze this 'logic,' and
the aporias or limits, the presuppositions or the axiomatic decisions, above all
the inversions and contaminations, in which we see it becoming entangled, this
is rather in order to exhibit and then formalize the terrifying mechanisms of
this program, all the double constraints which structure it. Is this unavoidable?
Can one escape this program? No sign would suggest it, at least neither in
'Heideggerean' discourses nor in 'anti-Heideggerean' discourses. Can one
transform this program? I do not know [OS 56 / 87-8],
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Derrida here gives an indication of how he understands his own procedure in OfSpirit and it
is important to note that he does not judge Heidegger, while pointing out the equivocations
of his work. I have already suggested in this chapter that responsibility precedes the subject;
that being born into one language rather than another is already a political decision for which
I am culpable, if not fully accountable. Here Derrida formulates this problem in terms of 'a
program.' Yet if this program has dictated to Heidegger, and to Derrida in his turn, neither
can avoid their responsibility for an attempt to come to terms with that program. Derrida
nowhere suggests that his work is to be preferred to Heidegger's in any straightforward way.
In the long footnote which appears to retract sections of the argument over the status of
questioning in Heidegger, Derrida describes an affirmative engagement which precedes
questioning, and which can be traced within Heidegger's work; yet this is something which
Derrida has been describing in his own terms for several years at this point [OS 129-136n.5 /
147-54n.l], While Derrida clearly wishes to isolate aporias and limits, 'axiomatic' decisions
in Heidegger's text: it is to exhibit these features of 'the program' rather than escape it. One
of the consequences of the 'contamination' to which he refers is that 'Heidegger' and
'Derrida' as proper names denoting discrete bodies of work cannot be adequately
distinguished.
This dimension of the problem has often been commented on. What has not been
dealt with is the way Derrida's response is inscribed with a national dimension: and in
particular a confrontation between the German and the French language. This, it seems to
me, repeats and complicates the identification between Heidegger and Derrida in the text.
David Farrell Krell has noted that at the climax of the book, when Derrida comes to read
Heidegger on Trakl, and identifies spirit as fire, he uses a word which is common to French
and German — shared, but different, in each language. That word is flamme. In other words
at the conclusion to the book 'spirit' [Geist, I'esprit] becomes that which German and French
hold in common. The question of spirit is a 'thoroughly French question' [OS 4 / 16], as
Derrida comments earlier in the book, and the relationship between German and French
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comes to replace, at least in the book's performative dimension, the question of translation
between Greek, Latin and German {'Spirit /soul / life, pneuma /psyche /zoe or bios, spiritus
/ anima / vita, Geist / Seele / Leben — these are the triangles and squares in which we
imprudently pretend to recognize stable semantic determinations' [OS 74 / 119]) and perhaps
even of the exclusion of Hebrew from this problem [OS 100-2 / 165-8].
Spirit names both that which puts into question and ghosts, or haunts the empirical,
and the necessary return of metaphysics: 'However we interpret this awesome equivocity, for
Heidegger it is inscribed in spirit. It is ofspirit [de I'esprit]' [OS 41 / 67], But in naming
spirit in French, the national dimension of the book is affirmed. Where Heidegger explicitly
claims that Geist can only be named in German, by translating it, Derrida cannot fail to
repeat this claim on behalf of the French national idiom in which he speaks. But by naming
this equivocity as 'de I'esprit' Derrida is also naming his own book. Not only is spirit best
spoken in French, but the book itself must be read as the exemplary exposition of spirit, as
not just the 'formalisation' but also the 'exhibition' of the 'terrifying mechanisms of the
program', to refer back to the passage I have just quoted at length. Derrida also draws
attention to the reference in his title to an eighteenth-century text by Helvetius. This earlier
book, of which his is a repetition, was condemned, banned and burnt. Might we not take this
to imply that Derrida's book of spirit is not only a book of fire, but another book to burn?
From the moment that it is written in one language rather than another, however translatable
that might make it, OfSpirit is the performative affirmation of the 'terrifying' program. Just
as in Monolingualism of the Other Derrida plays out the ambiguity of his own relation to
France itself, so in this text Derrida seeks to account for and respond to the necessary
inscription of deconstruction into a metaphysics of spirit
My claim is somewhat stronger than that ofGeoff Bennington who sees OfSpirit as
an exemplary deconstruction: 'what deconstruction will always have been saying on its own
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account, in its own name, this is deconstruction's very signature.'27 It also exceeds Simon
Critchley's claim that while Of Spirit is a responsible engagement with its own politics
through a reading of Heidegger, Derrida does not manage to decide and therefore ultimately
refuses politics.28 Derrida has written his own book of fire, his own book of spirit, his own
book to burn, a book which burns. In doing so he foregrounds the decisions which have
already been made for him, and which bind him to one language rather than another, and that
language to one tradition rather than another, one set of religions rather than another, and
thus to one set of political decisions rather than another. In doing so, Derrida (contra
Critchley, as it were) raises the question of the very possibility of politics, of a political
decision as something I could take: and repeats deconstruction (contra Bennington) as a
work of violence, of a national exemplarism and spiritual metaphysics which are
unavoidable and with which we can only negotiate.
.3 Europe as Responsibility.
Another of the arguments of Of Spirit has important consequences for this discussion.
Derrida begins a project of linking Heidegger's discourse on Europe with that of other
contemporary thinkers, in this instance Valery and Husserl. In doing so he at once returns to
one of his oldest themes, and pushes this political discourse and practice that deconstruction
cannot help but be even further. For crucially, not only is Europe identified with philosophy,
but with responsibility itself. So the situation we are describing cannot be one in which
deconstruction figures a return of responsibility to a flawed Western metaphysics.
27 Bennington. 'Spirit's Spirit Spirits Spirit.' in Derrida, Heidegger and Spirit. 91.
28 Simon Critchley. 'The Question of the Question' in Derrida, Heidegger and
Spirit. 101-2.
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Responsibility is also always already a political concept, not the neutral ground of politics, or
of political reflection, but already the taking of one side rather than another, and always on
the side of the fraternal friend, rather than that of the other. This question of responsibility
would make The Gift of Death a companion piece to Of Spirit, as Derrida turns from
showing Heidegger's Trakl reading to be finely balanced at the crossing of a Christian
metaphysics with a path to something completely other, to Patocka's genealogy of Europe as
responsibility itself. The problem is flagged up in OfSpirit:
What I am aiming at here is, obviously enough, anything but abstract. We are
talking about past, present and future 'events,' a composition of forces and
discourses which seem to have been waging merciless war on each other (for
example from 1933 to our time). We have here a program and a combinatory
whose power remains abyssal. In all rigor it exculpates none of these
discourses which can thus exchange their power. It leaves no place open for
any arbitrating authority. Nazism was not born in the desert. We all know this,
but it has to be constantly recalled. And even if, far from any desert, it had
grown like a mushroom in the silence of a European forest, it would have done
so in the shadow of big trees, in the shelter of their silence or their indifference
but in the same soil. I will not list these trees which in Europe people an
immense black forest, I will not count the species. For essential reasons, the
presentation of them defies tabular layout. In their bushy taxonomy, they
would bear the name of religions, philosophies, political regimes, economic
structures, religious or academic institutions. In short, what is just as
confusedly called culture, or the world of spirit [OS 109-10/178-9].
David Krell reads this passage as privileging a figure of the desert over the European forest
and wishes to recall that there is no pure outside, Judaic or otherwise, to this economy of
violence: 'To be sure, not in the desert. Yet the desert has often enough run red to the sound
of "sibboleth," a sound uttered without hope in many tongues. The prophetic discourses of
the desert, propagated in other lands, have often enough served as clarion calls to closure of
the triangle and violence in the wood.'29 But if this is what Derrida's appeal to the desert is
for, it is only to the extent that Judaism has always figured Europe's outside. Instead, we
might take this as a reference to another thinking of place, one that would be thought beyond
the opposition of desert and forest, beyond the possibility of a sacred place: what Derrida
29 David Farrell Krell. in Derrida, Heidegger andSpirit. 31
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refers to in Specters ofMarx as a desert in the desert [SoM 167-8 / 266-7] or in his text on
the Platonic chora, as the giving place to place.30 The old problem of deconstruction is at
work here: on the one hand we try to name the condition of possibility, but we can only
name it under the name of what is to hand, what we have inherited. That is, here, a desert
space.
Even before beginning OfGrammatology by linking logocentrism to ethnocentrism
[gra 3 / 11], Derrida was exploring the limits of the West. In his thesis, Le probleme de la
genese dans laphilosophie de Husserl, Derrida writes: 'This idea of Europe is the idea that is
born in Europe; it is the idea of philosophy that is, in its absolute originality, as Husserl tells
us, a European idea. In fact, Europe is not the cradle of philosophy, it is itself born as
spiritual signification, from the idea of philosophy.'31 Constituted by its outside, bearing its
other within, Europe just is the program of Western thought, whether in its Eurocentric or
anti-Eurocentric poles: 'Avowal, guilt, and self-accusation no more escape this old program
than does the celebration of self [OH 26 / 31]. Writing in Of Grammatology, Derrida
suspected that this structure Derrida could be found in the work of Levi-Strauss: 'the critique
of ethnocentrism has most often the sole function of constituting the other as a model of
original and natural goodness, of accusing and humiliating oneself, of exhibiting its being-
unacceptable in an anti-ethnocentric mirror' [Gra 114/ 168].
In The Other Heading a third stage is written into the thinking of national
humanism: we know it passes via a cosmopolitanism, but Derrida now asserts that it also
passes through a privilege assigned to Europe as the avant-garde, the leading force, the head
or header of the 'human' and 'national' world. This can be schematically set out as 'I am (we
are) all the more national for being European, all the more European for being trans-
European and international; no-one is more cosmopolitan and authentically universal than
30 'Khora' in On the Name. Stanford: Stanford UP, 1995.
31
Jacques Derrida. Le probleme de la genese dans la philosophie de Husserl. Paris:
PUF, 1990. 250
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the one, than this "we," who is speaking to you' [OH 48 / 49], A nationalism, or the national
affirmation of one idiom rather than another, also implies that 'what is proper to a particular
nation or idiom would be to be a heading for Europe, and what is proper to Europe would be,
analogically, to advance itself as a heading for the universal essence of humanity' [OH 48 /
49], In other words, philosophy itself:
Europe is not only a geographical headland or heading that has always
given itself the representation or figure of a spiritual heading, at once as
project, task, or infinite— that is to say, universal — idea, as the memory of
itself that gathers and accumulates itself, capitalizes upon itself, in and for
itself. Europe has also confused its image, its face, its figure and its very place,
its taking-place, with that of an advanced point, the point of a phallus if you
will, and thus, once again, with a heading for world civilization or human
culture in general. The idea of an advanced point of exemplarity is the idea of
the European idea, its eidos, at once as arche— the idea of beginning but also
as commanding [...] and as telos, the idea of the end [...] [OH 24 / 29].
Because Europe is identified with responsibility, our response to this situation is difficult.
Derrida formulates it in terms of a series of aporetic duties: for example that of striking a
balance between the nationalistic tensions of linguistic difference and homogenization of
universal translating machine [OH 58 / 58], or how to keep Geist and esprit apart without
making one simply an incomplete translation of the other, truer, word: 'The same duty
dictates respecting differences, idioms, minorities, singularities, but also the
universalizability of formal law, the desire for translation, agreement and univocity, the law
of the majority, opposition to racism, nationalism and xenophobia' [OH 78 / 76-7]. Derrida
has no option but to take up the old name of Europe (and culture, identity): if to be European
is to be responsible, we must only be more so, but only by transgressing the path of
responsibility as European, by thinking responsibility against itself [cf. OH 17 / 22], As we
shall see in the final section of this chapter, this might mean both 1) to see what resources
already open Europe, within its old name, to its outside and 2) at its borders (figurative and
quite literal) to welcome what is already inside, not just that which appears to come from the
outside [OH 82-3 / 80-1]. Derrida's memorandum to himself, that 'I am a good European
intellectual' [OH 82 / 80] once again reminds us in our turn of the implacable program of
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which he is writing. Deconstruction as political practice in this mode aims to appear at the
head of this program, but in such a way as to both commend and demonstrate ways of
thinking the program itself differently.
2.3.4 Hearing the Other in Politics ofFriendship.
Turning from OfSpirit back to Politics ofFriendship, Derrida appears to have moved away
from the problem of responsibility. Friendship, and the decision have replaced what may be
too European, too pious a discourse on responsibility. Instead the distinction between friend
and enemy reinforces the violence of the political inscription of the text. However, the book
is not without a link back to Heidegger. 'Heidegger's Ear: Philopolemology (Geschlecht IV)'
is an essay on Heidegger which deals with many of the same themes but which also seems to
stand on its own as a reading of the place of the concepts of 'friendship' in Heidegger. The
text was published in the French edition of Politics of Friendship and 1 will here read it as
having a supplementary relation to the main body of that book: as both the completion and
the rendering incomplete of the text.
Derrida begins with a relatively obscure passage from Sein und Zeit in which
Heidegger refers to 'the voice of the friend whom every Dasein carries with it.'32 Leaving
aside the suggestions of Christopher Fynsk and Jean-Luc Nancy that this passage opens a
possible reading of Dasein as Mit-sein, Derrida instead links this brief mention forward to
both the reading of Trakl, and to the seminar work of the 1930s in which Heidegger also
makes explicit reference to hearing. There are two dimensions to Derrida's argument. Firstly
he suggests how, on the basis of Heidegger's later work, this reference to the voice of the
'2
Being and Time. 163.
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friend — a mode of hearing which is neither sense perception nor intellectual faculty —
prefigures, calls for, and almost hears the approach of, the thinking of Being as event
[.Ereignis], as world-disclosure and the four-fold, which will characterise the work of the
later Heidegger, to which Derrida is much closer than he is to Being and Time. But Derrida is
also suggesting that Heidegger here prefigures his own interest in aimance — as I discussed
in the first chapter, a 'middle voice' of loving, neither active nor passive, ontologically prior
(even if not factually) to the distinction between friends: which Derrida in effect equates
with the calling of / for a politics beyond friendship modelled on fraternity. He comments:
Heidegger is pushed by a 'destructive' necessity to try to hear and understand
[entendre] (piAe iv before the Platonic and Aristotelian (piAla. He translates
qxAeiy of which he speaks a great deal, by das Leiben, loving, before any
distinction between the loving of love and the loving of friendship, what in
French, in a seminar I am devoting to these questions, I call aimance [G1V 180
/ 368].
While Derrida carefully marks this as a '"destructive" necessity,' not many lines beforehand
he has drawn attention not only to the difference, but also the similarity between the
Heideggerean and the Derridean mode, if we can accept this distinction provisionally.
'Deconstruction, or rather "Destruktion," he writes, commenting on Heidegger, 'is also an
experience of the appropriation of the tradition, and this deconstructive appropriation
signifies first, it calls itself, it calls heifit: "open our ear.'" What Derrida does not remind us
is that on several occasions he has drawn on the metaphor of hearing to suggest that what he
has been doing in his work is precisely 'a process of appropriation (Aneignung) and of
transformation. [...] The word Aneignung is used at least twice in this context, and
something more remarkable still, not only to designate the welcome of the tradition but also
its "destruction."' In 'Tympan,' Otobiographies, and 'Of an apocalyptic tone recently
adopted in philosophy' Derrida has associated deconstruction with something very similar.33
33
'Tympan' [Mar ix-xxix / i-xxv]; Otobiographies. Paris: Galilee, 1984.; 'On a
Newly Arisen Apocalyptic Tone in Philosophy.' trans. John P. Leavey, Jr. in Peter Fenves
ed. Raising the Tone ofPhilosophy. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 1993. 117-171.
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For both these reasons, above and beyond the general difficulty of distinguishing Heidegger
and Derrida, this would appear to be another text in which Derrida performatively
problematises the issue of the propriety of a text, or of what is proper to an author.
The second focus of Derrida's text is in the possibility ofpolemos, which Heidegger
also appears to assign to this philein, in his reading of Heraclitus. Where aimance for Derrida
would be 'a passivity beyond passivity', for Heidegger it appears to be linked to a rhetoric or
metaphorics of violence and struggle. Derrida looks particularly askance at the implication
that what is proper to the belonging together of people (of a nation?) is their communal
struggle. Polemos and philein are 'originarily the same' for Heidegger [GIV 209 / 410] and
'what we identify as the history of the world, for example, political history' [GIV 210/411]
is Kampf or struggle. In the work leading up to Of Spirit it was the privilege attached to
questioning, later modified in a lengthy footnote, and to essence which came into question.
Here it is the subordination of difference as 'dissociation, disjunction, scission, dissension, or
secession' to 'gathering' [GIV 209 / 409-10], When Heidegger speaks of the relation
between beings in terms of harmony, he appears to reinstall values based on 'the reciprocity
of the there-and-back, the going and coming of exchange. A serious problem when one tries
to draw the consequences of this mutuality in the moral and political field of friendship.'
Derrida then echoes the key themes of Politics ofFriendship when he asks:
What would be the political carrying-distance of a thought or an experience of
(pi)e ivthat would no longer respect this law of reciprocity and would appeal to
dissemblance, heterogeneity, dissymetry, disproportion, incommensurability,
non-exchange, the excess of every measure and thus of all symmetry? All these
words are not synonyms of course. A democracy to come should give to be
thought an equality that is not incompatible with a certain dissymetry, with
heterogeneity, or absolute singularity, an equality even requiring them and
engaging them from a place that remains invisible but that orients me here,
from afar, no doubt beyond the Heideggerian aim [GES IV 183 / 372-3].
As with the problem of spirit, at the very least, Heidegger's association of world-history with
struggle, with Kampf and polemos is equivocal. This ambiguity leaves the thought of Being
open to some unpleasant interpretations. Derrida's example is of the possibility of Hitler
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understanding Mein Kampf'm a Heideggerean manner: 'I speak, like you, Heidegger, of our
responsibility, of the mission, of the "historial spiritual mission of the German people'" [GES
IV 211 / 412-3]. Derrida is cautious about concluding: 'these strategies [...] are never totally
objectifiable, thematizable, and formalizable. This limit is even the place of decision, of
decision in general,, of political decision in particular, its tragic condition of possibility, there
where decision cannot finally let itself be guided by a knowledge' [GES IV 211-2 / 413]. Yet
this is what Heidegger will not have 'sufficiently thematised or formalised' [GES IV 211 /
413], The community of struggle is not first a community which then struggles, but is
community as struggle itself: 'this force is also the spiritual force of the west, what gives to
the German people the exemplary unity of its historical mission in order to make the people
of spiritual historiality a people "geschichtlich-geistige"' [GES IV 203 / 400-1],
This is why the essay is situated at the end of Politics of Friendship. With the
thought of differance reconfigured in terms of violence, politics and 'democracy-to-come',
Derrida is attempting to think aimance prior to or making possible the distinction between
friend and enemy. But for Derrida aimance does not have an empirical or factical existence
(and thus cannot be deduced with reference to a pre-Socratic thinker) or an affinity with any
one language or the other (hence Derrida's worry about finding such a good idiom in which
to express exemplarity — tout autre est tout autre). This suggests another context within
which to read Politics of Friendship. Alongside deconstruction as the thinking of a
'democracy-to-come,' and as the re-marking of the inevitable political decision which
language makes for me (national affirmation, exemplarity) can we not see deconstruction as
simply this political rewriting of Heidegger? Derrida's cultured, French, European discourse
in its shameful exhibition of its own violence, its appropriation of the discourse of others,
and its idiomatic happening, would then be an attempt to accept this situation, and then to act
within it. These 'readings' must be read as an exemplary political practice, not as a
theoretical program which could be detached from or applied to this or that more or less
pressing 'political' situation. In the next section I will turn to another of Derrida's seminars,
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on hospitality, to try and show Derrida's own response to this situation, before beginning, in
the following chapter to elaborate my own response.
2.4 Deconstruction as Hospitality.
IN THE THIRD section of this chapter I argue that Derrida's reconfiguration of deconstruction
as a political practice, a practice of acknowledging and negotiating with its inexorable
political dimension and its inscription into various political discourses emerges in seminars
and essays subsequent to the publication of Politics ofFriendship in terms of the question of
hospitality. I have already shown that in his work on the problem of philosophical
nationality, and in his reading of Heidegger, Derrida is concerned to raise the inevitability,
and even the necessity, of certain kinds of political decision, while attempting to
acknowledge and perhaps alleviate the attendant violence of such a decision. Derrida's
theoretical and practical engagement under the name of 'hospitality' — the object of
Derrida's seminar in 1995-6 — is deconstruction as a political practice at its most explicit,
developing themes which remain implicit, for example, in Derrida's work on witnessing and
on the gift; but moreover, I suggest, hospitality reveals deconstruction to have always
already been political. The main sources for the material of the seminar on hospitality are the
two published sessions and Derrida's later text on Levinas, 'A Word ofWelcome.' However,
the work is also prefigured in Specters ofMarx. Once again, Derrida's discussion is most
easily approached through his structural analysis of the concept of hospitality: on this basis
we will also be able to see the role his various examples play in his work on hospitality, and
in particular, the place ofKant and Marx.
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2.4.1 Hyperbole and Hospitality.
This passage from the second published seminar on hospitality 'Pas de l'hospitalite' (which
can be translated as both 'step of hospitality' and 'no hospitality' [HOS 75 / 71 ]34) is worth
quoting at length, since in it Derrida sets out the main features of his claims about
hospitality:
In other words, there would be an antinomy, an insoluble antinomy, a
non-dialecticizable antinomy between, on the one hand, The law of unlimited
hospitality (to give the new arrival all of one's home and oneself, to give him
or her one's own, our own, without asking a name, or compensation, or the
fulfilment of even the smallest condition), and on the other hand, the laws (in
the plural), those rights and duties that are always conditioned and conditional,
as they are defined by the Greco-Roman tradition and even the Judeo-Christian
one, by all of law and philosophy of law up to Kant and Hegel in particular,
across the family, civil society, and the State [HOS 77 / 73],
Derrida draws attention to the fact that the traditional concept of hospitality is a limited one.
It is governed both by the value of reciprocity, and by the notions of law and of rights.
Drawing on Benveniste's account of the origin of hospitality Derrida argues that hospitality
has generally been determined as mutual obligations between peoples.35 Hospitality is
presumed to be a pact between two states or nations, two families or groups. It is laid down
as a law, and as a right available to whoever is subject to that law. On this basis hospitality
falls foul of two objections from Derrida which I have already discussed in other contexts.
Firstly, if hospitality is the following of a rule, an acting out of obligation to the other, it
cannot be the object of a responsible decision, but remains the unfolding of a programme.
Secondly, if hospitality is only offered in expectation of a return, even in the minimal terms
of knowing that one also has the right to hospitality, it is not freely given, but is conditioned
or limited. Offered or owed only between those who are presumed to be equal, hospitality
34 The idiomatics of 'pas' are discussed at length in Jacques Derrida. 'Pas.' in.
Parages. Paris: Galilee, 1986. 9-116.
35 Emile Benveniste. 'Hospitality.' in Indo-European Language and Society, trans.
E. Palmer. London Faber & Faber, 1973. 71-83.
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shares the structure we have already seen in Derrida's analysis of the concept of friendship.
As a bond between one group and another, or some groups and some others, the laws of
hospitality must also enact exclusion. Even if hospitality were to be offered universally to
any other human, it would still be a limited hospitality— and perhaps the very definition of
a humanism. Can hospitality be offered to the non-human other: whether animal, vegetable
or mineral?
In practice however, hospitality is rarely to be offered to every other human as such.
Derrida uses the example of an absolute stranger or foreigner as the limit question of
hospitality:
we would have to note once again a paradox or a contradiction: this right to
hospitality offered to a foreigner 'as a family,' [Derrida uses Benveniste's terms]
represented and protected by his or her family name, is at once what makes
hospitality possible, or the hospitable relationship to the foreigner possible, but
by the same token what limits and prohibits it. Because hospitality, in this
situation, is not offered to an anonymous new arrival and someone who has
neither name, nor patronym, nor family, nor social status, and who is therefore
treated not as a foreigner but as another barbarian. [HOS 23-25 / 27-9]
Derrida takes both the self-characterisation of Socrates in his Apology and Oedipus as figures
of the absolute stranger, the stranger to the law of the city, who asks for protection in the
name of the law of hospitality. What these examples suggest, and which Benveniste also
describes as the original model of hospitality on the basis of its etymology, is a right and a
duty offered between Greek nations, or between the Greeks and certain other peoples, but
not to all (the barbarian). Derrida takes this to be the general structure of a limited
hospitality. Moreover, the barbarian is an outsider first of all in language, he speaks in a
language which is not recognised as language, is not without importance. Derrida insists that
this is another characteristic limit of hospitality:
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the foreigner is first of all foreign to the legal language in which the duty of
hospitality is formulated, the right to asylum, its limits, norms, policing, etc.
He has to ask for hospitality in a language which by definition is not his own,
the one imposed on him by the master of the house, the host, the king, the lord,
the authorities, the nation, the State, the father, etc. This personage imposes on
him translation into their own language, and that's the first act of violence
[HOS 15/21],
Put more concisely, hospitality becomes limited as soon as I ask the stranger to divulge his
name, to announce his arrival in my language, and not in his.
Derrida opposes another way of thinking about hospitality to all these limited forms
of hospitality which are or have been practised, formulated or theorised. Like both the
alterity beyond equality of 'democracy-to-come,' and justice thought beyond any
determinate law, the status of this unconditional hospitality is hard to define. It is neither a
truth nor an essence of hospitality of which all actual forms of hospitality would be flawed
copies, pale imitations. It is not an Idea of hospitality towards which we could work, or
towards which the world is progressing by some secret teleology. Yet in the same way that
Derrida claims that law bears witness to justice, and democracy bears witness to a
'democracy-to-come,' but which can never appear as such, limited hospitality is linked to
unconditional hospitality. We are caught between 'two plurals that are different at the same
timepure dispersion ('n + n + n, etc.')—- nothing other than the various (conditioned) laws
of hospitality— and the transcendental situation where one form of hospitality (an unlimited
one, if you like) would govern the entire series: ('One + n.') [HOS 81 / 77], This being
between is the mode of the quasi-transcendental: a Law of the law, which must also be a law
like any other, and thus become part of the series of all laws, while claiming to govern the
series, but in fact generating the opening to infinity of the series [HOS 81 / 77]. Let us follow
the argument more closely for a while.
Derrida offers two main figures of this unconditional hospitality. The first follows
from what we have already discussed, and consists in the offering of hospitality to the
unknown, without even asking for a name:
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absolute hospitality requires that I give not only to the foreigner (provided with
a family name, with the social status of being a foreigner, etc.), but to the
absolute, unknown, anonymous, other, and that I give place to them, that I let
them come, that I let them arrive, and take place in the place I offer them,
without asking of them either reciprocity (entering into a pact) or even their
names [HOS 25 / 29].
The second figure for absolute hospitality is that of the possible substitution of the host for
the guest. If the host, as master of the house, were to offer unconditional hospitality, would
that not be to make the guest, in his turn, the master, and for the master to become the guest?
This would no longer then be hospitality, which is precisely the offering of hospitality by the
master. It is not surprising that Derrida quickly argues that absolute hospitality is also
impossibility itself. Both the French idiom, hdte meaning guest and host, and the etymology
offered by Benveniste, in which hospitality is the product of the merging of guest and
master, suggest this situation.
It also seems clear that Derrida's object here is substantially similar to that of
Politics of Friendship. What he has called limited hospitality has the same structure as
friendship as fraternity, and of a democratic model understood in these terms: a limited duty
offered or owed only to members of my family, or the state understood in terms of birth¬
right, of native birth, as a homeland, as a natural or naturalised bond, modelled on the home,
and subject to the law of the home, which is also the circulation of obligation without an
excess, economy as reciprocity. Absolute hospitality is the figure of a hyperbolic duty which
not only cuts across or exceeds these forms of obligation and of politics, but is
heterogeneous, transgressive and violent. I have argued in the first two sections of this
chapter that the form of much of Derrida's work has been structured as a negotiation of the
contradiction between both these duties, and of the impossibility of their reconciliation, so
that that very negotiation must be experienced as violent. We might also expect Derrida's
work on hospitality to have this form. This can be seen when we expand the near constant
reference to Kant in these texts.
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2.4.2 Kant and the Cosmopolitical.
Kant appears to have a particular place in Derrida's work on hospitality. Three essays of his
are referred to regularly, as the very model of a politics which would enact a limited
hospitality, and therefore which we must seek to think beyond. While it would be possible to
claim, following recent work on the irreducibility of Kantian problematics to political
thought, and to international relations in particular, that this privileged reference to Kant
follows from an empirical importance of his work, this would be a little misleading.36 It
would also risk rendering Derrida's analysis at least irrelevant, and at worst incorrect, if it
could be proved that there was a way of thinking international relations which successfully
broke with Kant. I suggest that the place of Kant is again to be thought of as exemplary: that
is as both the best example, and just another example; both paradigmatic and merely typical.
I will pass quickly over the least frequently mentioned essay, 'On a Supposed Right to Lie
From Philanthropy' to the more regularly cited 'On Perpetual Peace' and the presumed 'Of
Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Point of View.'
Derrida's point in discussing Kant's justification of the absolute value he assigns to
the obligation not to lie reiterates the question of secrecy which I have expounded in my first
chapter. Kant argues that 'to be truthful (honest) in all declarations is [...] a sacred command
of reason prescribing unconditionally, one not to be restricted by any conveniences.'37
Derrida argues that Kant in this text both founds morality on this principle of transparency,
but also threatens the possibility of resistance by insisting that there can be no case of lying
to the authorities: he 'secures social right in public right. But simultaneously [...] he
destroys, along with the right to lie any right of [...] resisting the demand for truth,
36 For example, Kimberley Hutchings. Kant, Critique and Politics. London:
Routledge, 1996.; Mark F.N. Franke. 'Immanuel Kant and the (Im)Possibility of
International Relations Theory.' in Alternatives no.20 (1995) 279-322.
37 Immanuel Kant 'On a supposed right to lie from philanthropy' (1797) in Mary J
Gregor ed. & trans., Practical Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1996. 613.
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confessions or public openness' [HOS 69 / 65]. For Kant, the unconditional law of
truthfulness outweighs the law of hospitality and demands its transgression. The example
cited is that of being required to hand over someone to whom you have offered hospitality
and your protection. However for Derrida, this Kantian host has acted in an exemplary
* manner, by offering hospitality to the stranger only in so far as he is still a subject of the law:
'Hospitality is due to the foreigner, certainly, but remains, like the law, conditional, and thus
conditioned in its dependence on the unconditionality which is the basis of the law' [HOS 73
/ 67 ]. Just as the secret represents a principle of resistance to the public sphere, or to the
State, a right to non-response, a resistance to the law in the name of the law, so here Derrida
implies, against Kant, that the 'infinite idea' of hospitality should also be the principle of a
possible resistance to the State or the judiciary.
However it is Derrida's use of the essay 'On Perpetual Peace' which is more
germane to my argument here. In his reading of this essay Derrida links his account of
hospitality to the problem of the cosmopolitanism, which in its complicity with nationalism,
with the national affirmation of even the most universalist philosophy, we have seen Derrida
questioning. At the heart of 'On Perpetual Peace', Kant formulates the principle of relations
between states in terms of hospitality, and thus, as Derrida notes in 'A Word of Welcome',
cosmopolitical terms: 'The law and cosmopolitics of hospitality that he proposes in response
to this terrible alternative [between a Utopian irenism and the violence of realpolitik\ is a set
of rules and contracts, an interstate conditionally that limits, against the backdrop of natural
law reinterpreted within a Christian horizon, the very hospitality it guarantees.' [Adi 101 /
175] Peace, for Kant, retains a trace ofwar: an armed peace is simply the suspension ofwar;
peace is not natural, but instituted, and so perhaps not really peace at all [Adi 86-7 / 154-5]:
Kant does not say this, but can it not be thought, either with or against him,
that an institutional peace is at once pure and impure. As an eternal promise, it
must retain, according to a logic that I tried elsewhere to formalize, the trace of
a threat, ofwhat threatens it [...] [Adi 89 / 158].
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Derrida does not condemn Kant for proposing only a limited hospitality. But he argues that
what is brought out in Kant's essay is the limit to hospitality which must operate
everywhere:
We know this only too well: never will a Nation-State as such, regardless of its
form of government, and even if it is democratic, its majority on the right or
the left, open itself up to an unconditional hospitality or to a right of asylum
without restriction. It would never be 'realistic' to demand this of a Nation-
State as such. The Nation-State will always want to 'control the flow of
immigration' [Adi 90 / 159].
From this point of view, and this repeats the structures of responsibility in question in
Derrida's work on 'democracy-to-come,' the Nation-State can never be just. The flow of
immigration will always challenge the boundaries of the state, and to the extent that the State
seeks to enforce restrictions on immigration (even if some restriction is always necessary) it
will be less just. It is not fortuitous, Derrida writes, that it is the thinker of a universal right to
cosmopolitan citizenship in 'On Perpetual Peace' who so limits the right to hospitality in
terms of the law of veracity, of telling the truth, and of the right to the secret: 'who destroys
at its source the very possibility of what he posits and determines in this way' [hos 71 / 67]
by commanding that the guest be handed over to those seeking to kill him. The figure of the
absolute other, of someone without a place, or a state, without the means to return the
obligation of hospitality, is the one to whom hospitality or the right of sojourn is not owed.
We have several names for these unfortunates: in Britain, 'asylum seekers', in France 'sans
papiers.' But we might also adduce the problems of international relations as limited
hospitality more consistently to a widening economic North / South divide, to the question of
sanctions enforced against a people under International Law, and of a hospitality owed to a
people even if not to its leader. I believe one of the reasons Derrida formulates the problem
of hospitality in this way is because it is immediately apparent that this is the problem of
frontiers, and of the frontiers of the State, thus the problem of the polis as such.
Concluding the second published seminar on hospitality, with which I began this
section, Derrida asks:
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In giving a right, if I can put it like that, to unconditional hospitality, how can
one give place to a determined, limitable and delimitable — in a word, to a
calculable — right or law? How can one give place to a concrete politics and
ethics, including a history, evolutions, actual revolutions, advances — in short,
a perfectibility? A politics, an ethics, a law that thus answer to the new
injunctions of unprecedented historical situations, that do indeed correspond to
them, by changing the laws, by determining citizenship, democracy,
international law etc., in another way? So by really intervening in the condition
of hospitality in the name of the unconditional, even if this pure unconditional
appears inaccessible, and inaccessible not only as a regulatory idea, an Idea in
the Kantian sense and infinitely removed, always inadequately approached, but
inaccessible for the structural reasons, 'barred' by the internal contradictions
we have analyzed? [HOS 147-149 / 131].
It is the question of 'really intervening in the condition of hospitality in the name of the
unconditional' that is surely at stake here. My suggestion is that we must read deconstruction
as precisely this intervention. Furthermore, from this point of view, we are able to bring this
chapter towards its conclusion by arguing that there deconstruction as political practice,
which, beyond the reinscription of the necessity of ethico-political decisions, takes place as a
set of ethico-political decisions, can be understood as both the theoretical and practical
attempt to negotiate with these laws in the name of another law. On this basis, and on this
basis only, is there a possibility of better laws, of more equality, of more democracy, even
when these terms will never be just enough, equal enough, democratic enough. I will
examine this first in relation to Derrida's (practical, performative) call for a (theoretical,
constative) New International in Specters ofMarx, and then in relation to a (more practical,
more performative) intervention in the question of refugees in a short text published as part
of Marx en jeu. On this basis, it should become clear that the question of politics is for
Derrida not only the negotiation of responsibility, without any guarantees or certainty, but
also the challenge made to the limits of the state, in the name of what lies beyond the state,
and perhaps even beyond of the field of politics and law as narrowly defined.
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2.4.3 Figures of Hospitality in Specters ofMarx.
I am going to focus on one relatively short passage of Derrick's Specters ofMarx, a difficult
text which has caused some controversy, particularly over the adequacy of Derrida's
treatment of Marx. I do not have space to deal with this topic here. Instead I wish to focus
on the book's subtitles, 'The New International, and the State of the Debt', read beyond the
reference to Marx, and as just such an attempt to intervene in the conditional in the name of
the unconditional suggested in OfHospitality.
Derrida's most obvious 'complaint' in Specters ofMarx comes when he offers a list
of ten plagues. It is not immediately obvious how we should read this list. Is it a list of the
only ten? The most pressing ten? In which case, on what criteria is it based? In selecting his
list, Derrida acts, intervenes, chooses, prioritises — all these are political acts. But he must
do so on the basis of an impossible and irresponsible decision. So much so, that in Politics of
Friendship he gives no examples (and draws attention to this fact) since to choose some not
others could not be justified. In Aporias however, Derrida offers us another way to read the
ten plagues of Specters of Marx, which would account for its apparently arbitrary
formulation. Writing specifically of The Other Heading — but we can easily apply this to
Specters ofMarx— Derrida comments of his examples:
they concerned the question of Europe, of European borders and of the border
of the political, of politeia and of the State as European concepts. Nine or
eleven times, they involved the same aporetic duty; they involved ten — plus
or minus one— commandments considered as examples in an infinite series in
which the ten could only count a series of examples.38
The series of examples of what calls for responsible action must be infinite. Not only
because of the logic of exemplarity as the infinite field of difference itself, but because the
for there to be any responsibility it must be by definition an infinite task.
38
Jacques Derrida. Aporias. trans. Thomas Dutoit. Stanford: Stanford UP, 1993. 17.
/ Apories. Paris: Galilee, 1996. 39.
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Now of the examples given in Specters ofMarx— unemployment, refugees and the
homeless, economic war, the free market, the foreign debt, arms industry, nuclear
proliferation, inter-ethnic wars, mafia and drug cartels — it is the tenth which stands out as
the signal of a 'plus or minus one,' as the extension of the list to infinity. What appears to be
just one of Derrida's examples might also be the example which governs all the others:
For above all, above all, one would have to analyze the present state of
international law and of its institutions. Despite a fortunate perfectibility,
despite an undeniable progress, these international institutions suffer from at
least two limits. The first and most radical of the two stems from the fact that
their norms, their charter, the definition of their mission depend on a certain
historical culture. They cannot be dissociated from certain European
philosophical concepts, and notably from a concept of State or national
sovereignty whose genealogical closure is more and more evident, not only in
a theoretico-juridico or speculative fashion, but concretely, practically, and
practically quotidian. Another limit is strictly linked to the first: This
supposedly universal international law remains, in its application, largely
dominated by particular nation-States. Almost always their techno-economic
and military power prepares and applies, in other words, carries the decision.
As one says in English, it makes the decision [SoM 83-4 / 138],
The value attributed to international law is not that of a good in itself, but of a necessary evil.
Just as Derrida described the limits inscribed within the very concept of democracy, so here
he does the same with international law. The New International, as a rethinking of
international law is figured by the problem of the limited hospitality of the 'particular nation-
States' who dominate it. For the law to develop, these states would have to cede their control
rather than dictating the decision. Only in this event would the law have a chance of being
more just. Marx himself comes to stand in for the stranger within the text: 'Marx remains an
immigrant chez nous, a glorious, sacred, accursed but still a clandestine immigrant as he was
all his life' [SoM 174 / 276], We are to receive Marx's work, as we would an immigrant. He
has not yet been received, could not ever be completely received, but his work should be
neither domesticated or appropriated; nor simply turned back at the border. (The same might
be said of Heidegger, or of Derrida.) The impossibility of determining whether any problem,
any thinker, any event is one event among others, or the event of events, problem of
problem, text of texts, is paid tribute to in Derrida's thinking of exemplarity. Derrida's
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restless attempts to formulate these problems, from friendship to hospitality for example,
from justice, to unconditional hospitality, to democracy-to-come show this, as does his
reticence in adding pathos to his text from using individual examples.
To read Specters of Marx as this kind of text rather than a philosophical or
theoretical text can be confirmed from an interview given four years later, on the occasion of
a play dealing with Marx and influenced by Derrida. The book is not a 'return to Marx'
Derrida suggests; but an attempt to remain critical of all the dogmatisms of the Marxist
tradition, 'and to a certain philosophy, to a solely philosophical reading of Marx. One must
also say that, since the effondrement of certain so-called communist States, Marxist studies
have tended most often (not always but often) to a certain academisme. '39 Deconstruction as
a reading practice, and this is by definition a political practice, is also this work of
hospitality, of hearing the text on which deconstruction is working. Not only is the key
political issue of Specters ofMarx that of hospitality, of reinventing the law in the name of
the law, but its textual and performative mode is that of giving hospitality: but also therefore
at risk of being an appropriation rather than a letting-come.
2.4.4 Deconstruction as Hospitality.
It seems appropriate to introduce one final example to the discussion at this point. I have
argued that deconstruction in this phase of Derrida's work, and perhaps, throughout, might
be considered as hospitality. The figures of hospitality in Specters of Marx suggest this
several years before the seminar on hospitality and 'A Word of Welcome.' If hospitality is to
be considered one of the political translations of 'deconstruction' or perhaps of 'difference' -
39 Marx en Jeu 54
136
as I have suggested in the first chapter we might consider Derrida's analysis of democracy
and democracy-to-come— I think it right to draw attention to some of Derrida's 'practical'
political engagements of the same period. For example, in 'Pas de l'hospitalite,' Derrida
refers to the 'so-called Pasqua Laws and the "standardization" that now subjects Algerians to
the same conditions as other foreigners for their coming to France.' This reversed the
previous Evian agreements which had permitted Algerian citizens to enter France without a
visa. Derrida comments: "'The time of the Evian agreements has passed," a collaborator of
M. Pasqua replied to us when we were protesting against the said standardization' [HOS 147
/ 129], 'Standardization' speaks the very language of'equalisation' and of hospitality against
which Derrida has set his complaint, while his use of 'collaborator' raises once again the
spectre of the Vichy French removal of citizenship from Jewish French Algerians, 'without
the slightest intervention or demand on the part of the Germans' [Hos 143 / 127]. However
we might have referred also to Derrida's comments on the dispute of the wearing of the veil
by Muslim children in French schools in a text for Helene Cixous, that other exemplary
Franco-Maghrebian [MON 93n.9 / 114-5n.]40, or his earlier statement in 'Kant, the Jew, and
the German' of solidarity for Palestine [KJG 39-40]. Reversing the statement which 1 quoted
at the beginning of my first chapter, these political engagements must be considered as
having a philosophical dimension.
One text in particular brings these themes, of hospitality, and of Derrida's own
political engagements, together. It is the transcription of an improvised contribution to a
meeting organised around the question of the 'sans-papiers.' This names at the same time
both a specific context: the 'sans-papiers' was the name given to the 300 people evicted from
the Church of St Bernard in Paris, an event to which Derrida refers twice in 'A Word of
Welcome' [cf. Adi 20 / 46, 101 / 176], (It is perhaps not insignificant that the hospitality
40
Jacques Derrida. 'A Silkworm of one's own (points of view stitched on the other
veil)' trans. Geoffrey Bennington. OxfordLiterary Review, vol.18 (1997). 41.
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seminar takes place against the backdrop of these events.) It is a polemical and angry piece
of writing. Derrida objects that the 'sans-papiers' are being denied their human rights, under
EU law and the Geneva Convention, that the legislation fails to distinguish between those
without papers who have been living and working in France for up to fifteen years and
illegal immigrants, and condemns the failure of leftist politicians to oppose the law. He also
sets the legislation in a French context, referring back to earlier legislation in 1938, and
1945, and the apparent contradiction between this and France's self-image as the home of the
rights of man and of the right to asylum. (Although, as we have seen, these are not
incompatible, as the logic of exemplarism prescribes a direct correlation between patriotic
pride and an allergic particularism.) However, more widely, Derrida sees this as
symptomatic of upheavals everywhere, of what in another context he refuses to call
'globalisation' but insists on 'mondialatinisation' to bring out the sense in which this is a
Westernisation of the world.
Derrida's argument operates on several levels. Firstly it is a contestation at the level
of language, beyond a simple rhetorical confrontation. Two phrases, 'delit de I'hospitalite'
and 'sans-papiers' itself bear the brunt of this attack. The first, a crime of hospitality, he
calls shocking - it contradicts the imperative within hospitality as law, rather than as crime:
'What becomes of a country, I ask myself, or a culture, or a language, when one can speak of
a crime of hospitality, when hospitality can become, in the eyes of the law and its
representatives, a crime?'41 (This is understandably not the place for Derrida to bring out the
sense in which any form of hospitality is also a crime of hospitality, a transgression of the
law of absolute hospitality.) The second puzzles him — what are the sans-papiers lacking?
— and he answers that it is their relation to the law {droit), they are without right {droit). Yet
this is clearly only the case from within one determinate law. We might also add that as we
have seen in the seminar on hospitality, language is clearly not simply one problem among
41 Marx en Jeu. p74
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others at this point, given the difficulty of asking for hospitality in the name of the other. As
soon as someone is a 'sans-papiers' there is a problem within the terms of that definition:
what do they lack? Contestation on this level — even that of vocabulary— is necessary and
possible. We must fight against it, Derrida argues, 'by analysis, protest, struggle'42
Beyond the question of language, Derrida states, this intervention functions as an
affirmation. He is speaking 'for the sans-papiers': this is a delicate situation. He speaks up
for them, and on behalf of them, but without wishing to speak for them. He is speaking for
their right to speak, their right to be recognised by the law, to be speaking citizen-subjects: or
at least foreigners subject to the law of hospitality rather than those outside it altogether.
Then we should also listen to them. In this we can see Derrida accepting his own role as a
public intellectual again. In a position to be heard, he seeks to speak. As an intervention, in
the name of the unconditional. Thirdly, and again unusually for Derrida, he is also making a
call for further action, even to the point of civil disobedience. 'We should without doubt help
our friends sans-papiers in an individual fashion, locally, day after day, with all the material
or symbolic, financial, juridical or legal aid, wherever there is need. Many are doing so, in
theatres, churches, commisariats, or tribunals; we must thank them, but they are not
numerous enough.' But then he also calls for 'civil disobedience,' the defiance of the law in
the name of a higher law: 'In the name of a more elevated law [the citizen] will not obey
such and such a legislative proposition which he judges iniquitous and culpable, preferring
thus delinquency to shame, and thepretendu crime to injustice.'43
Finally, however, this must be a fight to change the law. Beyond the public
declarations and demonstrations. Even while there is a higher law (absolute hospitality,
democracy-to-come, justice) which will always be transgressed by an actual law, the law
42 Marx en Jeu. 83
43 Marx en Jeu. 90
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itself must be remade, transgressed. As in Specters ofMarx, what is called for is a remaking
of the law, in the name of the law:
all the most urgent questions of our time, everywhere that — in Israel, in
Rwanda, in Europe, in America, in Asia, and in all the churches of St Bernard
in the world — millions of 'undocumented immigrants' [sans papiers], of
'homeless' [sans domiciles fixes], call out for another international law,
another border politics, another humanitarian politics, indeed a humanitarian
commitment that effectively operates beyond the interests of Nation-States
[Adi 101 / 176],
Deconstruction as hospitality would be not only the affirmation of the (higher) law, but the
contestation of the (actual) law, struggle against the (actual) law: and, as I show in the next
chapter, simply the invention of the law as such: the happening of any law.
2.5 Conclusion.
DECONSTRUCTION, 1 HAVE argued in this chapter, may be read as political practice: as both
the intervention in the law in the name of the law, but also as an attempt to perform, exhibit
and thereby problematize the political decision which precedes the responses of the subject,
even a deconstructive subject seeking to respond to voice of the other. In one sense, then,
these texts are all radically contingent for the reader. These are Derrida's own responses, his
own coming-to-terms with the responsibility which precedes and exceeds him. Their value
for us can only be that of an example; if they were prescriptions our responses would be
irresponsible, would conform to a rule. However they are also exemplary in pointing up the
decision, the invention of the law, and the chance and the possibility of something else which
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constitute experience for Derrida: at the borders of the polis the state is already expropriated,
already exposed to its outside, already in question, de-naturalised. Politics is already in
deconstruction, already caught between the unfolding of a rule and the impossibility of a
decision. In other words, we are carried towards the rethinking of the very possibility of






In THE LAST chapter I outlined what I take to be Derrida's development of deconstruction as
a political practice in the years following his seminar on nationalism and philosophy. In
Specters of Marx Derrida suggests that this project may be understood in terms of a
paradoxical fidelity to 'a certain spirit' of Marx. On the one hand deconstruction operates as
a critique of the 'gap between an empirical reality and a regulating ideal' in order to attempt
to make 'reality' correspond to the 'ideal' as closely as possible [SoM 86 / 143]. On the
other hand, deconstruction involves putting the concept of that regulative ideal into question
[SoM 87 / 143]: it is a 'radical critique, namely a procedure ready to undertake its self-
critique' [SoM 88 / 145]. For example, Derrida is not only able to criticize the treatment of
the sans-papiers in the name of the laws of hospitality; but he can also demonstrate the limits
of the laws of hospitality themselves in the name of a hyperbolic or absolute hospitality in
which we can recognise the contours of 'democracy-to-come' and 'undeconstructible justice'
as they were outlined in my first chapter. As a political practice in its own right,
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deconstruction requires the performative problematization of its own political interventions
in an attempt to negotiate as responsibly as possible with the impossibility of absolute
responsibility. However, 1 have also suggested that this political practice constitutes, or at
least implies, an attendant political theory. In order to evaluate Derrida's claim in Specters of
Marx that 'there will be no repoliticization, there will be no polities' [SoM 87 / 144] without
the combination of strategies he has suggested, in this chapter I turn my attention to this
implied political theory.
In order to give the discussion a focus I will consider Derrida's work as a
contribution to the current debate within political theory as to the very specificity, nature and
limits of politics. Several strands within contemporary political thought may be said to
constitute such an investigation.1 Their shared concern is with the possibility of acting
politically at all; to repoliticize in the face of a perceived depoliticization. This
depoliticization is not simply evident at the level of socio-historical observation, but within
political theory itself. In her Political Theory and the Displacement of Politics, Bonnie
Honig argues that a distinction can be drawn between theories of politics which aim at
reducing 'dissensus, resistance, conflict, struggle' and those theories which affirm this
political realm. On one side Kant; on the other Nietzsche: 'Kant soothes and seals the
ruptures Nietzsche celebrates and aggravates.' 2 Jacques Ranciere has argued in a similar
vein that there is a fundamental conflict between philosophy and politics. Philosophy can
only ever function as a rational policing of the inequality which founds politics; 'what is
called "political philosophy" might well be the set of reflective operations whereby
philosophy tries to rid itself of politics, to suppress a scandal in thinking proper to the
1 For discussion of this work, in addition to the texts by Honig and Ranciere cited
below, see Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe & Jean-Luc Nancy. Simon Sparks ed. Retreating the
Political. London: Routledge, 1997; Benjamin Arditi & Jeremy Valentine. Polemicization:
The Contingency of the Commonplace. Edinburgh: Edinburgh UP, 1999; Darrow Schecter.
Sovereign States or Political Communities. Manchester: Manchester UP, 1999.
2 Bonnie Honig. Political Theory and the Displacement of Politics. Ithaca: Cornell
UP, 1993. 2; 7.
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exercise of politics. This theoretical scandal is none other than the rationality of
disagreement.'3 At stake is not only the possibility of acting politically, but of thinking
politics at all, let alone thinking politics politically.
Derrida nowhere proposes an explicit definition of the political. However, as we
have seen, beyond the question of democracy Politics of Friendship may be read as a
meditation on the concept of politics itself. Similarly, the development of deconstruction as
political practice can be considered as a process of coming to terms with 'the implicit
politics' of language [PoF 305 / 339]. Rather than attempting to violently abstract or deduce
a theory of politics from those aspects of Derrida's work I have already dealt with, I propose
that the problem may be usefully approached by collating a number of scattered references to
'depoliticization' and 'repoliticization.' For example in 'Marx and Sons,' a response to
criticisms of Specters of Marx, Derrida draws attention to a distortion of his words by
Gayatri Spivak, who glosses the passage 1 have referred to above ('there will be no
repoliticization otherwise' [SoM 87 / 144]) as 'we won't politicize.' Derrida's own account
is that he 'was insisting on the fact that, in the absence of the conditions 1 define in this
context, we will not succeed in repoliticizing, something I obviously desire and which it
plainly seems to me desirable to do.' Derrida has rarely been this explicit about his political
aim; but the question is immediately made more complex: 'But, of course, a repoliticization
always involves a relative depoliticization, an awareness that an old concept of the political
has, in itself, been depoliticized or is depoliticizing.'4 This complex relationship between
repoliticization and depoliticization is the object of this chapter.
3
Jacques Ranciere. Disagreement: Philosophy and Politics, trans. Julie Rose.
Minneapolis: U Minnesota P, 1999. xii. For discussions of Ranciere's work see Arditi &
Valentine. Polemicization.; Slavoj Zizek. The Ticklish Subject: The Absent Centre of
Political Ontology. London: Verso, 1999.; Peter Osborne. 'Radicalism and Philosophy.' in
Radical Philosophy, no. 103 (2000). 6-11. See also 'Post-Democracy, Politics and
Philosophy: an interview with Jacques Ranciere' in Angelaki no. 1:3 (1994). 171-8.
4
Jacques Derrida. 'Marx and Sons.' trans. G.M. Goshgarian. in Michael Sprinker ed.
Ghostly Demarcations. London: Verso, 1999. 213-69. 223.
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I begin by giving an account of the influential contribution made to the debate on the
nature of politics by Carl Schmitt, before considering Derrida's response to it in Politics of
Friendship.5 What Derrida calls a 'speciality' of the political not only renders Schmitt's
attempt at a pure definition of politics impossible but opens up an alternative account cast in
terms of depoliticization and repoliticization. In the second section I suggest both how this
account of the political might be developed by following closely Derrida's work on the
decision and the undecidable and how it avoids the danger of Schmitt's work. By means of
an analogy with the concept of the retrait I then distinguish deconstruction as a theory of
depoliticization from the account of the political in the work of Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe
and Jean-Luc Nancy, who have made the first major attempt to relate deconstruction to
politics. Their work however retains a Heideggerean inflection which Derrida is concerned
to avoid.
3.2 Derrida and Schmitt
the place of Carl Schmitt in the schematic genealogy set out in Politics of Friendship is
ambiguous. On the one hand, Schmitt can clearly be situated as just another example within
the larger framework of political thought from Aristotle to Nancy; but on the other hand,
since Schmitt makes the friend-enemy distinction the foundation of the concept of politics
5 On the recent revival of interest in Schmitt's thought see Chantal Mouffe ed., The
Challenge ofCarl Schmitt. London : Verso, 1999.
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itself, his work must inevitably receive some kind of privilege in a book concerned with
precisely the same question — even if Derrida's aim is to problematize rather than to
confirm it. Derrida emphasises Schmitt's relationship to the Nietzschean reversal in the
tradition, given the centrality of the figure of the enemy in his writing. One reading of
Nietzsche, Derrida writes, 'would lead back to a tradition ofmodernity which, in a naturally
differentiated and complicated fashion, goes back at least to Hegel,' a tradition which 'takes
on systematic form in the work of Carl Schmitf [PoF 83 / 101]. He also remarks on the
Hegelian features of Schmitf s theory; the general importance of negation, antagonism and
opposition [PoF 139-40 / 160-2; 162 / 187; 164 / 190] and his Hegelian doctrine of the State
[PoF 120 / 140], Yet the importance of the concepts of friend and enemy to Schmitt, and for
the definition of the political with which Derrida is concerned in the book — even if not
throughout the work, or in his other texts — suggests that the two and a half chapters
devoted to The Concept ofthe Political is an exemplary point from which to tackle Derrida's
own understanding of politics.
3.2.1 Politics in the Age of Depoliticization
The central statement of Carl Schmitf s The Concept of the Political, is that 'the specific
political distinction to which political actions and motives can be reduced is that between
friend and enemy.' Schmitt immediately explains that this is a 'definition in the sense of a
criterion and not [...] an exhaustive definition or one indicative of substantial content' [CP
26], His intention is to define the essence of politics and ground political thought in a
fundamental distinction analogous to those made in aesthetics, between the beautiful and the
ugly, and in moral philosophy, between good and evil. This distinction between friend and
enemy, Schmitt argues, is autonomous: it exists independently of any other criteria. Utility,
146
beauty or goodness do not necessarily define the friend in the political sense, just as the
harmful, ugly or evil are not necessarily the enemy [CP 27], This distinction is more
profound than the association of politics with the state: the state is political, but the state is
not a sufficient definition of the political [CP 19-20]. 'Friend' and 'enemy' in their political
sense must also be understood without reference to psychological factors; these terms are not
the expression of any feeling of enmity or affection: 'an enemy exists only when, at least
potentially, one fighting collectivity of people confronts a similar collectivity. The enemy is
solely the public enemy, because everything that has a relationship to such a collectivity of
men, particularly to a whole nation, becomes public by means of such a relationship' [CP
28], The identity of the enemy is established and authorised by the state; conversely, for the
state to be a political entity, it must establish enemies. Even if the political entity is not
actually engaged in a violent struggle or combat with its enemy, the relationship is
predicated on the possibility of killing, of war, and of the state's mobilisation of the lives of
its subjects [CP 33]. The possibility of war with the enemy is the final determinant of the
politically of the state: 'in the orientation toward the possible extreme case of an actual
battle against a real enemy, the political entity is essential, and it is the decisive entity for the
friend-or-enemy grouping; and in this (and not in any kind of absolutist sense) it is
sovereign. Otherwise the political entity is nonexistent' [CP 39. cf. 45-6].
It should be clear from this that Schmitt's definition of the political can provide
criteria against which a state or a political situation might be judged to determine something
like a degree of politically; the extent to which it is properly political. However, in doing so
Schmitt has also introduced the possibility of the relative or total disappearance of politics.
Accordingly, much of The Concept ofthe Political reads like a complaint against the various
possible threats to politics discussed by Schmitt. So for example, a world without war, 'a
completely pacified globe, would be a world without the distinction of friend and enemy and
hence a world without politics' [CP 35. cf. 53-7]. However the threat of depoliticization also
takes less extreme and more diverse forms in The Concept of the Political. Too great an
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emphasis on party politics rather than on 'the political attitude of the state' leads to 'banal,'
'parasite- and caricature-like' forms of politics. These forms only retain a reference to the
ultimate criterion of the political through both 'some sort of antagonistic moment' and
'everyday language, even when the awareness of the extreme case has been entirely lost' [CP
30]. The equation of politics with party politics which is possible 'whenever antagonisms
among domestic political parties succeed in weakening the all-embracing political unity, the
state' would be a further symptom of depoliticization [CP 31]. The surrender of sovereignty
— the right of the state to determine its own enemies for itself [CP 38-9] — to an
international body would also be depoliticizing [CP 50], Moreover, in political theory, not
only the pluralism of Cole and Laski [CP 40-45] and liberalism [CP 61, 69-72] but any
philosophy based on an 'anthropological optimism' [CP 64] will threaten the possibility of
politics itself by ignoring the decisive category of the political distinction between friend and
enemy.
Schmitt claims that his analysis is a neutral and objective deduction of the distinction
required to define the political — that it 'favours neither war nor militarism, neither
imperialism or pacifism' [CP 33] and could be described as neither optimistic or pessimistic
[CP 63], 'It is irrelevant here,' Schmitt writes, 'whether one rejects, accepts or perhaps finds
it an atavistic remnant of barbaric times that nations continue to group themselves according
to friend and enemy.' His concern 'is neither with abstractions nor with normative ideals, but
with inherent reality and the real possibility of such a distinction' [CP 28]. However this
claim is undermined by his own admission that 'all political concepts, images and terms have
a polemical meaning. They are focused on a specific conflict and are bound to a concrete
situation; the result (which manifests itself in war or revolution) is a friend-enemy grouping,
and they turn into empty and ghostlike abstractions when this situation disappears' [CP 30].
Schmitt has in mind 'words such as state, republic, society, class, as well as sovereignty,
constitutional state, absolutism, dictatorship, economic planning, neutral or total state' but
'above all [...] the use of the word political' [CP 30-2], He specifies that this must be the
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case even when the use of the term is portrayed as 'nonpolitical (in the sense of purely
scientific, purely moral, purely juristic, purely aesthetic, purely economic, or on the basis of
similar purities)' [CP 32], So there can be no purely analytic or neutral definition of the
political, since the use of the word will always be inscribed in a polemical context.
Schmitt's understanding of the context of his own polemical definition of the
political is usefully summarized in a conference paper entitled 'The Age of Neutralizations
and Depoliticizations.' Although written in 1929, two years after the first publication of The
Concept of the Political, the paper was included in the third edition of that book (1932) so
we can presume that Schmitt considered them to be thematically linked. Schmitt's broad
purpose in it is to undertake a general diagnosis of the state of depoliticization of Europe
following the 1914-18 war. He undertakes three specific tasks. The first is to provide a
general account of the historical circumstances which have led to what Schmitt perceives to
be the depoliticization of Europe. Schmitt describes this in terms of successive cultural
shifts. The second is to give a specific characterisation of the current era, the technological
age, as the climax of this process. The third task, which follows logically from the previous
two but precedes them in the rhetorical arrangement of the argument is to open the path for a
repoliticization by identifying a new enemy for Europe. In doing so Schmitt conforms to the
thesis of the earlier essay that the essence of politics depends on the distinction between the
friend and the enemy. In this case Schmitt argues that the new enemy for Europe is Russia,
which epitomises the 'anti-religion of technicity' [ND 131] and by effecting 'a union of
Socialism and Slavism' has seized 'our knowledge and technology as weapons' [ND 130],
Like his 1922 text Political Theology, in which he argued that 'all significant
concepts of the modern theory of the state are secularized theological concepts,'6 Schmitt's
genealogy of the depoliticization of Europe in 'The Age of Neutralizations and
6 Carl Schmitt. Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty.
trans. George Schwab. Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 1985. 36.
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Depoliticizations' rests on a secularisation thesis. What Schmitt here calls 'depoliticization'
is not merely a conceptual possibility but an historical event, a consequence of certain
identifiable developments in European culture and history subsequent to the demise of
theology as a foundational discourse. Schmitt makes clear however that what he describes is
not to be taken as either a necessary nor a universal process: it is not a theory of 'cultural
dominance' or a 'universal historico-philosophical lawnot to be understood as either a
continuous line, or in terms of progress or decline; nor to rule out the possibility of different
stages co-existing within the same country, or even the same family [ND 132]. These
precautions notwithstanding, Schmitt's account is somewhat reductive. He interprets the last
four hundred years of European history on the basis of a reaction to the theological and
political turmoil of the sixteenth century. Cultural developments, he argues, are driven by the
search for a neutral sphere on which to ground cultural practice in which agreement can be
reached through debate rather than conflict. However 'in each new sphere, at first considered
neutral, the antitheses of men and interests unfold with a new intensity and become
increasingly sharper' [ND 138] ensuring that the process is continuous. Theology is
succeeded by a metaphysics based on natural science in the seventeenth century, to be
followed in turn by a humanitarian morality in the eighteenth, economics in the nineteenth,
and technology in the twentieth century. In the terms established by The Concept of the
Political, a succession of depoliticizing tendencies have dominated European politics and
thought, seeking to subsume the properly political in the name of a rational resolution of
conflict in a higher set of values. This depoliticization is most intensive in the development
of nineteenth century liberalism as an accompaniment to the dominance of the economic
models, since in the liberal doctrine of the neutral state 'the process of neutralization finds its
classical formula because it has also grasped what is most decisive: political power'[ND 138.
cf. CP 69-73].
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However, in the triumph of technology, the process of neutralization enters a new
phase. This is a result of what Schmitt considers to be the instrumental nature of technology:
it is 'refreshingly factual' and 'serves everyone'; since progress is now understood not in
religious, moral, or even economic terms, but in technological terms, technology becomes an
'absolute and ultimate neutral ground' [ND 138]. Technology appears to offer no criterion
for evaluation of the ends to which it is put: 'Technology itself remains culturally blind.
Consequently, no conclusions which usually can be drawn from the central spheres can be
derived from technology as such and nothing but technology — neither a concept of cultural
progress, nor a type of cleric or intellectual leader, nor a specific political system' [ND 139].
The paradoxical result is that the age of greatest neutralization also holds the greatest
potential for a repoliticization. The very neutrality of technology, which makes it available to
'every strong politics' might also be the end to neutralization: 'The present century can only
be provisionally understood as the century of technology. How ultimately it should be
understood will be revealed only when it is known which type of politics is strong enough to
master the new technology and which type of genuine friend-enemy groupings can develop
on this new ground' [ND 141]. It is in this context that Schmitt proposes his own analysis of
politics as a contribution to the repoliticization of both political thought and politics as such.
To summarize: on the basis of a historical depoliticization Schmitt proposes a
repoliticization of political thought. Only by grasping the properly political distinction
between friend and enemy as the basis of politics can political theory adequately think a
practical repoliticization. This political distinction between friend and enemy is in turn
defined by the possibility of war, 'armed combat between organized political entities' [CP
32], and in particular on 'the real possibility of physical killing' [CP 33]. The state's political
authority resides in 'the real possibility of deciding in a concrete situation upon the enemy
and the ability to fight him with the power emanating from the entity' [CP 45] and the
concomitant power of life or death over its own citizens [CP 46-8]. Even if it does not
actually declare war, a state remains political to the extent that the possibility of such a
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decision on the enemy is left open: 'when it no longer possesses the capacity or the will to
make this distinction, it ceases to exist politically' [CP 49], It is the curious nature of this
decision, whose presence, even if only virtual — as a possibility rather than a fact — is the
necessary condition of politics as such, on which Derrida's response to Schmitt in Politics of
Friendship centres.
.2 The Spectrality of the Political
The importance here of Derrida's reading of Schmitt in the central chapters of Politics of
Friendship is that in The Concept of the Political and its subsequent supplement, Theory of
the Partisan, Derrida finds a 'spectrality' of the political. Schmitt's attempt to define a pure
concept of the political, which Derrida suggests is almost phenomenological in rigour and
intent [PoF 87 / 106], is destined to failure: the 'concretion of the concrete, this ultimate
determination to which Schmitt ceaselessly appeals, is always exceeded, overtaken — let us
say haunted — by the abstraction of its spectre' [PoF 117 /137]. Not only does this 'spectre'
ruin Schmitt's repoliticization of the concept of politics, but Derrida concludes that it is
'lodged within the political itself; the antithesis of the political dwells within, and politicizes,
the political' [PoF 138 / 160], The spectre comes before the political, and is not only the ruin
of politics, but also its possibility — it 'politicizes' the political. Schmitt's attempt at a pure
definition of the political 'capitalize^] "en abyme^ [PoF 115 / 135] all the difficulties of
any similar project; but in doing so they open up another reading of politics, a deconstructive
reading, or what we might call, following Specters ofMarx, a political hauntology. This
phantasmatic political theory might be read as the quasi-foundation of the politics of
deconstruction. Foundational, since this is the text in which the concept of the political itself
comes under the most intense scrutiny; but only quasi-foundational since what is uncovered
is an effect which 'ruins in advance and from within'' [PoF 144 / 166] such oppositions as
that between politics and the political; between political theory and political practice;
between foundation and superstructure. Derrida's reading of Schmitt cannot provide a firm
basis from which to deduce the politics of deconstruction, but may be read as a particularly
condensed example of the political dimensions of his work in general. Derrida's discussion
resists easy summary, since it is discursive rather than systematic, often repetitive and
punctuated with a number of lengthy digressions. At the risk of over-formalising Derrida's
approach, I have summarised his argument around three moments where the 'spectrality' of
the political interrupts Schmitt's attempt to define politics.
1) One of the key distinctions on which Schmitt's account depends is that between the public
enemy and the private enemy. The political enemy is not 'merely any competitor or just any
partner of a conflict in general. He is also not the private adversary whom one hates' [CP
28]. The importance of this clarification is that it removes the definition of the political from
the psychological or merely personal realm. Here, as elsewhere, Schmitt would like to appeal
to 'daily speech' [CP 30] for the sense of his definitions, but 'German and other languages
do not distinguish between the private and the political enemy' [CP 29]. So instead Schmitt
appeals to classical sources, referring to the difference between host is and inimicus in Latin,
and between polemios and ekthros in Greek, and in particular to Plato's contrast in the
Republic 'between the public enemy (polemios) and the private one (ekthros)' in the context
of the 'antithesis of war (polemos) and insurrection, upheaval, rebellion, civil war (stasis)'1
[CP 28-9n.9], Derrida does not disagree that such a distinction is made in Republic, but
suggests that Schmitt does not specify 'what type of relationship or connection this is' [PoF
89-90 / 110]. He notes that Schmitt's gloss on Plato — 'the dominant idea here is that a
people cannot wage war on itself and that a 'civil war' is never but a rending of self but
7 Plato. Republic, trans. Robin Waterfield. Oxford: Oxford UP, 1994. 187-8.
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would perhaps not signify the formation of a new State, or even of a new people' [CP 29n.9]
— seems 'hardly Platonic' [PoF 90 / 112], Derrida argues that the difference between
polemos and stasis is not directly equivalent to the distinction between domestic politics or
civil war and inter-state war, but signifies two different orders of conflict. Both depend on a
natural order: Greeks are naturally the enemies of Barbarians, and naturally the friends of
other Greeks. Civil war would then be a sickness or disease of friendship, which could not be
explained in terms of enmity [PoF 92 / 113]; which would then suggest that the distinction
has little bearing on Schmitt's attempt to ground politics in the polarity of friend / enemy.
Derrida argues that the 'prevailing determination of civil war' [PoF 121 / 142] in
Schmitt's theory is the consequence of Schmitt's need to map the structure of inter-state
relations inside the State. The possibility of civil war, of a war within the State confirms the
inter-State war as the paradigmatic case of the political. It is the potential 'armed combat' to
which it could give rise which makes the internal politics of a State political at all [CP 32],
This would also account for Schmitt's insistence on the definition of an enemy of the State in
Greek and Roman law [CP 46-7], Schmitt's haste in reading Plato seems to be occasioned by
a disinclination to complicate this structure, and Derrida is able to draw on Plato to suggest
that this structure cannot be so simple. Furthermore, Derrida reminds us that in Republic
Plato is concerned with an ideal State, and that 'as long as this unity [of justice and power]
remains out of reach — that is for ever — the conceptual unities that depend on it [...]
remain ideal entities' [PoF 91 / 112]. For Plato, 'the purity of the distinction between stasis
and polemos remains in the Republic a "paradigm," accessible only to discourse' [PoF 114/
133], In practice, they cannot be distinguished. Derrida refers to the following passage: 'is it
possible for anything actual to match a theory? Isn't any actual thing bound to have less
contact with a truth than a theory, however much people deny it?'8 So for Schmitt, drawing




in the concrete, in everyday language, it removes politics itself to the realm of ideal entities,
while in the world itself there will never be a clear distinction between a public enemy and a
private enemy, between inter-state war and civil war, and perhaps even between friend and
enemy.
This points to a further problem. As 1 discussed in my first chapter, for Derrida there
can be no question of simply opposing the public and private. Yet for Schmitt, the possibility
of making this distinction founds his definition of the political. If the public enemy and the
private enemy cannot be rigorously discriminated, the purity of the political must be
interminably suspended. Derrida suggests that Schmitt's attempt to refound politics by
policing the boundary between public and private is symptomatic of the impossibility of
establishing such limits: 'at every point when this border is threatened, fragile, porous,
contestable (we thus designate so many possibilities that "our time" is accentuating and
accelerating in countless ways) the Schmittian discourse collapses. It is against the threat of
this ruin that his discourse takes form' [PoF 88 / 107], Elsewhere Derrida asks: 'Why does
Schmitt take no account of the fact that the police and spy network — precisely the police
qua spy network [...]— points to what, precisely in the service of the State, ruins in advance
and from within the possibility of the political, the distinction between public and private?'
[PoF 144 / 166], Derrida's intention is not to dismiss Schmitt's theory out of hand, despite
this apparent incoherence at its centre. His interest in Schmitt is as much in the 'heritage' of
his work [PoF 84 / 102] as in the work itself. The spectrality which ruins Schmitt's attempt
to secure the definition of the political is one which will haunt any attempt to define the
political. If it is felt more strongly in The Concept of the Political than in other similar
theories, it is perhaps testimony to the rigour of that text.
2) It is perhaps owing to this rigour that Schmitt accepts at least one sense in which the
concept of the political cannot be 'pure.' I have already referred to Schmitt's insistence that
'the use of the word political' will always be polemical [CP 30], On the one hand this would
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seem to place Schmitt beside Plato: accepting the inaccessibility of the ideal entities he is
describing. There could never be a 'purely political' state — or a purely political State,
indeed — because the political as a concept is only an ideal. On the other hand, however,
Schmitt appears to rehabilitate the purity of the concept from another direction: in the
concrete and polemical distribution of the use of the concept. Schmitt, Derrida claims,
'would like to be able to count on the pure impurity, on the impure purity of the political as
such, of the properly political' [PoF 116 / 136], This purity cannot be found in theoretical
terms, precisely because of the nature of politics:
The concept of the political undoubtedly corresponds, as concept, to what the
ideal discourse can want to state most rigorously on the ideality of the political.
But no politics has ever been adequate to its concept. No political event can be
correctly described or defined with recourse to these concepts. And this
inadequation is not accidental, since politics is essentially a praxis, as Schmitt
himself always implies in his ever-so-insistent reliance on the concept of real,
present possibility or eventuality in his analyses of the formal structures of the
political [PoF 114/134],
But if the purity of politics cannot be given in conceptual terms, Schmitt turns to an
equivalent idealisation of political praxis to ground his argument, and to a form of knowing
which 'is not in the mode of theoretical knowledge, but in one of a practical identification:
knowing consists here in knowing how to identify the friend and the enemy' [PoF 116/
136], However, as Derrida argues throughout Politics of Friendship, and as I discussed
extensively in my first chapter, this possibility is available neither in theory, nor in practice.
Schmitt's hyperbolic insistence that 'one can and must know — first of all practically,
politically, polemically— who is the friend and who is the enemy' [PoF 116/ 136] suggests
to Derrida that 'perhaps [...] the concrete finally remains, in its purity, out of reach,
inaccessible, unbreachable, indefinitely deferred, thereby inconceivable to the concept
(Begri/f) ; consequently as "spectral" (gespenstisch) as the ghost on its periphery, which one
opposes to it and which could never be set apart' [PoF 117/ 136-7]. Schmitf s insistence on
the concrete, Derrida argues, is an equally illusory or problematic basis for a definition of
politics as the attempt to define politics in conceptual terms.
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3) Derrick's main piece of evidence for the remarking of this failure within Schmitt's text,
and thus for the irreducibility of the spectral to the political, is the contortions of Schmitt's
argument when attempting to define the 'real possibility' of war without which 'the political
entity is nonexistent' [CP 39]. War is the most extreme manifestation of political enmity. If
there is no possibility of war with another state, or within the state, there is no real enemy —
either because the state is failing in its duty to determine friends and enemies, or because it is
too weak to wage war — and politics itself is threatened. Schmitt takes some care not to
suggest that war is in and of itself desirable. War 'does not have to be common, normal,
something ideal, or desirable. But it must nevertheless remain a real possibility for as long as
the concept of the enemy remains valid' [CP 33]. Derrida argues that this 'real possibility' of
war does not belong to the 'conventionally Aristotelian opposition of potentiality and act'
but is 'something altogether different: the radicalization of a possible reality or a real
possibility' [PoF 124 / 147], Referring to the German text, Derrida insists on a word which is
missed from the English translation of the passage I have just quoted. War must remain 'als
reale Moglichkeit vorhanden bleiben,\ as Derrida translates it, 'presente comme possibility
reele,' or in English, 'present as a real possibility' [PoF 124 / 147], Beyond the opposition
of a possible war to an actual war, Schmitt seems to require that war is not merely a
possibility but somehow already 'present.' According to Derrida, this serves to separate two
lines of argument: war can be the transcendental condition of possibility for politics, but
without becoming its telos, 'the aim, the finality or even the content of politics' [PoF 126 /
149], The 'presence' of this 'real possibility ofwar' also becomes the criterion against which
the degree of politicization of a state, a situation, or indeed the world in general, is to be
judged. The important question for Schmitt is always that of knowing 'whether such a friend
/ enemy grouping is really at hand' [CP 36], or in Derrida's translation, 'is or is not present
as possibility or as real actuality / effectivity (als reale Moglichkeit oder Wirklichkeit
vorhanden ist oder nichty [PoF 131 / 155], Where the English translation addresses the
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problem as one of verification, of the real friend-enemy rather than a false friend-enemy,
Derrida stresses an ambiguity in the logic of the original text:
The syntax of this question, which we have already cited, does not admit of a
decision on whether the double alternative (oder ... oder) is of the order of
presence (vorhanden ist oder nicht) or of the order of modalities of this
presence (real or effective/actual possibility, real possibility or real
effectivity/actuality: reale Moglichkeit oder Wirklichkeit). In the first case the
grouping of the political (friend / enemy) would always be present, in one
mode or the other; in the other, it could be present or not [PoF 131-2/155],
The question would be not whether the apparent friend-enemy grouping is a true or false
grouping but either: a) whether the grouping is present or not; or b) in what mode the
grouping is present. Derrida stresses that there can be no decision between these alternatives;
yet he suspects that by 'relying on a logic of inference, of proof, of indication and of
testimony,' Schmitt decides 'for the presence of the political' [PoF 133 / 157], To hold in
mind both questions would be to allow for a spectrality of the political; to never claim to be
absolutely sure if there is or is not any politics. But Schmitt 'decides [...] either in terms of
positive and univocal signs of the presence of the political, or in terms of what the
disappearance of these signs witnesses of their possible andpermanent presence' [PoF 133 /
157]. For Schmitt, depoliticization, which as I suggested in my discussion of 'The Age of
Neutralizations and Depoliticizations,' is a historical rather than a theoretical or conceptual
possibility, and can be attested to in historical terms, merely testifies to the permanent
presence of politics.
3.2.3 Spectrality and Depoliticization
Derrida's demonstration that Schmitf s discourse is 'ruined in advance' by a spectrality of
the political might be construed to be in itself depoliticizing, or symptomatic of a
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depoliticization of philosophy or of political thought. There can never be a pure concept of
political. Does this mean there is no possibility of a repoliticization? This argument can
however only be made if we retain a similar understanding of depoliticization to that
operated by Schmitt. Depoliticization would be the name or the symptom of something
historical. But Derrida's work undermines that possibility. The spectraiity of the concept is
not a historical possibility which comes to affect the concept from outside, but its very
condition of possibility. If spectraiity is in some sense a depoliticization, the announcement
of the impossibility of a total politicization or of the absolute presence of the political, this
possibility does not accompany or follow a pre-given concept of the political, but precedes it.
Politics itselfwould be an effect of depoliticization. This understanding of politics would not
imply an end to politics, but the necessary basis for any attempt to think radically about
politics, or even to think politically at all. In a passage which echoes the lines in Specters of
Marx which describe deconstruction as a repoliticization, Derrida proposes:
two types of rejoinder to the Schmittian project [...], two distinct sides of the
same answer to The Concept of the Political, that is, to the reconstruction of
the political. On the one hand, we seem to be confirming— but not by way of
deploring the fact, as Schmitt does — an essential and necessary
depoliticization. This depoliticization would no longer necessarily be the
neuter or negative indifference to all forms of the social bond, of community,
of friendship. On the other hand, through this depoliticization [...] one would
seek to think, interpret and implement another politics, another democracy
[POF 104/ 127-8].
The repoliticizing potential of deconstruction, which Derrida claims is the only potential path
for a successful repoliticization — 'there will be no repoliticization, there will be no politics
otherwise' [SoM 87 / 144] — depends on a prior depoliticization. This depoliticization is
not, as it is for Schmitt, the diagnosis of a historical depoliticization 'out there.' It is the
depoliticizing discovery of a depoliticization already at work within both the concept of the
political and the practice of politics. On this at least, Schmitt is correct:
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the inadequation to the concept happens to belong to the concept itself. This
inadequation of the concept to itself manifests itself pre-eminently in the order
of the political or political practice, unless this order— or rather, its possibility
— would situate the very place, the phenomenon or the 'reason' of an
inadequation of any concept to itself: the concept of disjunction qua the
conceptual being of the concept [PoF 114-5 / 134].
If, as Derrida argues, the concept of politics cannot be secured by theoretical discrimination,
nor even, as Schmitt hopes, by appeal to the 'concrete,' within 'this political practice that
history is' [PoF 114/ 134] any concept or practice of politics should manifest the limits of
this problem. The 'speciality' of the political must be addressed by any political thought
which hopes to be in any way adequate to its object.
It is this configuration which I will explore for the remainder of this chapter.
However, rather than focus explicitly on the notion of'speciality,' I will pose the problem
in terms of depoliticization and repoliticization. The difference between these approaches
may be thought of as two ways of asking the same question. The first might ask 'What is the
speciality of the political?' The second, with a change of emphasis, would be 'What is the
spectrality of the political!' The first question would lead us back to Derrida's work, even if
it was to elaborate those places where the principle of 'speciality' had imposed itself upon
him. Rather than returning the question to one set of texts, the second question, whose
impetus I will follow here, opens politics itself to the principle of spectrality. The initial
question would lend itself to a more exclusive reading of Derrida's claim that deconstructive
questioning is the necessary condition of a repoliticization, in which he appears to be
claiming a unique priority for his own texts, or those of his followers. The other question,
almost a democratization of deconstruction itself, would seek to direct attention to the ways
in which deconstruction can be said to be already at work, and not just in certain texts, but in
'this political practice that history is' [PoF 114/ 134], The radical question of politics would
not be found exclusively within the work of Derrida but within politics itself. It is this radical
potential which I propose to analyse in terms of depoliticization and repoliticization.
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3.3 Deconstruction as Depoliticization
DECONSTRUCTION CANNOT PROVIDE a definition of the political. The principle of spectrality
proper to the being-concept of the concept ruins any such attempt from within. This is not
the same thing, however, as saying that there is no such thing as politics, nor that there can
be no philosophical reflection on politics. For Schmitt, reflection on the concept of the
political was an essential preliminary to a successful politicization. For Derrida, it seems,
reflection on the impossibility of the concept in general must precede either the study of a
specific concept, or of the reality that that concept seeks to name. In this section I will begin
to outline what such a deconstructive reflection on politics might look like, drawing not on
examples of moments in his texts at which Derrida himself relates deconstruction to world
events, but on his account of the decision and the undecidable. This will enable me to
formulate deconstruction in terms of effects of depoliticization and repoliticization. Passing
through this conceptual work will make clear the distinction between depoliticization in
Derrida's work and the use made of the term by Schmitt. Finally, by comparing Derrida's
work on Benjamin with his analysis of Schmitt I will be able to suggest that Derrida is
concerned with the possibility of a quasi-revolutionary politics which bypasses the moment
of the sovereign and exceptional decision — war or revolutionary violence — in order to
think something like a revolutionary politics of the everyday.
3.3.1 Undecidability and the Decision.
Derrida has written extensively on the concept of decision, but without proposing a single or
unified theory. In this section I will attempt to summarize some of this work without
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systematising it. On this basis, in the next section 1 elaborate an understanding of politics in
terms of depoliticization and repoliticization.
Derrida's account of the decision claims to draw on both a traditional philosophical
concept of the decision as well as on an appeal to our everyday experience of the decision.
We can helpfully distinguish between these traditional or common-sense propositions which
serve to define a decision, and Derrida's complication of the discussion. So, a first and
reasonably uncontroversial proposal might be that a decision arises in a situation where there
is a choice between two or more alternatives. There must be also be an element of hesitation
between the choices. If I knew in advance what my choice would be, there would not be a
decision; or rather, a decision is only necessary to the extent that my choice is not certain or
predictable in advance. A decision must thus be distinguished from a situation in which I
follow a rule or a programme: 'A decision that didn't go through the ordeal of the
undecidable would not be a free decision, it would only be the programmable application or
unfolding of a calculable process' [FoL 24 / 53]. It also seems fairly incontestable that there
is some relationship between the decision and the singularity of an event — a decision
happens once and once only. A new set of circumstances requires a new decision. To ask
whether a decision can be repeated is to test this proposition. Derrida's answer is 'no.' In a
discussion of his work, he gives the example ofmarriage: 'Ifyou think when you get married
it's enough to make the decision once and not the day after, then it's not a promise, it's not a
decision. And the second decision is as new as the first. The content is the same— and it is
different.'9 To follow a decision made earlier would be to follow the rule set by that earlier
decision: to repeat the decision, like reaffirming a vow, is to make it again, in different
circumstances. Only if there is the possibility of a different outcome is this still a decision.
9
'Perhaps or Maybe.' Derrida in conversation with Alexander Garcia Duttmann. Pli.
vol.6 (1997). 1-18. 11.
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All of this seems to correspond to everyday experience and to what we generally mean by
the word 'decision.'
Derrida complicates the concept by drawing some rigorous conclusions from the
propositions I have set out. For example: if a decision does not follow a rule, then a decision
can never be predicted or determined on the basis of any amount of knowledge. We can
prepare for a decision, try and take into account as many factors as possible, and try and
predict as many of the outcomes which would follow from it as we are capable of:
The instant of decision must remain heterogeneous to all knowledge as such, to
all theoretical or reportive determination, even if it may and must be preceded
by all possible science and conscience. The latter are unable to determine the
leap of decision without transforming it into the irresponsible application of a
programme, hence without depriving it of what makes it into a sovereign and
free decision — in a word, of what makes it a decision, if there is one. [PoF
219/247]
Because the instant of decision is 'heterogeneous to all knowledge' we can never be sure if a
decision has been taken. This is what requires Derrida to qualify his argument here with 'if
there is one.' From this follows a second conclusion. If the instant of decision is
heterogeneous to knowledge, not only can we never be certain if there is a decision or not, or
if there has ever been a decision or not, but no concept of the decision will ever be able to
account for any decision. This is not to claim that no-one ever has an experience of what we
generally call a decision; but that no concept of that decision is strictly possible. A third
conclusion would suggest a similar problem with the conceptualisation of the decision. If the
undecidable is a necessary and constitutive element of the decision, a theory of the decision
would also have to be a theory of the undecidable. In the language of transcendental
philosophy, undecidability is a necessary condition of possibility of a decision. 'The
undecidable,' Derrida notes in Politics of Friendship, '— that is to say, the condition of
decision' [PoF 219 / 247], The concept of the decision would not be able to tell apart the
decision and the undecidable: 'the ordeal of the undecidable,' is 'never past or passed, it is
not a surmounted or sublated moment in the decision' [FoL 24 / 54]. Here another flaw is
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inscribed in the concept of the decision, and Derrida draws a further conclusion. A decision
cannot be fully conscious. When Derrida speaks of a passive decision [PoF 68-9 / 87-8], he
does not mean to disprove that anyone has ever made a decision, but that any thing which
could be called a decision cannot be accounted for on the basis of the intentions of the person
making it. In fact, no concept of a decision can account for the making of a decision. It can
describe what we think of as a decision, but can never explain or dictate a single decision
[POF 68 / 87],
Bearing in mind Derrida's conclusions from his reading of Carl Schmitt, that the
inadequation of a concept to itself is a necessary function of its being a concept, we should
not perhaps be too surprised that his conclusions here apparently devastate the concept of the
decision. This may be the case, but at the same time Derrida is confirming not only the
possibility of attempting to think about the decision, but also the importance of doing so. The
difficulties of a conceptual analysis of the decision call both for a new way of thinking about
what we call the decision, and an attempt to think both the concept of the decision and the
concept of the concept differently. So for example, Derrida's essay 'Force of Law: the
"Mystical Foundation of Authority'" may be read as an attempt to do just that. Derrida's
discussion of the relationship between law and justice focuses heavily on the moment of
decision in which the law is applied to a particular case. As I have just suggested, for Derrida
the experience of judgement is that of an impossible moment of decision, while justice is
constituted by the contradiction between the universality of law and the singularity of the
subject before the law. There is only a chance of justice being done if the law is interpreted
according to the individual case, but in so far as the law is not tailored to the singularity of
this case, it is also violence. To the extent that the law accommodates the individual, justice
can be seen to be done; and the decision will be a decision rather than the unfolding of a law
without regard to the specificity of the case at hand:
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Each case is other, each decision is different and requires an absolutely unique
interpretation, which no existing, coded rule can or ought to guarantee
absolutely. At least, if the rule guarantees it in no uncertain terms, so that the
judge is a calculating machine; which happens, and [which will always happen
in part, according to an irreducible mechanical or technical parasitism which
introduces a necessary iterability ofjudgements; but to that extent] we will not
say that he is just, free and responsible. But we also won't say it if he doesn't
refer to any law, to any rule or if [...] he [...] leaves aside all rules, all
principles10 [FoL 23/51].
The instant of the decision, of the undecidable choice, is what Derrida calls an aporetic or
paradoxical situation. If there is a moment of decision, it is the moment of the suspension of
the rules — in a legal judgement, the moment in which the law is invented, reinterpreted,
confirmed or modified by its passage through a single case. Yet at this moment the decision
is not yet a decision, while as soon as it is a decision, the law has been destabilised, re-fixed,
or the decision has invented a new rule, to which the next case must be applied.
There is apparently no moment in which a decision can be called presently and
fully just: either it has not yet been taken according to a rule, and nothing
allows us to call it just, or it has already followed a rule — whether received,
confirmed, conserved or reinvented — which in its turn is not absolutely
guaranteed by anything; and moreover, if it were guaranteed, the decision
would be reduced to calculation and we couldn't call it just [FoL 24 / 54],
This moment is not only irreducible to the order of justice, but is a moment of violent and
transgressive illegality. For in the moment of decision there is no law; moreover the law is
itself unstable and is constantly being re-made. This can only happen through a violent and
illegitimate action which cannot be justified by any law in its turn. For this reason Derrida
suggests that the 'very moment of foundation or institution' of the law, '[...] the operation
that amounts to founding, inaugurating, justifying law {droit), making law, would consist of
a coup de force, of a performative and therefore interpretative violence that in itself is neither
just nor unjust and that no justice and no previous law with its founding anterior moment
could guarantee or contradict or invalidate' [FoL 13 / 32-3], The law is made only in a
10 This sentence has been expanded on republication in French in Force de Loi. I
have included the additional material in square brackets.
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moment of illegality. This is what Derrida refers to as the 'mystical foundation' of authority
or law, and as 'a violence without ground' [FoL 14 / 34].
The moment of decision belongs to neither the order of knowledge nor that of the
decidable. But equally, the temporality of the undecidable remains unable to include the
decision. It is worth clarifying slightly that the 'instant of decision' has no ontological status.
It is not of the order of being present. As in the case of Schmitt's analysis of the political, we
might think of the passage through the undecidable as an account of the spectrality which
haunts any decision. What Derrida describes in Politics of Friendship as thinking in the
mode of'the perhaps' is a way of thinking about this elusive concept: 'the crucial experience
of the perhaps imposed by the undecidable [...] is not a moment to be exceeded, forgotten or
suppressed. It continues to constitute the decision as such; it can never again be separated
from it, it produces it qua decision in and through the undecidable[...]' [PoF 219 / 247]. We
can recognise here another approach to hauntology, to suspending the suppositions of
ontology that existence is determinable, or can answer to questions of the form 'is it?' 'By
specifying recurrently:' Derrida writes, "'if there is one," by suspending the thesis of
existence wherever, between a concept and an event, the law of an aporia, an undecidability,
a double bind occurs in interposition, and must in truth impose itself to be endured
there'[POF 38-9/59]:
Thus we regularly say - but we could multiply the examples - the gift, if there
is one', invention, if there is any such thing, and so forth. This does not amount
to conceding a hypothetical or conditional dimension ('if, supposing that, etc.')
but to marking a difference between 'there is' and 'is' or 'exists' - that is to
say the words of presence. What there is, if there is one or any, is not
necessarily. It perhaps does not exist nor ever present itself; nevertheless, there
is one, or some; there is a chance of there being one, of there being some [PoF
39/59],
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3.3.2 Decision and Depoliticization
Having set out the basics of Derrida's account of decision, I will draw on that model to give
an account of what deconstruction has to say about politics. The similarities are perhaps
already apparent. The concept of decision embodies many of the problems we saw
exemplified in the failure of Schmitt's attempt to define the purely political. Where for
Schmitt, a speciality of the political preceded and ruined a pure politics, so 'the
undecidable,' Derrida comments, 'remains caught, lodged, at least as a ghost — but an
essential ghost— in every decision, in every event of decision' [FoL 24 / 54], Just as we can
never say for sure that there has been a decision, or what a decision is, so we can never say
for certain what would constitute a pure politics, since anything, event or decision or
concept, which we wished to call political is inhabited by its opposite, a principle which
disrupts its politically from within. It is this which I call 'depoliticization' and we can
understand it by analogy with the undecidable. Any political decision must pass through the
undecidable, and will never be present to itself as a result, but always inhabited by this
undecidability. A political decision, like any decision, must have something of the
undecidable lodged within it. Equally, it is not a decision, as I argued in chapter one, where it
follows a rule, for example, — and this is the burden of Derrida's argument in Politics of
Friendship — nowhere that political choices are restricted or predetermined on the basis of
the 'natural' value attributed to a family, a people, a homeland, a nation or a State. If the
political decision is structured like a decision in general, above and beyond any
programming of the decision by the natural values of politics — let us say where it is
governed by a politics-to-come — it must necessarily set a rule, as soon as it is made. In
other words, there would no longer be a decision, as soon as there is a decision. There is no
politics — no decision — where a rule is unfolded / unfolds, and a rule unfolds / is unfolded
by every decision. The political decision is divided against itself. The undecidable would
become the very name for the political — 'what dwells within, and politicizes, the political':
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yet at the same time, the political would then become the impossible, that which remains to
come, the trace, difference. As we have seen, the undecidable is not simply the suspension or
refusal of decision. It is the condition of decision, and if it rules out any final
conceptualisation of the decision, it also prompts a necessary deconstructive questioning
which would seek new ways of thinking about a decision. My hypothesis here is that the
same can be said for politics.
The impossibility of defining the political for Derrida suggests that we should not
seek to give a deconstructive theory of the political any content. As soon as politics has been
defined depoliticization has taken place, and a law established, which will subsequently
require further politicization to challenge or expand the definition of the political. Instead of
trying to think of politics in terms of a concept or a content, a set of practices or descriptions,
we should think instead of a grammar or syntax of politics, which any attempt to give a
definition to politics would participate in. Moreover, any political 'event' or 'decision'
would also be part of this grammar. Since there is never any fully present politics (concept or
event) this is a grammar of politicization and depoliticization. The decision is politicising, it
challenges and suspends the political status quo, but it is also depoliticizing, as it sets new
political precedents. This structure can be illustrated with reference to the notion of political
friendship at the heart of Politics ofFriendship. I showed in chapter one that Derrida was
concerned to separate two logics at work within the concept of friendship, and of democracy:
aimance as the thought of a non-determinate ground of friendship from an active,
discriminating and exclusive befriending. The decision which determines friends proves to
be the naturalisation of the decision itself. The figure of the brother, inseparable from the
philosophical definition of the friend, represents this inevitable prediction of the rule.
If the friend-enemy choice were to be taken as the definition of politics, we could
describe aimance as the politicization of the decision, and brotherhood — what Derrida calls
fraternization — as its inexorable and inevitable depoliticization. Aimance, as we know, can
appear only as a trace within the naturalised decision in which friends and enemies have
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been determined: no decision without depoliticization, the re-establishment of norms. If there
is a moment of politicization, it is the point at which political identity is cast into doubt, and
when established models are open to revision or alteration. It is that moment in which the
state is faced with a choice which will define its laws and its political actions. The event of
politicization is the point where a decision has to be made without any criteria. But this
moment is never available as such. It is impossible. There can be no politics of the moment
of politicization, since it has no content, nothing that can be acted upon — it is the
suspension of all decision. (It is also the suspension of both security and sovereignty.)
Politicization itself cannot become the subject of any political movement, or the promise
made to the electorate of any political party. Any political decision, any political event must
be an experience of depoliticization by definition; it sets a rule. This may be setting a
precedent, demanding one policy not another; but it can never be asking for the undecidable
or the suspension of decision. Politicization cannot be the object of a political demand; what
complicates this structure is that every political demand, while depoliticizing, will attest to
the possibility of a repoliticization.
However, if politicization would then be the rarest thing, the name of the impossible
itself, another effect would also make it perhaps the most commonplace thing. I emphasise
again: if there is a decision, there is a decision wherever there is an event. There is no law
without the event of its application, and its own reinvention, and no political event without
politicization. Even if politicization cannot be the content of a formulation of policy, it is
irreducible in the moment of the formulation of policy. This is certainly the most ambiguous
and difficult point to be grasped in mapping Derrida's account of the decision onto politics
considered in terms of depoliticization and repoliticization. In Politics ofFriendship Derrida
explains that 'without the opening of an absolutely undetermined possible, without the
radical abeyance and suspense marking a perhaps, there would never be either event or
decision' [PoF 67 / 86], This is what I have called the moment of politicization, a moment
which is not a present moment, which is heterogeneous to the time of politics or history.
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Derrida continues: 'But nothing takes place and nothing is ever decided without suspending
the perhaps while keeping its living possibility in living memory.' This suspension of the
perhaps makes possible 'rules and laws, contracts and institutions' in 'the order of law,
politics or morality' but it also 'violence done to the perhaps, to the possible that makes
them possible' [PoF 67 / 86], Politics is depoliticization, but is made possible by an
irreducible, but indeterminate politicization.
What Derrida is trying to invent is a way of thinking about the world, in its spatiality
and temporality, which would be adequate to describe it in its happening; that is in the
coming of the unknown which characterises it as the place of a time which is out-of-joint,
which must remain heterogeneous to any history, any physical or temporal science, even to
imaginative recreation:
deconstruction is not, in the last analysis, a methodical or theoretical
procedure. In its possibility as in the experience of the impossibility that will
always have constituted it, it is never a stranger to the event, that is, very
simply, to the coming of that which happens. Certain Soviet philosophers told
me in Moscow a few years ago: the best translation of perestroika was still
'deconstruction' [SoM 88-9 / 146].
Derrida never ceases to insist on this in the texts of this period: 'I have often had occasion to
define deconstruction as that which is — far from a theory, a school, a method, even a
discourse, still less a technique that can be appropriated— at bottom what happens or comes
to pass [ce qui arrive].' Once we accept this is the case, that 'deconstruction happens,' we
can begin to appreciate deconstruction as both 'the maximum intensification of a
transformation in progress, in the name of neither a simple symptom nor a simple cause'
[FoL 9 / 24] but also, again, hospitality not only to the other, or to the passive decision
within [PoF 69 / 87] but to that which happens. To claim that the experience of politics is the
experience of the impossible, is not to claim that politics is impossible; or that politics is not,
11 'The Time is Out of Joint.' trans. Peggy Kamuf. in. Anselm Haverkamp ed.
Deconstruction is / in America. New York: New York UP, 1995. 17.
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since we are no longer able to oppose being and not being, possibility and impossibility,
happening and not happening. Deconstruction as a theory of politics would not be the same
as claiming that politics is at an end. If there is any politics at all, then politics must already
have begun. Politics as a name for what might be— what happens, if it happens — would at
the same time be the name for its own disappearance. But this disappearance is not a
historical possibility, it is not of the order of an event, although it is the necessary
accompaniment of the event. While the virtuality and spectrality, the undecidability at the
heart of the decision must frustrate any attempt such as that of Schmitt's to tie down, to
reconstitute the political in its essence, to make politics present, to actualize and effect a
repoliticization, a repoliticization is not alien to the experience of politics either. Without the
suspension of certainty in the political decision there would be nothing that we could call
politics.
The experience of 'what happens', of 'this political practice which history is' [PoF
114/ 134] would be that of the complex combination of politicization as the experience of
the impossible itself and politics as an effect of depoliticization, as the programming of its
own decisions. Where Schmitt offers a historical analysis of depoliticization, as something
which has happened to Europe, but which a sovereign decision might displace, 1 argue that
Derrida opens up a structural diagnosis of politics as depoliticization, and one which, with no
relation to history as narrative, will prove much harder to recuperate, to recover from, or to
repoliticize. However to see the importance for Derrida of thinking this way, we need to turn
again to Schmitt, but also to the correspondence between Schmitt, Benjamin and Heidegger
to which Derrida refers obliquely in 'Force of Law.'
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3.3.3 Rethinking the Revolutionary.
Derrick's sense of the danger of Schmitt's account of depoliticization as a historical category
becomes quite plain in his reading of The Concept of the Political. Referring to Schmitt's
insistence that politics depends on 'actual / effective conflict' as its 'most extreme
possibility' [CP 35], Derrida goes on to draw 'the extreme consequence of these
propositions, the one which would seem to us as unavoidable as it is properly disastrous' but
which Schmitt does not grasp:
If it is true [...] that the rarer or the more improbable the situation of exception
or of decision (war, hostility, the political event as such, etc.), the more
decisive, intense and revealing it is, and in the end the more it politicizes [...]
then one must conclude that rarefaction intensifies the tension and the
revealing power (the 'truth' of the political): the less war there is, the more the
hostility, etc. This is less a default of 'common sense' than it would appear, to
be sure, but it does inevitably lead to a change in all the signs, and therefore to
having to measure po/iticization in terms of the degree ofdepoliticization [PoF
129/152-3].
Once this equation has been made clear, it becomes apparent that the depoliticization of the
technological age for Schmitt is 'in truth an over- or hyperpoliticization' [PoF 129 / 153].
Depoliticization would be 'but the supplementary and inverted symptom, the abyssal
hyperbole, of a hyperpoliticization' [PoF 133 / 157]. In Schmitt's later work, The Theory of
the Partisan, the figure of absolute hostility, of the force of the greatest potential for a
repoliticization, is that of the revolutionary war. The blurring of legal and conceptual
boundaries represented by the guerrilla or the partisan testifies to both the depoliticization of
the world — no longer can we distinguish between the violence licensed by law, and
violence against the law, or between regular troops and irregulars; the properly political is
less apparent than ever — and the possibility of the most violent repoliticization. The
exemplary political figures of the age for Schmitt are Stalin and Mao.
Not only does Derrida think this a dangerous proposition, but he shows it to be a
consequence of any attempt to define politics in terms of determinable friends and enemies.
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The figure of the revolutionary war for Schmitt is that of fratricide, the moment when the
brother becomes an enemy.12 Yet, as I discussed in my first chapter, for Derrida there can
never be a natural brother— the absolute friend is an ideal, a legal fiction, a spectre— or an
absolute enemy. The concept of friendship is always contaminated by the potential of
enmity, exposed in Nietzsche's reversal of the Aristotelian formula, and can never be
secured except by an idealisation, such as the analogy with brotherhood, itself the
naturalization of a non-natural bond. The spectrality of the concept of the political, as of the
concept of friendship, which means that neither can ever be established in any degree of
purity, suggests that a theory such as Schmitt's risks conferring philosophical legitimation on
revolutionary violence as such without any concern for its aims, means or objectives, and is
not only dangerous but incoherent. A brother is never wholly a brother, a friend is never a
friend for certain, politics may always be just the playing out of programmed choices. For
Derrida this suggests that we can only think friendship or politics in terms of an economy of
friendship and enmity, politicization and depoliticization, but from which the poles of the
opposition have been removed. There can be no absolute politicization, and no absolute
depoliticization — no end to politics, no pure politics — but only an economy of relative
violence. Derrida's rethinking of the decision in terms of undecidability, and the rethinking
of politics in terms of depoliticization opened up by it, are concerned, at least in part, to
question the political theory of the exceptional moment of revolutionary violence which
follows any theory which attempts to think the possibility of a fully present politics; and of
absolute repoliticization.
This impulse lies behind not only Derrida's reading of Schmitt, but his discussion of
Benjamin's essay 'Critique of Violence' in the second part of 'Force of Law.' One subtext to
the essay, is the literal and figural correspondence between Benjamin and Schmitt, with
12 There is no English translation of this work. I have referred to Carl Schmitt. La
Notion de Politique et Theorie du Partisan, trans. Marie-Louise Steinhauser. Paris:
Flammarion, 1993.262.265.
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Heidegger forming a third party to the debate [FoL 48 / 114; 66n.6 / 72].13 Derrida
comments on Benjamin's diagnosis of the '"degeneracy" of a parliamentarism powerless to
control the police violence that substitutes itself for it' that it 'is very much a critique of
violence on the basis of a "philosophy of history": a putting into archeo-teleological, indeed
archeo-eschatological perspective that deciphers the history of droit as a decay (Verfall)
since its origin'; moreover 'the analogy with Schmittian or Heideggerean schemas does not
need to be spelled out.'14 'And,' Derrida adds, 'it is still a question of spirit and revolution'
[FoL 46 / 111]. Derrida's concern is that all three thinkers base their premises on a narrative
of loss, of the fall from an origin of some form of purity. But in diagnosing this loss, each
prepares the way, within quite distinct political allegiances, to the possibility of some form
of revolutionary violence. Derrida is not against revolution as such, but he is very much
against a traditional way of thinking revolution. Commenting on Benjamin again, Derrida
calls it 'revolutionary, even marxisant, but in the two senses of the word "revolutionary,"
which also includes the sense "reactionary," that is, the sense of a return to the past of a
purer origin" [FoL 46 / 111]. Concluding the post-script to the essay, Derrida confirms this:
'This text, like many others by Benjamin, is still too Heideggerean, too messianico-Marxist
or archeo-eschatological for me' [FoL 62 / 146]. By disavowing the inevitability of
contamination, in their desire to return to the conditions of a pure origin, whether of a certain
form of violence (Benjamin), or mode of being (Heidegger), or of politics (Schmitt), all three
thinkers are unable to think critically and responsibly about their own position. Each
threatens to unleash the worst violence in the name of a 'purer violence' and loses the sense
in which Derrida wishes to reinstigate calculation, to rethink politics and law as interminable
1 The French republication of the text adds notes linking the discussion of Benjamin
to that of Schmitt in Politics ofFriendship. 87n.2; 126-7n.l.
14 cf. Samuel Weber. 'Taking Exception to Decision: Walter Benjamin and Carl
Schmitt.' Diacritics, vol.22, no.3. (1992) 5-18.
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negotiation, a negotiation which must seek to negotiate without a determined horizon of
expectation or a particular goal in mind.
What Derrida proposes is not the end of revolution, however, but an extension and
revision of the concept:
What I am saying is anything but conservative and anti-revolutionary. For
beyond Benjamin's explicit purpose I shall propose the interpretation
according to which the very violence of the foundation or position of law must
envelop the violence of conservation and cannot break with it. It belongs to the
structure of fundamental violence that it calls for the repetition of itself and
founds what ought to be conserved, conservable, promised to heritage and
tradition, to be shared. [FoL 38 / 93-4]
Benjamin's opposition of a 'law-making' to a 'law-conserving' violence depends on the
revolutionary situation — his example is the general strike — in which a new founding of
the law is at stake [FoL 34-5 / 84-5]. However, for Derrida, we cannot know whether or not
we are in the middle of a law-founding moment; precisely because such a moment can never
be said to be 'present.' The event and the effects of a decision can only be revealed in
retrospect: 'those who say "our time," while thinking "our present" in light of a future
anterior present do not know very well, by definition, what they are saying.' Instead, as I
have shown in relation to the decision, for Derrida 'the whole history of law' is that of its
continual refoundation and reformulation: but crucially, 'This moment always takes place
and never takes place in a presence'' [FoL 36 / 89], Like the decision, which calls for its own
reaffirmation, for another decision, but which becomes law as soon as it has been done, so
the violent foundation of the law calls for confirmation and conservation which is also
violence. On the one hand, the violence of the suspension of all laws, on the other hand the
violent suspension of that suspension in the rule of law. 'Deconstruction is also the idea of
— and the idea adopted by necessity of— this differantielle contamination' [FoL 39 / 95],
Politics is the mixture of these two forms of decision, two forms of violence which cannot be
opposed in the manner Benjamin wishes (rigorously) or in terms of Greek and Judaic origins.
This suggests a complete revision of the concept of revolution. By analogy with Schmitt, we
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might say that the moment of revolution or of violent overthrow is the possibility of a pure
and present politicization. The danger of such an analysis is that it will tend to a glorification
of violence for its own sake. But for Derrida there can be no question of such a politics.
However, his overturning of the logic of the revolutionary could in some ways be considered
more radical, if it didn't subvert the traditional concept of the 'radical' as well. Instead of the
moment of revolution becoming the defining moment of the political, every moment, every
decision is to be considered revolutionary. The revolutionary moment of the exception, the
suspension of all rules, can no longer be imagined to be something that could or would take
place, and therefore no longer something to call for or aim at. Revolutionary politicization
can no longer be thought of as something that could be made present, it is not of the order of
possibility. Instead the revolutionary is the order of the perhaps. But this 'perhaps' is not
found in the exceptional moment, but makes an exception of every moment and every
decision.
If there is a politics of Derrida's work it lies here, in his insistence on the
revolutionary act of interpretation, of foundation of the law, of negotiation and calculation.
This is where we must work most patiently to show that his messianism without messiah,
which he is at pains to distinguish from that of Benjamin, is a messianism without content,
without expectation of any thing coming: no revolution, no God, nothing.15 But by relocating
the messianic to the structure of event-hood itself, to the everyday negotiation with the law,
with responsibility and duty, Derrida radicalises the possibility of thinking politically. If the
political is the moment of absolute uncertainty, but such uncertainty that we do not know
where it is to be found even, everywhere, then the political is both the most common and the
least common experience. The possibility of change, of something else happening, ofjustice,
of more equal distribution of wealth or power is witnessed to and attested to by every event;
although this possibility is indissociable from the threat of less justice, less equality, less
15 'Marx and Sons.' 250-1.
democracy. The challenge of deconstruction is to find ways of thinking and acting which are
adequate to this not-knowing, to the radical condition of the perhaps. Alexander Garcia
Diittmann suggests to Derrida that this is the case: 'on the one hand, we could be talking in
the name of reformism, because each decision calls for another one. We face an ongoing
process of reform after reform after reform. But at the same time we could radicalise that
thought into something like a permanent revolution.' Derrida confirms his proposal, echoing
the passage from 'Psyche: Inventions of the Other' with which I concluded my introduction:
'When I referred a moment ago to messianicity without messianism, 1 was describing a
revolutionary experience. [...] But when I insisted on the fact that we must nevertheless
prepare the revolution, it was because we must not simply be open to whatever comes. The
revolution, however unpredictable it may be, can and must be prepared for in the most
cautious slow and labourious [sic.] way.'16
Such a thought of depoliticization will always be open to two accusations. The first
is that it is too theological, too messianic, too abstract, or not concrete enough. Yet clearly
from Derrida's point of view, any theory which presumes to label, identify or name a present
politics, a determinate concept of the political, is being more messianic, in seeking to make
some particular future arrive, to make something in particular happen. The other potential
accusation would be that this is not radical at all, since it is not radical according to
traditional political paths and codes. Certainly, if the degree of radicality of a theory were to
be measured in term of the incomprehension and misunderstanding that have accrued to it—
for example Slavoj Zizek's mystified complaint that 'Derrida's "radicalization ofMarx" is in
fact 'its exact opposite: the renunciation of any truly radical political measures' 17 — then
we would quite easily be able to prove that Derrida's revolutionary politics is more radical
than traditional concepts of revolution. As Geoffrey Bennington comments: 'the need to
16
'Perhaps or Maybe.' 11.
17
Slavoj Zizek. 'Melancholy and the Act.' in Critical Inquiry, vol. 26 (2000). 657-
681.664-5.
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compromise, negotiate, with the most concrete detail of current arrangements of right: this is
what defines deconstruction as radically political.'18 Deconstruction is an affirmation ofwhat
happens, and of the revolutionary reinvention at work in every political decision, and so
clearly cannot be simply opposed to politics as it already exists. As I argued in the discussion
of radical democracy in my first chapter, this means thinking politics within and beyond the
state as much as against the state19; and as I emphasised in the second chapter,
deconstruction demands an intensive engagement with the law, within and beyond the state.
In the next section I will expand this account by contrasting Derrida's rethinking of politics
with that of his friends Phillipe Lacoue-Labarthe and Jean-Luc Nancy, while in the
conclusion I will attempt a provisional formalisation of the relationship between
deconstruction and depoliticization.
3.4 The Politics of the Retrait
IT WILL NOT have escaped the notice of anyone reasonably familiar with the work of Derrida
that what I have been describing as a structure of depoliticization and repoliticization is
homologous, not only to the relationship between the decision and the undecidable, but also
to what Derrida terms 'the retrait.' Such an analogy offers more than just clarification, since
18 Geoffrey Bennington. Interrupting Derrida. London: Routledge, 2000. 192.
19 David Campbell reaches similar conclusion on the value of deconstruction's
engagement with the state in his 'Deterritorialization of Responsibility' in David Campbell
& Michael J Shapiro eds. Moral Spaces: Rethinking ethics and world politics. Minneapolis:
U Minnesota P, 1999. 57-91.
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understanding the relationship between deconstruction, depoliticization and re-trait will
enable us to contrast Derrida's work with that of his friends Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe and
Jean-Luc Nancy. In a group of texts associated with the Centre for Philosophical Research
on the Political, Nancy and Lacoue-Labarthe offer some preliminary reflections on a post-
deconstructive rethinking of the political. These texts are of interest not only for themselves,
and for the critical responses they have provoked but because Derrida mentions in a note to
his discussion of Schmitt that Politics ofFriendship might be read as a 'modest and belated
contribution' to the work of the Centre, which 'was important for my own' [PoF 137 n.25].
His contribution may be 'modest and belated,' but I will argue here that Nancy and Lacoue-
Labarthe's account of the political repeats the structure we saw in Schmitt and Benjamin in
which politics is thought of the order of something which could come to presence.
3.4.1 Heidegger, Being and Technology.
Heidegger's essay 'The Question concerning Technology' provides a helpful starting point
from which to approach the thought of being. Heidegger is concerned to elucidate man's
relationship with modern technology, and characterise it as a particular mode of historical
existence. For Heidegger, 'the essence of all history [Geschichte] is determined' from a
'destining [Geschick]' [QT 306]. This destining is a determined mode of concealment of the
fundamental truth as aletheia, unconcealment. The history of being for Heidegger is the
history of this concealment, and can only be uncovered through a destructive enquiry into the
origins of Being in its concealment. Only through listening to the essence of the mode of
destining, can we understand man's predicament, which is one of 'danger' but also of the
possibility of 'a freeing claim'[QT 307]. This much could be said of any epoch of Being's
destining. However, 'when destining reigns in the mode of enframing, it is the supreme
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danger' [QT 308]. Enframing [Gestelt] is what Heidegger has called the essence of modern
technology, which is nothing technological. Modern technology's characteristics are of
drawing energy from Nature and of storing it. There is a fundamental difference, Heidegger
suggests, between 'the work of the peasant' which 'does not challenge the soil of the field'
and agriculture as a 'mechanized food industry' [QT 296], Similarly, a windmill 'does not
unlock energy from the air currents in order to store it'; by contrast the hydroelectric plant
across the Rhine turns the river itself into a water power supplier [QT 296-7], It is not
technology itself which threatens man — 'the potentially lethal machines and apparatus of
technology' — but 'the actual threat has already affected man in his essence. The rule of
enframing threatens man with the possibility that it could be denied to him to enter into a
more original revealing and hence to experience the call of a more primal truth' [QT 309],
However Heidegger turns the logic around. 'The extreme danger, not only for man's coming
to presence, but for all revealing as such' is still a granting; a saving power [QT 313].
Ultimately, 'the closer we come to the danger, the more brightly do the ways into the saving
power begin to shine and the more questioning we become' [QT 317],
This clearly fits into the general structure of Heidegger's account of Being as
concealment and unconcealment. The object of the destructive (or deconstructive) coming to
terms with the tradition of Western thought is to recover the original character of Being,
which has been forgotten or covered over. We cannot think the ontic-ontological difference,
the difference between Being as sending and Being as its beings or sendings, as such. This
difference will only appear as its own non-appearance, as its withdrawal or concealment
behind the various epochs of being. Joseph Kockelmans glosses this aspect of Heidegger's
thought:
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History of Being, therefore, means the sending of Being. And in the various
ways of sending, the sending itself, as well as that mysterious 'it' which sends,
holds itself back in the various manifestations in which Being 'shows' itself.'
Modern technology is the last of these 'manifestations' or epochs: 'To hold
back means in Greek epoche. That is why we speak of epochs in Being's
sending. Epoch does not mean primarily a certain period of time in the
coming-to-pass of Being's truth; it means the basic characteristic of the
sending itself, that is to say, this holding-itself-back in favour of the various
manifestations of the gift, namely, Being with respect to the discovery of
beings.'20
Metaphysics has been the history of the forgetting of what makes it possible, of the
concealment of being. This is why metaphysics is nihilism for Heidegger. The important
point to grasp here, as Miguel de Bestigui makes clear, is that modern technology represents
the final stage of nihilism: 'Metaphysics is the way in which the abandonment of being
happens in the forgottenness of being. Seinsverlassenheit is Seinsvergessenheit. Yet this
forgetting is not simply a form of absence or an effacement: it rules or reigns over the whole
of being in such a way that the truth of being becomes unattainable. In its completed form,
nihilism in the form of technology, it rules as will to power, the most disastrous unleashing
of power amidst beings as a whole.'21 But according to the logic set out in 'The Question
Concerning Technology' the epoch of modern technology holds not only the greatest danger,
but also the greatest and most powerful potential for the 'saving power.'
The form of Heidegger's argument here strongly recalls both Schmitt's argument in
'The Age of Neutralizations and Depoliticizations' and Derrida's criticisms of The Concept
of the Political. For Schmitt too the modern era is the age of technology. While Schmitt's
account of the technological era sees its roots in the 'apparently hybrid and impossible
combination of aesthetic-romantic and economic-technical tendencies in the nineteenth
century' [ND 133] rather than an original sending of Being given form in a determined
20 quoted in Herman Rapaport. Heidegger & Derrida: Reflections on Time and
Language. Lincoln: U Nebraska P., 1991. 177.
21
Miquel de Beistigui. Heidegger and the political: dystopias. London: Routledge,
1998.76.
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constellation of presencing, there is a structural similarity between the two accounts. For
both Heidegger and Schmitt the age of technology is the age of the most extreme
neutralisation and danger of the forgetting of being, respectively. Conversely, this also
makes the age of technology the age with the greatest potential for the restoration of politics
or of an originary relationship to Being. Derrida finds in The Concept of the Political a logic
by which the possibility of the total disappearance of the political acts instead as a hyper-
politicization, and it would seem that the same might be said of the closure of metaphysics as
technology for Heidegger. In 'Force of Law' Derrida compared his reservations about
Benjamin's thought to his concerns about that of Heidegger: both are too archeo-
eschatological. In other words, both think history in a circle, and are interested in the coming
to presence of something which has been lost or concealed but which was originally present.
This problem is in fact tackled at length in Derrida's work on Heidegger, and
especially in The Post Card. In 'Envois', the long first essay of The Post Card, Derrida sends
up the notion of sending, and in particular the 'decisive' elements of Heidegger's thought —
the sense that now is the destined moment for the revelation of Being. What he calls the
postal principle, or destinerrance is an attempt to displace the sense of truth as aletheia,
predicated upon the possibility of its own reception, of its possible being brought into
presence. This is elaborated at some length in the more theoretical essay 'The Factor of
Truth' in which he famously argues that truth is determined by the necessary possibility of it
not being revealed; that a communication must always, to some extent, go astray, and that a
letter never arrives at its destination. In 'Envois' Derrida puts the whole problem more
playfully:
It's the end of an epoch. [...] The postal principle does not happen to
differance, and even less to 'Being,' it destines them to itself from the very
'first' envoi. [...] The post is always en reste, and always restante. It awaits the
addressee who might always, by chance, not arrive.
And the postal principle is no
longer a principle, not a transcendental category; that which announces itself or
sends itself under this heading [...] no longer sufficiently belongs to the epoch
of Being to submit itself to some transcendentalism [...] [PC 190-2 / 205-6].
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While from this passage Derrida does not appear to distinguish either difference and Being,
the key emphasis is on by chance and on the possibility of the non-arrival of the postal
principle. His effort is to think an indeterminacy of destination; that is the possibility that
Being will not arrive at its 'destination' or that this arrival is controlled by chance; or is
beyond the opposition between chance and necessity. A few lines later however, another
distinction is introduced:
Tekhne (and doubtless he would have considered the postal structure [...] a
metaphysical and technical determination of the envoi or of the destinality
(Geschick, etc.) of Being; [...]); now tekhne, this is the entire — infinitesimal
and decisive — differance, does not arrive. [...] Tekhne does not happen to
language or to the poem [...]: this can mean simultaneously that it does not
succeed in touching them, getting into them, it leaves them virgin, not
happening to arrive up to them, and yet it has to happen to them like an
accident or an event because it inhabits them and occasions them [PC 192 /
207],
Technics cannot be thought apart from Being, or from differance. In insisting on this Derrida
opposes a reading in which technics comes second, in which the technical is a blight which
befalls being or differance; and in which some form of purification might still be possible.
The 'infinitesimal and decisive' difference may be taken in part as a difference between
Heidegger and Derrida. Turning now to another of Derrida's essays on Heidegger, we will
see how this decisive difference will help reiterate the difference between deconstruction as
depoliticization and the retrait of politics.
3.4.2 Derrida sRetrait.
Derrida's own account of the retrait is most decisively set out in his essay 'The Retrait of
Metaphor.' A companion piece of sorts to 'White Mythology: Metaphor in the Text of
Philosophy,' in the essay Derrida gathers his thoughts on Heidegger and the question of
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metaphor. It is perhaps worth recalling at this point the argument of the earlier essay. In
'White Mythology' Derrida argues that since metaphor is a philosophical concept, it cannot
be used to explain away philosophy; for example to demonstrate that philosophy is nothing
but an effect of language, or that in Nietzsche's words, 'truths are illusions of which one has
forgotten that they are illusions' [Mar 217 / 258], 'Metaphor,' Derrida writes, 'remains in
all its essential characteristics, a classical philosopheme, a metaphysical concept. It is
therefore enveloped in the field that a general metaphorology of philosophy would seek to
dominate' [Mar 219 / 261]. Even if all the other concepts of philosophy could be accounted
for as the metaphorical usage of language, the concept ofmetaphor itselfwould remain to be
accounted for: 'the metaphor of metaphor. This extra metaphor, remaining outside the field
that it allows to be circumscribed, extracts or abstracts itself from this field, thus subtracting
itself as a metaphor less' [mar 220 / 261] and disabling its own claim to be able to dominate
the field of philosophy. The structural principle of what Derrida elsewhere calls differance,
and much else, returns: 'The field is never saturated' [Mar 220 / 261]. Yet since philosophy
can only ever describe this 'field' metaphorically, via the non-absolute coincidence of sign
and meaning, we could also formulate a claim such as: there are only metaphors, there are
only non-proper meanings, out beyond the coherence of an opposition between proper and
improper meaning, the true and the metaphorical use of language. This situation, which
Derrida describes as one of 'supplementarity (between the concept and the field)' [Mar 229
/ 273] we have already encountered as difference.
In 'The Retrait of Metaphor,' having first answered a series of criticisms put to
'White Mythology' by Paul Ricouer, Derrida establishes some of the connections between
his work and that of Heidegger, referring not so much to Heidegger's brief comments on
metaphor as such, but to the general structure of his work. Derrida proposes under the name
of the retrait in which we are interested, to approach a group of problems: not only the
question of Ubersetzung and Ubertragung, of translation / transfer and metaphoric transfer;
but also the question of Ereignis— of proper, propriation, de-propriation — as a question of
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event, and of metaphor; and the question of the home, of economy as the law of the house.
The word retrait appears 'to be the most proper to capture the greatest quantity of energy
and information in the Heideggerian text' [RM 114 / 77]. Derrida proposes 'retrait' as an
idiomatic French expression which can condense three motifs of Heidegger's later work,
bringing out the linguistic and theoretical relationship between these moments, which I
summarise in my turn.
1) Derrida suggests that we might understand the ontic-ontological difference in terms of
metaphor. Metaphor belongs to metaphysics, considered as a 'suspensive withdrawal of
Being': both 'being hidden' and 'dissimulation or veiling.' Metaphysics would itself then
become a metaphorical system, a veiling of Being: 'as a tropical system and singularly as a
metaphorical detour [metaphysics] would correspond to an essential withdrawal of Being:
unable to reveal itself, to present itself except in dissimulating itself under the "species" of
an epochal determination [...]. Being would only allow itself to be named in a metaphorico-
metonymical divergence' [RM 116/ 79]. But since metaphor would remain a metaphysical
concept it could not be an accurate name for the relation between Being and being, which
could not be of the order of the distinction literal-metaphorical. 'Consequently,' Derrida
writes, 'if we cannot speak metaphorically on its subject, neither can we speak properly or
literally. We will speak of being only quasi-metaphorically, according to a metaphor of
metaphor' [RM 117 / 80]. In other words, the same quasi-transcendental status which
Derrida accorded to metaphor in 'White Mythology' and which renders radically
indeterminable the possibility of distinguishing metaphorical from proper use of language,
might be read as a translation — or a metaphor — for Being in its withdrawal. From this
point of view, retrait would be both a translation and not a translation from Heidegger; an
approximation to Entziehung and Sich-Entziehen of Being. The withdrawal of Being gives
place to a discourse which cannot name it, except abusively, quasi-metaphorically.
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2) Secondly, Derrida, draws attention to Heidegger's own concern to show that his language
cannot be read as metaphorical (understood in its metaphysical determination as the familiar
detour which illuminates the unknown) in such passages as: 'Discourse about the house of
Being is not a metaphor, transporting the image ofthe 'house' toward Being, but it is by way
of appropriating thinking the essence ofBeing, that we will one day be able to think what
'house' and 'to inhabit' are' [RM 119/ 83], But this is not to imply that the relation between
the terms has been simply inverted: we do not know Being, as a fixed point from which we
can understand 'dwelling.' The relation between 'Being' and 'house' would again not be of
the order of the proper or the improper; and the statement of this would itself not be
metaphorical or literal, but a withdrawal of the possibility of understanding the relation in
those terms.
3) Derrida finally returns to 'trait' as a translation. He discusses the overlapping of two
semantic chains in Heidegger's German: one based around Ziehen (relation) and the other
around Reissen (cut, mark). Riss, which Derrida translates as 'trait,' names definitional
relation itself. It is a cutting, a division, the separation of elements, which neither belongs to
the elements thereby separated, but is nothing other than their relation. It thus is not. In being
traced, it is withdrawn. But it is also more originary than the elements it divides, since they
are not until they have been distinguished:
It does not precede the two properties which it causes to come to their
propriety, for it is nothing without them. In this sense it is not an autonomous,
originary, instance, itself proper in relation to the two which it incises and
allies. Being nothing, it does not appear itself, it has no proper and independent
phenomenality, and in not disclosing itself, it withdraws, it is structurally in
withdrawal, as a divergence (ecart: splitting aside), opening, differentiality,
trace, border, traction, effraction, etc. From the moment that it withdraws in
drawing itself out, the trait is a priori withdrawal, unappearance, and
effacement of its mark in its incision [RM 124-5 / 88].
There is thus an analogy between the re- of the re-trait, and the Heideggerean Ent-Ziehung
(with-drawal), and Ent-fernung (dis-tancing), and 'the Ereignen of the Es gibt which focuses
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all of Heidegger's late thinking, in precisely this trait where the movement of the Enteignen
(dispropriation, retraction of propriety) happens to empty out all Ereignis' [RM 125 / 89].
'Retrait' also translates the Aufriss, the 'totality of traits', which Heidegger names as the
incision which names language: 'the trait of the incision is therefore veiled, withdrawn, but it
is also the trait that brings together and separates at once the veiling and the unveiling, the
withdrawal and the withdrawal of the withdrawal' [RM 126-7 / 90]. This transport or
translation is not all one way however— 'the deal works, it is already at work in the other's
language. I would say in the other's languages' — for re-trait comes to mean the retracing
(re-treating) as well as withdrawal [RM 126 / 90-1],
Derrida's reinscription of these developments in Heidegger's thought in another language,
and by way of a quasi-metaphoricity which cannot be effaced, sets his own work against
Heidegger's insistence on the original rooting of his language in the Greek origin of Being,
and in Gasche's words, 'although it still repeats the question of Being, inscribes it, and thus
remains altogether extraneous to this still-philosophical question.'22 Heidegger has claimed
that his words are not metaphorical. Following Derrida's arguments in 'White Mythology'
we know he disagrees.23 The detour of metaphor does not happen to an originally pure
language, since the possibility of translation and of metaphorical transfer is an original
possibility. In fact it seems to me that the re-trait can be mapped onto the quasi-concept of
depoliticization that I have been sketching out. Depoliticization for Derrida is not an
accidental or contingent possibility in an originally political context, but is a necessary
condition of the political. Just as the re-trait rewrites the withdrawal of being in terms of
metaphor as permanent detour rather than truth, so Derrida's version of depoliticization
removes the possibility of a recovery of an authentic politics. There is no originary
22 Rodolphe Gasche.' OfMinimal Things. Stanford: Stanford UP, 2000. 241.
23 See also Christopher Norris. New Idols ofthe Cave: On the limits ofanti-realism.
Manchester: Manchester UP, 1997. 104.
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politicization; hence we should only speak of a re-politicization. There are only relative
depoliticizations and repoliticizations. Like the trait, which is only as re-trait, as
disappearance and re-tracing, so politics is only as depoliticization and re-pol iticization.
The Politics of the Re-trait and the Re-trait of the Political
We are now in a position to turn to the thesis of the 're-trait' of the political proposed by
Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe and Jean-Luc Nancy in the context of the Centre for Philosophical
Research into the Political. In their opening address to the centre, they give two senses for
the phrase: 'withdrawing the political in the sense of its being the "well-known" and in the
sense of the obviousness (the blinding obviousness) of politics, the "everything is political"
which can be used to qualify our enclosure in the closure of the political; but also as re¬
tracing the political, re-marking it, by raising the question in a new way which, for us, is to
raise it as the question of its essence.'24 What is clear from this somewhat obscure definition
is that its authors are proposing both a historical argument and a philosophical argument. A
thesis about the state of the world today accompanies a philosophical understanding of both
the 'closure' of the political and the potential for a new understanding of politics. In a
programmatic paper given at the end of the Centre's second year, Lacoue-Labarthe and
Nancy clarify their understanding of the phrase, in the light of the papers delivered to the
Centre. Here they recognise three ways of understanding the retrait of the political: in terms
of a Hegelian Aufhebung of the political as the absorption and sublimation of the political by
the state; the subordination of the political, along Marxist
24 Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe & Jean-Luc Nancy., Simon Sparks ed. Retreating the
Political. London: Routledge, 1996. 112.
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lines, to an ontology of the individual; and their own understanding, derived from Heidegger
via Derrida. Their explanation confirms the dual nature of their diagnosis. On the one hand,
they state, 'Our retreat accompanies, in reality, a retreat of the political itselfwithin and from
the epoch of its world domination.' On the other hand, 'our retreat operates in relation to the
political in general and absolutely, and that is to say in relation to the intrinsic political
determination of the onto-theology of Realpolitik as it appears through the theoretical face of
the Hegelian state or through the empirical face of the calculation of forces.' 25 In particular,
we should note the Heideggerean thesis that this is the 'era of the world domination' of
politics, which Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy admit is largely inspired by Heidegger's work
on technology. There are two sides to this claim: one philosophical, that this is the age of
'the actualisation or the installation of the philosophical as the political, the generalisation
(the globalisation) of the philosophical as the political — and by the same token, the
absolute reign, or domination of the political'26 — and the other that this thesis is confirmed
historically in the determination of the horizon of the age by totalitarianism.
The equivocation between the historical and the philosophical dimension of their
argument persists in the details of Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy's diagnosis of the retrait of
the political in the modern age. They are concerned by the disappearance of the specificity of
the political (which is to be distinguished in particular from the economic); the reduction of
politics to 'banal management'27; and what, drawing on Hannah Arendt, they class as the
triumph of a definition of man as worker and producer, the occupation of public space by the
social rather than the political, and a loss of political authority in the world. It is in this
context that they propose to extend Claude Lefort's work on the totalitarian to show that the
loss of sovereignty which makes available a reincarnation and reimagination of the social
body to fill the empty place of power is not just a characteristic of specifically totalitarian
25
Retreating the Political. 139.
26
Retreating the Political. 110.
27
Retreating the Political. 126.
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societies. They define a 'soft totalitarianism' within liberal democracy.28 While they draw
the apparently pessimistic conclusion that there is no possibility of recovering the political
from its withdrawal, the retrait of the political is also the setting free of a new possibility.
This 'something' is a way of thinking politics which no longer depends on the notion of a
political subject; which replaces any question of ground, subject or class with a notion of
finitude; and which raises the central questions of 'relation' and of the constitution of social
identity.29 The later work of both writers, but particularly that of Nancy, can be read as an
attempt to develop such a mode of thought.30
A lot seems to hang on Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy's assertion, echoing Sartre, that
totalitarianism is 'the unsurpassable horizon of our times.'31 I argued in chapter one while
discussing the work of Claude Lefort, from whom Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy derive much
of their definition of totalitarianism, that the opposition between the totalitarian and the
democratic needs to be rethought. Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy clearly begin to rethink this
opposition, but solely in terms of revealing an unthought totalitarianism within the
democratic. I suggested that in thinking politics after Derrida's work, we would need to
make the reverse claim, and find democratic resources within the totalitarian. The
politicization of civil society in Eastern Europe in the years following the closure of the
Centre for Philosophical Research into the Political seems to bear out this thesis. To deduce
that the social has excluded the political is to foreclose on its potential politicization. In
Simon Critchley's words, 'the thesis of the withdrawal cannot be a partial withdrawal, it
must be total. The analysis of the dual closure of the philosophical and the political must see
28
Retreating the Political. 128.
29
Retreating the Political. 122-3.
30 See for example Jean-Luc Nancy. The Inoperative Community, trans. Peter Connor
et. al., Minneapolis : U Minnesota P, 1991.; The Experience of Freedom, trans. Bridget
McDonald. Stanford: Stanford UP, 1993.; The Sense of the World, trans. Jeffrey S Librett.
Minneapolis: U Minnesota P, 1997.; Being Singular Plural. Trans. Robert D. Richardson &
Anne E. O'Byrne. Stanford: Stanford UP, 2000.
31
Retreating the Political. 126.
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totalitarianism as the final figure in the development of political forms."2 While Lacoue-
Labarthe and Nancy cannot be said to share the political views of either Heidegger or
Schmitt, their work also seems to repeat the same structure. The hypothesis of a total closure,
like that of a final neutralization or the most extreme danger, serves to announce or herald
the potential for something new. This has the apparently paradoxical effect of both
postponing that arrival (since it cannot be seen to be already at work) and predicting its
content or form.
Depoliticization, understood in the sense I have been suggesting Derrida's work
makes available would be constructed to avoid precisely this problem. No politics, no
politics to come or new way of thinking politically will avoid being a depoliticization;
conversely no form of politics as depoliticization will not attest to the possibility of a
repoliticization. By thinking these two possibilities together in the same moment, in the same
concept, a deconstructive thought of the politics of the retrait would both revalue politics
itself, even in its most apparent triviality — as 'banal management', as interminable
negotiation and calculation — while maintaining the possibility of an equally necessary
critique of the limits of any actual politics. This complex of depoliticization and
repoliticization operates at the level of the concept; no way of thinking about the world
which does not pass through it will be able to avoid the far more banal thesis of a historical
depoliticization. This does not rule out the possibility of speaking about the world, although
it might suggest a certain hesitancy about totalizing hypotheses. In Politics of Friendship
Derrida insists that what Schmitt cannot acknowledge, having posited the technological as a
secondary, and inauthentic neutralization of the purely political, is that the 'derealization' of
the territorial drive in modern warfare is not a displacement of an original politics of
autochthony, but that 'telluric autochthony is already a reactive response to a derealization
32 Simon Critchley. 'Re-tracing the political: politics and community in the work of
Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe and Jean-Luc Nancy.' In David Campbell & Michael Dillon eds.
The Political Subject of Violence. Manchester: Manchester UP, 1993. 83.
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and to a form of tele-technology'' [PoF 142 / 164], What is at stake in Schmitt's work, but
more so in Derrida's commentary is 'the relations between the history of the political and the
structure of theoretical concepts which one claims to articulate upon it' [PoF 143 / 164],
What distinguishes Derrida's own work is the rigour with which it refuses to leave the order
of the conceptual to make a claim upon the world. The 'inscription' of the re-trait, Derrida
writes, 'as 1 have attempted to describe it in the trace or in difference, succeeds only in being
effaced (n 'arrive qu'a s'effacerf [RM 125 / 88]. Taken as the structure of repoliticization
which is only as depoliticization, this would also then bear a fundamental similarity to the
time of friendship as aimance through which Derrida thinks the essence of the political, an
essence which is only in its own contamination, its not being essential: 'such a time gives
itself in its withdrawal. It occurs only through self-effacement [II n 'arrive qu 'a s 'effacer,
also: 'It succeeds only in effacing itself]' [PoF 14 / 31]. As I have insisted, deconstruction is
not just an attempt to think through the concept of depoliticization; it must have the form or
the effect of a depoliticization as well. But as an attempt at re-politicization, might not its
most distinctive feature be its own self-effacement? Not only a modest withdrawal before the
texts on which Derrida writes, but also before politics itself? This would in turn prevent the
attempt to thinking the retrait of politics as depoliticization from becoming a reduction of
politics or the necessity of political calculation in the name of an essence of the political,
however subtly thought out.
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3.5 Conclusions
since his 'Letter to a Japanese Friend,' which I discussed in the introduction to my first
chapter, Derrida has offered a number of accounts of what he means by deconstruction.
These comments made in an interview in 1991 are typical: deconstruction does not name a
'fundamental project' or even 'the techniques [Derrida] use[s] for reading and writing' [poi
357 / 367], Deconstruction is not even one thing: '1 have never had a "fundamental project."
And "deconstructions," which I prefer to say in the plural, has doubtless never named a
project, method or system' [Poi 356 / 367], Moreover, 'there is deconstruction, there are
deconstructions everywhere' [poi 357 / 367]:
In contexts that are always very determined, it is one of the possible names for
designating, by metonymy in sum, what happens or doesn't happen to happen,
namely, a certain dislocation that in fact is regularly repeated — and wherever
there is something rather than nothing: in what are called the texts of classical
philosophy, of course and for example, but also in every 'text' in the general
sense that I try to justify for this word, that is in experience period, in social,
historical, economic, technical, military etc., 'reality' [POI 356 / 367],
Beginning the conclusion to this chapter I will summarize and formalize my analysis of
deconstruction as depoliticization and repoliticization by focusing on the relationship
between deconstruction as 'one of the possible names for [...] what happens or doesn't
happen to happen' and that more determined mode of deconstruction which happens within
Derrida's texts. In particular I am concerned to demonstrate that the necessary and inevitable
institutionalisation of deconstruction which Derrida describes in his paper 'Some Statements
and Truisms...' can be understood as more or less directly equivalent to what I have
designated as depoliticization. Derrida's paper 'Some Statements and Truisms about
Neologisms, Newisms, Postisms, Parasitisms, and other small Seismisms,' to give it its full
title, was given to a conference entitled 'The States of Theory' in 1988.33 Derrida used the
33 The proceedings were published as David Carroll ed. The States of Theory. New
York: Columbia UP, 1990.
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opportunity to address the status of the heterogeneous body of work loosely known as theory
within American universities at the time, and the place of 'deconstruction' within it. It is a
revealing paper, not least because Derrida addresses the genealogy of deconstruction as a
theoretical project, and makes some suggestions about its relationship to various Marxist and
historicist modes of reading, which were gaining currency at the time against the more
formalist deconstructionism popularised in the wake of the so-called Yale School. However
the paper also offers a way of understanding deconstruction as itself a theoretical discursive
formation both in terms of what it shares with a number of competing theories, and in terms
of what distinguishes it from these other theories.
Derrida proposes an attempt to tabularize the various theoretical approaches
currently on offer in the academic battlefield (Kampfplatz) [SST 72] or market-place [SST
73-4]. This attempt at a taxonomy of theories, however, is made impossible by the very
nature of these theoretical 'jetties.' Each jetty 'is only a theoretical jetty inasmuch as it
claims to comprehend itself by comprehending all the others' [SST 66]. Every theory
presumes a claim to account for every other theory, even if this is only by virtue of being
situated in relation to other theories: it is 'the institution of a new statement about the whole
state and of a new establishment aiming at state hegemony. Each jetty has a hegemonic aim,
which isn't meant to subjugate or control the other jetties from the outside, but which is
meant to incorporate them in order to be incorporated into them' [SST 68]. Any attempt at
generating a meta-theory will merely replicate the implicit project of each theory; Derrida
quotes Heidegger and Lacan: 'there is no metalanguage' [SST 76]. The quotation not only
formalizes but exemplifies the problem. Derrida's meta-commentary on the problem of a
metalanguage is both the repetitive instantiation of that very problem and an attempt to
account for this situation. Derrida's conclusion is not that we should give up attempting
theoretical explanations. On the contrary, we need to develop more and more rigorous
formulations of this problem. This doesn't preclude engaging with 'reality' or history' —
'what happens or doesn't happen to happen' [POI 356 / 367] — but is the necessary
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precondition of a responsible engagement [SST 77]. 'Reality' or 'history' are themselves
concepts, with their own 'reality' or 'history.' To institute a theory in the name of such
concepts without reflecting on their genealogy is simply to institute a less coherent, less
vigilant, theory.
Derrida's language here — 'institution' — suggests that the 'establishment' of a
theory may be considered by analogy to the institution of the law in general. That this is the
case is made explicit by the example Derrida gives of another conference, 'The Languages of
Criticism and the Sciences ofMan,' at which he presented 'Structure Sign and Play' in 1966.
This conference has subsequently been taken as the moment of the arrival of both
structuralist and post-structuralist thought to literature departments in the USA. The reality
or truth of the fact that this conference took place is not in question; but Derrida argues that
for the conference to become an 'event' in the narrative of deconstruction in America,
another kind of evaluation must take place:
if something happened there which would have the value of a theoretical event,
or of an event within theory, or more likely the value of an advent of a new
theoretical-institutional sense of'theory' — of what has been called 'theory' in
this country for about twenty years — this something only came to light
afterwards and is still becoming more and more clear today. [SST 80]
Derrida's point here depends on his analysis of the structure of the event in general. In his
essay 'Psyche: Inventions of the Other' this is set out briefly in the context of a discussion of
the concept of 'invention.' An invention, as an event, 'always presupposes some illegality,
the breaking of an implicit contract; it inserts some disorder into the peaceful order of things,
it disregards the proprieties' [PSY 25 / 11]. An event cannot be predicted in advance, and like
a decision, can only occur in a moment of the suspension of the law. Yet as soon as it has
occurred the event is recuperated by a programme. The legal confirmation of the event of an
invention by patent laws or some form of right of property testifies to the structure of the
event as such; that invention begins by being susceptible to repetition, exploitation,
reinscription' [PSY 28 / 16]. Invention is 'never private' [PSY 28 / 15]; the legal institution of
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an invention is only a response to its prior iterability. This means that, as for a decision, we
can never be certain if an event has occurred: 'of this event, one is never sure' [PSY 56 / 54],
In 'Force of Law' Derrida takes the foundation of a nation state to be the best example of the
institution of the law in general; and therefore we presume of the structure of an event [FoL
23-4 / 52]. In an earlier text he also takes this as a privileged examples. Using the text of the
American Declaration of Independence, Derrida shows in some detail that the status of the
Declaration, considered in terms of speech act theory, is very uncertain indeed. The
constitution is signed by the self-proclaimed representatives of the people of the United
States: yet the people in whose name the signatories of the constitution sign is not constituted
as a people until the event of signing has taken place. Further, the signatories have no
authorisation to sign until the people in whose name they sign has been constituted. Thus at
the moment of signing there is a transgression, an illegal and illicit constitution of a law by
representatives of a body which has not yet been brought into being, and who are therefore in
no position to legislate:
This people does not exist. It does not exist before this declaration, not as such.
If it is given birth, as a free and independent subject, as a possible signatory,
this can only be by the act of this signature. The signature invents the
signature.34
The founding moment of the institution of the law, Derrida writes, 'implies a performative
force' [FoL 13 / 32]; what he elsewhere calls 'perverformative.'35 This should remind us that
what Derrida has to say about theoretical events — and the 'event' that 'The Languages of
Criticism and the Sciences ofMan' may have been — applies to events in general and to the
possibility of an event as such.
The most interesting passages of 'Some Statements and Truisms...' for my present
purpose come when Derrida dramatises his conceptualization of the event in terms
34 'Declarations d'Independence' in Otobiographies. Paris: Galilee, 1984. 21-22.
35 'Marx and Sons.' 224-5.
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of his 'theoretical jetties.' The description of the jetties is clarified as a double movement
which replicates that of the event and the decision: an opening to the other, or a moment of
undecidability which is the condition of something happening (arriving— the French for 'to
happen' is 'arrived) or of a decision being taken; and an immediate reinscription of law and
programming in general. Derrida writes that each jetty is double: '1 will call the first the
destabilizing jetty or even more artificially the devastating jetty, and the other one the
stabilizing, establishing or simply stating jetty.' Derrida characterises this as follows. In the
word 'jetty,' he writes:
I distinguish, on the one hand, the force of the movement which throws
something or throws itself (jette or se jette) forward and backwards at the same
time, prior to any subject, object or project, prior to any rejection or abjection,
from, on the other hand, its institutional and protective consolidation, which
can be compared to the jetty, the pier in a harbor meant to break the waves and
maintain low tide for boats at anchor or for swimmers. Of course, these two
functions of the jetty are ideally distinct, but in fact they are difficult to
dissociate, if not indissociable [SST 84],
In the phrase 'the states of theory' Derrida wishes us to hear the idea of a static or stasis
inducing force, as well as the disruptive or path-breaking dynamic. These two jetties are not
equally opposed: one supplying momentum, one solidifying and hardening the outcome.
Only the stabilising jetty moves, or hardens, it is 'essentially edifying' [SST 93], The
destabilising jetty is not, it cannot be said to exist, since as soon as we pose a question which
can be given the form 'what is' we have stabilised, attempted to fix the jetty.
In terms of deconstruction as a theoretical jetty we might be tempted to distinguish
Derrida's own work, as the original or destabilizing jetty, and the institution of
deconstruction in America to be its stabilization. However, Derrida insists that this is not the
case. His own work must in and of itself be its own stabilization; or a stabilization of that
destabilization which it both attempts to draw attention to, and of which it must be an effect.
So the deconstructive jetty could refer to three things. Firstly, 'neither a theory nor a
philosophy [...] neither a school nor a method [...] not a discourse, not an act, nor a practice
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[...] [i]t is what happens, what is happening today in what they call society, politics,
diplomacy, economics, historical reality' [SST 85]. Secondly, the forms of resistance
provoked or inspired by 'what happens,' a quasi-theoretical set of resistances to particular
modes of reading, interpreting, writing about 'what happens.' These forms of resistance in
turn generate their own stabilizations: 'the very thing which exceeds at the same time the
theoretical, the thematic, the thetic, the philosophical and the scientific provokes, as gestures
of reappropriation and suture, theoretical movements, productions of theorems'[SST 87],
Derrida takes Rodolphe Gasche's The Tain of the Mirror as an example. Gasche risks
reconstituting the second deconstructive jetty as 'a philosophy of deconstruction' [SST 89-
90], Deconstruction, to summarise, would refer to three experiences: the destabilization
which is not but remains the necessary condition for that which happens, and its concomitant
stabilization ('a resistance which produces theories' [SST 87]); a theoretical discourse which
attempts to describe this structure while being an example of it; the further
institutionalisation of this discourse in certain academic or journalistic contexts which 'isn't
bad, it isn't an evil, and even if it were one, it would be a necessary evil' [SST 88].
On this basis I will make a provisional definition of what I have been calling
depoliticization and repoliticization in Derrida's work. We can broadly distinguish three
levels or modes of depoliticization. 1) The first would be the depoliticization operative
within the events and decisions ofwhat is called politics. Following the argument of Politics
of Friendship, depoliticization would be at work wherever the political decision follows a
rule — that is wherever there is a decision — and either follows or founds a naturalized
sense of political responsibility, in which political equality or justice is limited to the one
group rather than another. It is clear that this sense of depoliticization is necessary for there
to be what we call politics. From one point of view it looks very like the definition of politics
in its most common current form, as the management and allocation of the resources of a
state amongst its citizens and a select group of other fraternal friends in the form of overseas
aid. Yet from Derrida's point of view, as soon as this becomes the total definition of politics,
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we could no longer speak of politics, since there would be no outcome which has not been
programmed in advance. To the extent that there is an auto-deconstructive motif within
politics, that is to say that politics can be put in question, or puts its own foundational
decisions into question, politics itself bears witness to democracy-to-come. 2) The second
form of deconstruction as depoliticization is the theoretico-practical description or definition
of this situation within deconstruction; a set of strategic interventions in the political field
which may be said to be both examples of any political event and as an attempt to account
for, as far as possible, the necessary depoliticizing effect of any political discourse. This
defines deconstruction as a political practice, as it was set out in the preceding chapter. By
affirming the depoliticization of traditional political thought, this mode of depoliticization
would be an attempt to repoliticize, without predicting an outcome, or instituting a doctrine.
3) The third order of depoliticization would be the depoliticizing effect within the second
mode of depoliticization, which cannot avoid an instituting momentum. The possibility of a
reflection such as this one in which I am engaged demonstrates the possibility of this further
depoliticization of Derrida's own strategies. Again, as with Gasche's re-philosophising of
deconstruction, this makes the project at worst a 'necessary evil' [SST 88].
Derrida's most suggestive and explicit comments on repoliticization come in 'Force
of Law' with a direct reference to the possibility of emancipation:
Politicization, for example, is interminable even if it cannot and should not
ever be total. To keep this from being a truism or a triviality, we must
recognise in it the following consequence: each advance in politicization
obliges one to reconsider, and so to reinterpret the very foundations of law
such as they had previously been calculated or delimited. This was true for
example in the Declaration of the Rights ofMan, in the abolition of slavery, in
all the emancipatory battles that remain and will have to remain in progress,
everywhere in the world, for men and for women. Nothing seems to me less
outdated than this emancipatory appeal [FoL 28 / 62].
Discussing these comments in his 'Remarks on Deconstruction and Pragmatism,' Derrida is
somewhat concerned by Simon Critchley's surprise at them. He reiterates his position: 'I
believe there is an enormous amount to do today for emancipation, in all domains and areas
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of the world and society. Even if I would not wish to inscribe the discourse of emancipation
into a teleology, a metaphysics, an eschatology or even a classical messianism, I none the
less believe that there is no ethico-political decision or gesture without what I would call a
"Yes" to emancipation' [DaP 82], Taken together these statements confirm the suggestions I
have been making. Politicization is broadly equivalent to emancipation; however every step
is also a depoliticization, which in turn requires more politicization, further emancipation.
This is why the notion of a code of human rights is problematic for deconstruction, since it
claims a universal and natural value, rather than leaving itself open to negotiation, challenge,
and political revision. If more politicization or emancipation is the object of deconstruction,
the difficulty comes in trying to formulate a politics or a political demand which could
achieve such an end, without resigning oneself to the depoliticizing tradition of teleology,
eschatology and metaphysics. No political theory can supply the solution to this question
without falling foul of one of these traditional traps. Not only can there be no adequate
theory of this politicization; if there is politicization at all, we will be unable to recognise it
until after the fact. Only when the law has been cast into doubt by the arrival or event of
something unpredictable can emancipation be seen to have taken place. The challenge
deconstruction poses is of thinking and acting politically in a way you judge to be the most
open to this event of emancipation, even while you attempt not to prejudge the issue.
The structure I have set out in this chapter is well described in these remarks:
All that a deconstructive point of view tries to show, is that since conventions,
institutions and consensus are stabilizations, this means they are stabilizations
of something essentially unstable and chaotic. Thus it becomes necessary to
stabilize precisely because stability is not natural; it is because there is
instability, that stabilization is necessary; it is because there is chaos that there
is a need for stability. Now this chaos and instability, which is fundamental,
founding and irreducible, is at once naturally the worst against which we
struggle with laws, rules, conventions, politics and provisional hegemony, but
at the same it is a chance, a chance to change, to destabilize. If there were
continual stability, there would be no need for politics, and it is to the extent
that stability is not natural, essential or substantial, that politics exists and
ethics is possible. Chaos is at once a risk and a chance, and it is here that the
possible and the impossible cross each other [DaP 83-4],
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In this context we can understand depoliticization as the effect of a stabilization in the
political field. What Derrida calls 'chaos and instability' becomes another name for what he
calls 'democracy-to-come' and 'justice' elsewhere. Depoliticizing stabilizations of this field
of forces are necessary; but until we think chaos itself as fundamental, which is what
deconstruction offers to political theory, no kind of political thought will be able to grasp the
'chance to change' or destabilize. As I have argued, Carl Schmitt's attempt to repoliticize by
thinking the essence of the political risks bringing the worst violence, and to some extent this
is also Derrida's concern with Benjamin's affirmation of a messianic violence.
Deconstruction is apparently both the most radical and perhaps the most ascetic alternative to
such theories, by seeking to discover a revolutionary potential in the everyday, to discern the
possibility of destabilization attested to in the maintenance of the law, and to put into
question political theory as in and of itself depoliticizing. Yet Derrida insists that
repoliticization only has a chance if a decision could be thought without criteria, without
rules or any defined or expected outcome. In the vocabulary of his essay 'Psyche: Inventions
of the Other,' 'the only possible invention is the invention of the impossible' but 'an
invention of the impossible is impossible. [...] It is in this paradoxical predicament that a
deconstruction gets under way [qu'est engageeY [PSY 60 / 59]. But this is not to resign
ourselves to just anything happening. As Derrida argues in 'Force of Law,' 'incalculable
justice requires us to calculate' [FoL 28/61]. This calculation will not be without risk, but
even in the worst circumstances, 'there is no ethico-political decision or gesture without







the structure of deconstruction's difficult engagement with politics which I have set out
in the preceding three chapters has struck many of Derrida's readers as bearing close
similarities to the ethical critique of politics in the work of Emmanuel Levinas. Indeed, this
has become a central reference point for political readings of Derrida in recent years.' This
has not always been the case. In an extended review article which was first published in
1988, Geoffrey Bennington is surprised to find little reference to ethical questions in the
three books on which he is commenting, although that is where 'almost by definition, our
real interest lies: Derrida's persistent location of "et/z/co-theoretical" decisions at the root of
1 For example Richard Beardsworth. Derrida and the Political. Routledge: London,
1996. 122-144.; Christina Howells. Derrida. Oxford: Polity, 1999. ch.6. 'The Ethics and
Politics of Deconstruction and the Deconstruction of Ethics and Politics.' 122-156.
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supposedly pure theoretical concerns [...] is proof enough of that.' A little later Bennington
comments that 'freedom, quaintly enough, is nonetheless what Derrida is all about.'2 While
Bennington's rhetorical phrasing — and this is at least in part his intention — raises an
ambiguity about the assumption that 'we' make that ethics 'comes first,' he does locate a gap
in the earliest book-length philosophical readings of Derrida's work.3 He is only able to refer
to one article by Robert Bernasconi on a possible ethics of deconstruction.4 More than a
decade later, this is probably the area in which Bennington's article most shows its age. For
alongside the publication by Derrida of increasingly explicit work on political questions,
there has been a great deal of discussion of the ethical dimension of his thought, mostly
published in English, and including several more important articles by Bernasconi.5
The key text for the discussion of the relationship between deconstruction, politics
and ethics remains Simon Critchley's The Ethics ofDeconstruction, published in 1992, and
following Critchley, the relationship between Derrida's work and that of Emmanuel Levinas
has been of particular importance in this debate. It seems plausible that at least some of the
recent growth of interest in Levinas's philosophy in English language work in the humanities
2 'Deconstruction and the Philosophers' first published in Oxford Literary Review
no. 10 (1988). and republished in Legislations: The Politics of Deconstruction. London:
Verso, 1994. 45.
3 The books under review are Rodolphe Gasche. The Tain ofthe Mirror. Cambridge
MA: Harvard UP, 1986.; Irene Harvey. Derrida and the Economy of Difference.
Bloomington: Indiana UP, 1986.; John Llewellyn. Derrida on the Threshold of Sense.
London: Macmillan, 1986.
4 Robert Bernasconi. 'Deconstruction and the Possibility of Ethics.' in John Sallis
ed., Deconstruction and Philosophy. Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1987.
5 For example, John Caputo. Against Ethics: Contributions to a Poetics of
Obligation with Constant Reference to Deconstruction. Bloomington: Indiana UP, 1993.
Bernasconi's articles include 'Levinas and Derrida: The Question of the Closure of
Metaphysics.' in Richard A Cohen ed. Face to Face with Levinas. Albany: SUNY, 1986.
181-202.; 'The Trace of Levinas in Derrida.' in David Wood & Robert Bernasconi eds.
Derrida and Differance. Evanston: Northwestern UP, 1988. 13-29.; 'The Ethics of
Suspicion' Research in Phenomenology, vol. XX (1995). 3-18.; 'Different Styles of
Eschatology: Derrida's take on Levinas's Political Messianism.' Research in
Phenomenology, vol. XXIII (1998). 3-18.; 'The Third Party: Levinas on the Intersection of
the Ethical and the Political.' Journal ofthe British Society for Phenomenology, vol. 30. no. 1
(1999). 76-87.
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is a by-product of Derrida's persistent engagement with Levinas. Given the polemical
context of the reception of 'deconstruction' this has led to the paradoxical position that
Levinas's work has been taken to offer not only an ethical alternative to deconstruction, but
that deconstruction has been seen to be merely derivative of Levinas's work. In the
'Foreword' to the first paperback edition of the English translation of Levinas's major text
Otherwise than Being in 1998, Richard Cohen makes such a claim when he asserts that
'Heidegger's celebrated disciple in France, Jacques Derrida, staked out his own career by
borrowing Levinas's notion of the trace of diachrony, and ethical structure. He nonetheless
purported to bend it for Heideggerean purposes [...]' [OB xv]. As I will argue however, the
insistence by Critchley and others that the 'ethical' dimension of deconstruction depends on
Derrida's relation to Levinas is somewhat misleading. The exchange between Derrida and
Levinas is complex, not least because both their texts and that which they are seeking to
describe resist straightforward philosophical analysis for intrinsic reasons. The extent to
which Derrida borrows and manipulates Levinasian terms in his recent texts can only
complicate the problem, but a close reading ofAdieu: a Emmanuel Levinas will demonstrate
that their positions can be distinguished
In this chapter I set out what I take to be the fundamental distinction to be drawn
between the positions of Levinas and Derrida, drawing on Levinas's work in Totality and
Infinity and Derrida's early essay 'Violence and Metaphysics.' I draw on this distinction to
assert that there is a particularly significant difference between their work when we turn to
the question of politics. I claim that Derrida offers a specifically political critique of the
ethical relation in Levinas's work, and that this provides another important context for
Politics ofFriendship.
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4.2 Derrida and Levinas
In THIS SECTION I will focus the problem of the relation between ethics and politics through
a discussion of the first of Levinas's major philosophical works, Totality and Infinity, and
Derrida's response to that book in his early essay 'Violence and Metaphysics.' The key issue
for assessing the relationship between Levinas and Derrida is whether the changes in
Levinas's work between the publication of Totality and Infinity and ofOtherwise than Being,
arguably made with Derrida's criticisms of the early work in mind, successfully overcome
the problems Derrida finds in it. If this is indeed the case, both the later Levinas and Derrida
may be said to be following the same project, and turning to Otherwise than Being and
Derrida's later book on Levinas, Adieu, in the following section will only be able to reveal
political or strategic differences subsequent to a common (ethical) theoretical project. If this
is not the case, then we should expect Adieu to bear out the same criticisms of Levinas that
Derrida makes in 'Violence and Metaphysics.'
I have encountered a particular methodological problem in writing this section of my
thesis. Since deconstruction has been concerned to put the whole notion of propriety into
question, there can be no possibility of rigorously distinguishing commentary from critique
within Derrida's readings of other texts. (Although this may also be a useful exercise to the
extent that it is possible.) This problem is most intense with those authors with whom
Derrida has most in common; Heidegger, Levinas, Blanchot. Elsewhere in my thesis this has
not been an issue since I have been concerned to reconstruct Derrida's own thought, and the
question of the originality of his work has been suspended. In this chapter, where the
difference between Derrida's work and that of Levinas is itself at stake, to simply distribute
their work in terms of a fundamental opposition would be to regress to a pre-deconstructive
methodology. Particularly in the sections discussing Levinas's texts — for example the
paragraph concerned with the place of the State in Totality and Infinity— I have attempted
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to avoid reducing his work to one voice or one argument, against which Derrida's own work
could be simply contrasted.
.1 The Ethics of Emmanuel Levinas.
I begin my discussion of the relationship between ethics and politics in Levinas and Derrida
by specifying how Levinas understands ethics. This is not however an easy question to
answer ■—- particularly since, as Robert Bernasconi has argued, Levinas's use of the term
itself changes as his work develops, and perhaps even in response to Derrida's criticisms.6 In
this section I focus on Levinas's first philosophical work, Totality and Infinity, since this is
the text to which Derrida formulates his most lengthy and complete reply. This requires the
reconciliation of two apparently contradictory statements by Levinas. In the preface to the
work Levinas appears to indicate that he will be following a path broken by Husserl:
'Husserlian phenomenology has made possible this passage from ethics [I'ethique] to
metaphysical exteriority' [TI 29 / 15]. Yet elsewhere Levinas insists that his rethinking of
metaphysics is itself 'ethical [ethiqueY [TI 43 / 33]. To make sense of what Levinas is
arguing, it is necessary to consider his argument as operating with two very different ideas of
ethics. The first meaning of ethics is conventional; the second, with which he is seeking to
replace the first, is a specialised understanding of the term, within the context of his broader
metaphysical claims. So to understand the concept of 'ethics' in Levinas's work, it will be
necessary to sketch briefly the major themes of Totality and Infinity.
6 Robert Bernasconi. 'Justice Without Ethics.' Pli vol.6 (1997). 58-69.
Levinas argues that thought, action or intentionality in general are made possible by
the prior presence of that which is other.7 Each takes place as transcendence, as a movement
outside the self. The tradition ofmetaphysics, Levinas claims, has precisely aimed at what is
beyond the world, yet has consistently failed to appreciate the radicality of what is outside,
choosing instead to understand the unfamiliar in terms of the familiar, the unknown in terms
of what can be known, the other in terms of the same [TI 33 / 21]. Yet what makes possible
the awareness of something else, whether beyond the senses, beyond the natural world, or
beyond the self, is the absolutely other: 'this absolute exteriority of the metaphysical term,
[...] is, if not demonstrated, claimed by the word transcendent. The metaphysical movement
is transcendent' [TI 35 / 24], The totality of the self-same is always already breached by the
transcendence or infinity of the absolutely other. Levinas attempts the re-foundation of
metaphysics in this relation to the other considered as absolutely other, rather than as an
other modelled on the familiar; only this could provide a philosophy which would be
adequate to the world itself. This new form of metaphysics must be opposed to Hegelian
philosophy as a dialectic of negativity since the relation between the same and the other is to
be thought 'cutting across' the logic of contradiction or opposition [TI 40-2 / 30-2], and
beyond the Hegelian reconciliation of difference in totality [TI 150 / 161]. It must also
exceed all ontology, up to and including the work of Heidegger [TI 27-8 / 13; 46 / 36; 89 /
88-9], which 'presupposes metaphysics' [TI 48 / 39]. To pursue philosophy as ontology 'is
to subordinate the relation to someone, who is an existent, (the ethical relation) to a relation
with the Being of existents, which, impersonal, permits the apprehension, the domination of
existents (a relationship of knowing)' [TI 45 / 38]. This argument leads Levinas to specify
that the relation with the other as absolute alterity [Autre] is the relationship with any
7 Following standard practice in translating Levinas, I will use 'other' for both
'autre' and 'Autre' and Other only for 'autruV when it is not qualified by 'absolute' or
'person,' for example. It is generally accepted that Levinas himself is inconsistent in his
capitalization of the terms.
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particular other person [.Autrui]. More specifically, it is in the face of the other person that
the absoluteness of their difference from me is encountered.
The sense in which Levinas uses the term 'ethics' [ethique] positively is as a
description of this face-to-face encounter with the Other. In the passage quoted above, the
relationship to an existing being is 'the ethical relation' [TI 45 / 36], More broadly, this is an
ethical relation with the world in general. It thus makes possible a mode of thinking about
the world which would respect the dimension of exteriority rather than, as Levinas claims all
previous Western philosophy has done, reducing the other to the same. Levinas sometimes
describes this new way of thinking as metaphysics, sometimes as 'theory' and sometimes as
a form of 'critique': 'critique does not reduce the other [Autre] to the same but calls into
question the exercise of the same. A calling into question of the same— which cannot occur
within the egoist spontaneity of the same — is brought about by the other [Autre], We name
this calling into question of my spontaneity by the presence of the Other [Autrui] ethics /
ethical [ethique]' [TI 42-3 / 33]. There is however an ambiguity in this description. Ethics is
here the name for the relation to the other, rather than for a theory of that relation: Levinas's
work is not in itself an 'ethics.' Yet the name itself returns us to the more conventional
meaning of'ethics' which would belong to Western philosophy, and which Levinas is trying
to avoid. The sense of 'ethics' for Levinas is not that of the determination of a moral code
whether from a theory of virtue; by the observation of a moral sentiment within human
nature; or as an abstraction from the ethical life of a particular community. Levinas claims
that it is the work of Husserl which has enabled him to escape from the hold of the
traditional understandings of ethics. But Levinas still calls the 'metaphysical exteriority' to
which this 'passage' has led 'ethical.' While we might hold apart these two meanings for the
same word more or less successfully, many commentators on Levinas have suggested that
the problem can be resolved (at least in translation) by distinguishing the nominal and
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adverbial aspects of the French I'ethique.8 'Ethics' would then continue to name the familiar
dimension of moral philosophy, while 'the ethical' would be reserved for the more profound
sense of 'ethics' as metaphysics or transcendence itself. While helpful, it should be noted
that such a distinction is rarely rigorously observed by the translators of Levinas, since it has
no basis within his language and must already depend on an interpretation of his work.9
The bulk of Totality and Infinity consists of a series of analyses which Levinas
proposes to describe the nature of the ethical relation of the self to the world: for example, of
Desire, of sensibility, of the face, of fecundity, of dwelling, of the erotic. The ethical relation
cannot be described strictly 'in terms of experience, for infinity overflows the thought that
thinks it' [TI 25 / 10]. It is also difficult to grasp it theoretically, for what Levinas refers to as
'thematization and conceptualization' are 'not peace with the other, but suppression or
possession of the other' [TI 46 / 37], The problem which Levinas faces in his work is that
what he wishes to describe as 'infinity' and as 'transcendence' is irreducible to the order of
theoretical explanation, yet is already at work in both theoretical and experiential relations to
the world. So 'metaphysics' is not 'a philosophy of transcendence that situates elsewhere the
true life to which man, escaping from here, would gain access in the privileged moments of
liturgical mystical elevation, or in dying' [TI 52 / 44], Yet nor is it 'a philosophy of
immanence' — by which Levinas appears to mean Hegelianism — 'in which we would truly
come into possession of being when every "other" (cause for war), encompassed by the
same, would vanish at the end of history.' The relationship with the other must be described
'within the unfolding of terrestrial existence, of economic existence' [TI 52 / 44].
Accordingly, Levinas's analyses often seem to be suspended between the two poles of
8 See Adriaan Peperzak. Beyond: The Philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas. Evanston:
Northwestern UP, 1997. 112.
9 In 'Violence and Metaphysics' Derrida emphasises that 'as this determination does
not offer itself as a theory of ethics, in question then is an Ethics of Ethics' [WD 111/164],
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everyday experience and of theoretical description, both of which, pursued in isolation,
would ultimately converge as the 'totalization of history' [TI 52 / 44].
To some extent these analyses complicate the rather bold and stark terms in which
Levinas has set out his central argument— as the opposition between totality and infinity, or
the ontological and the ethical— and which is apparently mapped over onto both the relation
between transcendence and history, and that between the subject and the State. Totality is
directly associated throughout the book with the State [TI 301 / 336, 305 / 341], as is
ontology: 'Ontology as first philosophy is a philosophy of power. It issues in the State and in
the non-violence of the totality, without securing itself against the violence from which this
non-violence lives, and which appears in the tyranny of the State' [TI 46 / 37]. Meanwhile
the dimension of interiority (which, like Derrida's use of the secret which I discussed in my
first chapter, is not a form of containment, but the principle of an irreducible singularity, of
the being-called-into-question of my self by the relation with the other other) is consistently
opposed to history: psychic life 'interrupts historical time' [TI 57 / 51]. Set out in these
terms, Levinas's work would lend itself to being read as a crude anti-Hegelianism. In
political terms it would seem to be either apolitical — a total rejection of and disengagement
from the state and an alternative focus on the question of transcendence — or anarchist —
simply opposed to the state form as such. These alternatives could perhaps be clarified if it
could be established whether Levinas understands the state to be the name of the political
entity as such, or as the legal apparatus and institutions which enforces the law within the
state. However, a brief look at the use of labour in Totality and Infinity suggests that this first
response will not do. Levinas is writing in a philosophical context which is dominated by the
Marxist and existentialist reading of Hegel popularised in France by Kojeve.10 So when
10 See Alexandre Kojeve. Introduction to the Reading of Hegel, trans. James H.
Nichols, Jr. Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1980. On Kojeve see the introduction to Hyppolite. The
Genesis and Structure of the Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. Samuel Cherniak & John
Heckman. Evanston: Northwestern UP, 1984. xv-xli.; Judith Butler. Subjects of Desire:
Hegelian Reflections in Twentieth Century France. New York: Columbia UP, 1987.
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Levinas argues that every labour 'presupposes a primordial hold on the things, possessions,
whose latent birth is marked by the home, at the frontier of interiority' [TI 163 / 175] it
seems reasonable to suppose that his argument is intended to complicate the post-Hegelian
account of being in terms of work. Rather than defining man's existence in terms of a
dialectical operation performed upon or against the world, Levinas insists that man's labour
proceeds from an original dwelling which is a dwelling with the other. In doing so he seeks
to break a path between the materialist analysis of existence as labour, and either the idealist
account of man as intentional consciousness or the transcendental account in which meaning
is to be found beyond the world. Labour itself attests to the ethical relationship with the
world within which it takes place. Transferring this argument to the problem of the state, one
would assume that if infinity can only be thought from within the finite (labour), which must
bear some trace of what transcends it (dwelling), then presumably the State must also bear
some trace of the ethical.
The ultimate figure of the ethical relation in Totality and Infinity is in the epiphany
of the face. It is before the face of the other person [.Autrui] who is absolutely other that the
subject is called into question. The face of the Other \Autrui\, writes Levinas, is a 'moral
summons' [TI 196 / 213]. Freedom does not consist in the exercise of the free will of an
individual, but in the experience of the contestation of my freedom by the other: 'the other
[Autre], absolutely other [autre] — the Other [Autrui] — does not limit the freedom of the
same; calling it to responsibility, it founds it and justifies if [TI 197 / 214-5], Responsibility
is an effect of the ethical relation. From the metaphysical establishment of subjectivity in
relation to the infinity of transcendence — both figured and experienced in the face of an
other ('it remains terrestrial' [TI 203 / 222]) — Levinas deduces the conditions of
responsibility. The relation with the other precedes the possibility of a struggle with the
other: 'War presupposes peace, the antecedent and non-allergic presence of the Other
[Autrui]; it does not represent the first event of the encounter' [TI 199/218]. If the relation
with the other is perceived as struggle it is because such a perception remains within 'the
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idealism of a consciousness of struggle' [TI 199 / 218], The peace of the ethical relation with
the face of the Other comes before violence, although it remains unclear whether this is a
temporal or a logical precedence. Responsibility is a question of the infinite response to this
peaceful relationship. The absolute alterity expressed in the face of the other also conveys
'the presence of the third party, the whole of humanity' [TI 213 / 234]. (For Levinas this is a
community 'instituted by' language which amounts to brotherhood between men [TI 213-4 /
234].) Before the face of the whole of humanity, as the Other [Autrui] who faces me and the
other others who face me through his eyes, the subject is faced with 'the call to infinite
responsibility' [TI 245 / 274]. Levinas calls for an assumption of responsibility, a turn from
possession to generosity [TI 50 / 42]. 'To welcome the other,' he writes, 'is to put in
question my freedom' [TI 85 / 84].
It is this asymmetrical relationship between the subject and the infinite
transcendence of the other which Levinas calls ethical. Only when this relation is taken into
account is there any possibility of something like 'ethics' in the sense that we usually come
across it. Yet this 'ethical' relation is founded neither in a neutral ground (a relationship
between beings which would be mediated by the relationship of beings with Being) nor in a
principle of finite responsibility (based on the equivalence of the same and the other) but on
the asymmetry of the relation itself. This asymmetry summons the subject as responsibility.
As Levinas puts it, 'to be judged does not consist in hearing a verdict set forth impersonally
and implacably out of universal principles' [TI 244 / 273] for this would presume a relation
with others set out in terms of reciprocity or universality. Instead, 'the exaltation of the
singularity in judgement is produced precisely in the infinite responsibility of the will to
which the judgement gives rise' [TI 244 / 273]. Levinas insists:
The summons exalts the singularity precisely because it is addressed to an
infinite responsibility. The infinity of responsibility denotes not its actual
immensity, but a responsibility increasing in measure that it is assumed; duties
become greater in the measure that they are accomplished. The better 1
accomplish my duty the fewer rights I have; the more 1 am just, the more I am
guilty [TI 244 / 273-4],
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As soon as I admit that I am responsible to the other, in whatever measure, it will never be
enough: for there to be any responsibility, there must always be more responsibility. From
the point of assumption of any responsibility onwards, the more 1 presume myself to be
responsible, the less responsible I then become. This is the 'ethical' message of Totality and
Infinity, which renders the common understanding of 'ethics,' in the sense of an obligation I
could fulfil or a life I could possibly lead, unable to account for the true dimensions of
responsibility.
There is however a slightly more complex relationship between the ethical relation
and justice. We might have already presumed this to be the case, on the basis of the
argument that the transcendence of the infinite must not only be thought not from within the
finite, but must also be found to be traced within the finite. Levinas introduces a structure to
mediate the passage between the ethical relation of the face to face encounter with one other
person, which testifies to the relation with absolute alterity itself, and 'terrestrial' or
'economic' existence, in which there will always be more than one other person. This is the
concept of 'the third' (tiers). 'Everything,' Levinas argues, 'that takes place here "between
us" concerns everyone' [TI 212 / 234], The rest of the world is present for me in the eyes of
the Other, and 'the presence of the face, the infinity of the other (Autre), is a destituteness
[denuement], a presence of the third party (that is of the whole of humanity which looks at
us), and a command that commands commanding' [TI 213 / 234]. I am commanded to
command, because the third party is joined to me 'for service' [TI 213 / 235]. In
commanding I fail to be responsible, just as no-one exists in the pure state of the ethical
relation; but I am commanded to command because there must be justice within the world,
which Levinas associates with language [TI 213 / 234] or discourse: 'Metaphysics is enacted
where the social relation is enacted — in our relations with men' [TI 78 / 77], Far more so
than in the case of the State, the mechanisms of justice, even though they must be based on a
formal equality between men [TI 212-4 / 234-6] rather than on the dissymmetry of the
relation to the absolute other, attest to the transcendent.
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Even from this brief summary it will be obvious that the work of Derrida which I
have discussed in the preceding chapters has immediate points of comparison with the
themes of Levinas's argument that I have just laid out. However rather than attempt a
tabulation of the similarities between Levinas and Derrida I turn instead to Derrida's reply to
Totality and Infinity, the essay 'Violence and Metaphysics.' This will help to establish both
the basic parameters of Derrida's response to Levinas and the trajectory of the encounter
between the two thinkers within which both Levinas's second major text, Otherwise than
Being, and Derrida's own later texts, must be situated.
.2.2 Ethics, Metaphysics and Violence.
'Violence and Metaphysics' is Derrida's first essay on Levinas. It was also the first major
consideration of Levinas's thought to be published in France — indeed Jacques Roland
describes Derrida as 'Levinas's first reader in the sense in which Heidegger was Husserl's
first reader'11 — and ran in two consecutive issues of La Revue de la Metaphysique et de la
Morale, before being collected in revised form in Writing and Difference. The essay is
broadly divided into two halves. In the first Derrida gives a sympathetic account of Levinas's
work up to and including the publication of Totality and Infinity while in the second, he
formulates three criticisms of his work. However, the distinction between the two halves is
not as clear as it might be. Derrida is asking similar questions of Levinas throughout, and
when he does come to propose his objections, he comments ambiguously that 'the route
followed by Levinas's thought is such that all our questions already belong to his own
11 in Emmanuel Levinas. God, Death and Time. ed. Jacques Rolland, trans. Bettina
Bergo. Stanford: Stanford UP., 2000. 243n.l.
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interior dialogue, are displaced into his discourse and only listen to it, from many vantage
points and in many ways' [WD 109 / 161]. What Derrida means by this will be crucial for an
attempt to clarify his relationship with Levinas. If Derrida is being sincere, his statement
could mean that he considers his own project to be a continuation of that of Levinas, even to
the point where he formulates what are apparently criticisms of Levinas. However, as I will
argue, not only do these criticisms seem substantial, but they never appear to be retracted in
Derrida's subsequent essays on Levinas. In which case Derrida might be read as expanding
on a point which Levinas has only partly grasped, to the point where Levinas's own work
comes to seem inadequate to the possibilities it opens up — perhaps in the same way that
Levinas considers the work of Husserl to have made the passage from ontology to ethical
metaphysics possible. Alternatively, it is also important to consider the possibility that this is
merely a rhetorical flourish, a modesty topos. For it can be shown, I think, that what Derrida
undertakes in this essay is entirely consistent with the other work he undertakes at the time,
which would imply that there is no special relationship with Levinas — or that if there is, it
must be internal to the logic of Derrida's work, and not acknowledged explicitly within the
argument of his essay. This is the assumption from which I will proceed.
All of the problems which Derrida locates in Totality and Infinity follow a similar
pattern, which is a familiar one in Derrida's early work, and in particular, throughout Writing
and Difference. This similarity can be highlighted by a comparison of the original and the
revised versions of the essay, which show that Derrida recasts his concerns to fit with issues
raised in other essays in the book. As Geoffrey Bennington has argued extensively, Derrida's
early work largely takes the form of revealing transcendental or metaphysical
presuppositions in discourses which claim to have somehow got beyond metaphysics.12 So in
Writing and Difference, texts by Freud, Foucault, Bataille and Levi-Strauss, amongst others,
are all debunked, and shown to presume metaphysical foundations. To take the essay on
12 For example, in 'Jacques Derrida.' Interrupting Derrida. 12-13.
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Foucault as an example, Derrida argues that the attempt to write a history of madness,
understood in terms of an unreason defined by exclusion from reason itself, runs the risk of
'confirming metaphysics in its fundamental operation' by 'construing the division [of reason
and madness, which Foucault seeks to locate within history. AT] as an event or a structure
subsequent to the unity of an original presence,' [WD 40 / 65] rather than as a 'dissension
[...] a self-dividing action, a cleavage and torment interior to meaning in general' [WD 38 /
62], Derrida proposes another project, which rather than thinking through either the
historicity of the concept of madness or the light that this might shed on the historicity of
history (as the project of reason), would seek to think the grounds of what both makes
possible and depends on the distinction between madness and reason, the very 'historicity of
philosophy' in general: 'The historicity proper to philosophy is located and constituted in the
transition, the dialogue between hyperbole [i.e. madness, which exceeds reason. AT] and the
finite structure [i.e. a historically situated concept of reason. AT], between that which
exceeds the totality and the closed totality, in the difference between history and historicity'
[WD 60 / 94], The first stage of the argument is derived from Husserl's criticism of
naturalism as a self-refuting scepticism, while the second constitutes Derrida's more
distinctive contribution, as I discussed in the first section of my second chapter. What is
peculiar to Writing and Difference is the attempt to think this account of historicity in terms
of 'economy,' perhaps as a result of the inclusion of Derrida's essay on Bataille, 'From
Restricted to General Economy.' So in the essay on Foucault Derrida comments that 'the
relationship between reason, madness, and death is an economy' [WD 62 / 96] and in the
revisions of 'Violence and Metaphysics' a number of references to economy are also added,
several of which will be crucial for my reading.13
13 WD 102 / 151, cf. VM 347; WD 125-6 / 185, cf. VM 442; twice at WD 128-9 /
188, cf. VM 444; twice at WD 148 / 220, cf. VM 467. NB also the alteration at WD 117 /
173, cf. VM 433.
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It is within this general structure that Derrida performs what might be considered to
be a rather unfair preliminary situation of Levinas's work. For he recasts the project of
Totality and Infinity in terms of an opposition between the Greek and the Judaic traditions.
This is an argument which is nowhere evoked in Totality and Infinity, and Levinas's
references to transcendence as God [TI 246-7 / 276-7; 293 / 326], and the ethical relation
with the other as religion [TI 40 / 30; 80 / 79] draw precisely on the God of Descartes and
the Good beyond being of Plato. Derrida insists however that Levinas's attempt to think
beyond philosophy as ontology can be understood as the Greek discourse of philosophy
being transcended by a Judaic other which it cannot account for. If Levinas's project can
successfully be assimilated to that of Foucault or Levi-Strauss as an attempt to get beyond
metaphysics, then the apparent unfairness of this situation will be justified, and Derrida will
have exposed a structure which is presupposed but not stated within Totality and Infinity.
However, if the position is rather more complex, and we cannot simply compare the attempt
to escape philosophy from the perspective of the human sciences with the attempt to refound
philosophy within philosophy, then this gives us a clear entry point to Derrida's arguments
against Levinas, which will depend on distorting Levinas's work in this way. Let us follow
the second hypothesis for the moment and use it to help set out the basic questions which
Derrida puts to Levinas, underlying all of which can be seen this presumed opposition
between the Greek and Jewish traditions. These questions concern: 1) the problem of
language in Levinas's work; 2) the relationship between totality and infinity itself; 3)
Levinas's relation to Heideggerean ontology; 4) Levinas's relation to Husserl's
phenomenology.
The question of language is the most pervasive in the essay and relates directly to the
possibility of establishing a meaningful distinction between Greek and Jewish thought. As
Derrida had argued in his 'Introduction' to Husserl's The Origin ofGeometry, the discourse
of philosophy must have a finite origin; an origin which can neither be fully recovered nor
fully disowned. Once philosophy has been born in Greece, it cannot think the non-Greek, or
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the non-philosophical, except by reference to itself. Or, to put this argument in Levinas's
terms, philosophy can only think the other in terms of the same, thus reducing the other to
the same. But the attempt to call philosophy itself into question runs into the difficulty of
finding a language in which to do so. 'Will the other of the Greek,' Derrida asks 'be the non-
Greek? Above all, can it be named the non-Greek?' [WD 82 / 122], Further on in the essay
he adds, 'will a non-Greek ever succeed in doing what a Greek [...] could not do, except by
disguising himself as a Greek, by speaking Greek, by feigning to speak Greek [...]?' [WD 89
/ 133]. Derrida does not answer this question directly, but in his conclusions he argues that
Levinas's project is that of an empiricism, which 'always has been determined by
philosophy, from Plato to Husserl, as nonphilosophy. as the philosophical pretention to
nonphilosophy, the inability to justify oneself, to come to one's own aid as speech' [WD 152
/ 226]. In other words, Derrida's claim is that Levinas cannot escape philosophy, and creates
a philosophically incoherent discourse in trying to do so: but this would be something like an
honourable failure, since 'this incapacitation, when resolutely assumed, contests the
resolution and coherence of the logos (philosophy) at its root, instead of letting itself be
questioned by the logos' [WD 152 / 226].
At its most extreme this complaint against Levinas takes the form of suggesting a
complicity or parallel between his work and that of Hegel: 'The other, for me, [Derrida is
glossing Levinas. AT] is an ego which 1 know to be in relation to me as to an other. Where
have these movements been better described than in The Phenomenology of The MincTP
[WD 126 / 185], In a long passage [WD 98-100 / 146-8; cf. VM 345] and a footnote [WD
320n.91 / 227n.l; cf. VM 472] added to the essay before its republication in Writing and
Difference Derrida spells out what is almost a shocking challenge to a thinker whose work
takes as its horizon the violence of philosophy as the thinking of totality: 'Levinas is very
close to Hegel, much closer than he admits, and at the very moment when he is apparently
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opposed to Hegel in the most radical fashion'14 [WD 99 / 147], When he makes this
comment Derrida has a specific similarity in mind, between Levinas's and Hegel's analyses
of the face, yet he goes on to suggest that this is a more than an incidental correlation: 'a
situation he [Levinas] must share with all anti-Hegelian thinkers' [WD 99 / 147], Later on in
the essay Derrida compares Levinas to Kierkegaard and Feuerbach as fellow anti-Hegelian
(and therefore, in retaining the logic of dialectical opposition, perhaps still too Hegelian)
thinkers when he questions the return in Totality and Infinity of terms proscribed in
Levinas's earlier texts [WD 109 / 162]: the same and the other, interiority and exteriority.
Derrida's intention here is consistent with his earlier concerns about speaking Greek, that of
thinking through 'the necessity of lodging oneself within traditional conceptuality in order to
destroy it' [WD 111 / 164-5],
The difficulty of escaping Hegel, who, as so often in Derrida's texts, stands for
philosophy as such in its own claim to completion, leads us to the condensation of this
general concern with the problem of escaping the language of metaphysics around the
second of the four questions which I listed above, that of the relationship between totality
and infinity itself. In a footnote appended to the conclusions of his essay before its revised
publication Derrida refers to the Science ofLogic: 'Pure difference is not absolutely different
(from nondifference). Hegel's critique of the concept of pure difference is for us here,
doubtless the most uncircumventable theme. Hegel thought absolute difference, and showed
that it can be pure only by being impure' [WD 320n.91 / 227n.l]. The question which
Derrida poses in the section of the essay 'Of the Original Polemic' may be read as a re-
translation of precisely this problem. If Levinas makes use of the concept of exteriority in
14 Cf. the discussion of 'desire' in its Levinasian and Hegelian forms at WD 92-3 /
137-8. Derrida suggests here that despite their differences — 'Hegelian desire would be only
need, in Levinas's sense' — a closer reading of Hegel might reveal Levinas to be more
Kierkegaardian — and therefore in a sense more Hegelian — than he would admit: 'Despite
his anti-Kierkegaardian protests, Levinas here returns to the themes of Fear and Trembling.'
It appears that Derrida is here announcing the programme undertaken in the second half of
The Gift ofDeath [GoD 83-84 / 116-7],
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Totality and Infinity, having warned against this in Time and the Other, Derrida suggests, it
is because while what he seeks to describe is non-spatial, it can only be understood on the
basis of a spatial analogy. To think an exteriority beyond the philosophical space in which
exteriority can only be thought as non-interiority, and thus recoverered for the same, Levinas
cannot not proceed within the terms of the tradition. In other words, and following the
argument that there is no extra-philosophical language, 'it is necessary to state infinity's
excess over totality in the language of totality; [...] it is necessary to state the other in the
language of the Same; [...] it is necessary to think true exteriority as non-exteriority'' [WD
112/165].
Within language, philosophical concepts and metaphors cannot be opposed, any
more than philosophy could be simply reduced to a metaphorical basis, a point touched on in
the discussion of 'White Mythology' and 'The Retrait of Metaphor' in my third chapter.
Derrida describes what it is hard not to read as his own project at this early stage of his
career (the first version of this essay was published in 1964, his 'Introduction to The Origin
ofGeometry'' in 1962):
Philosophical language belongs to a system of language(s). Thereby its
nonspeculative ancestry always brings a certain equivocality into speculation.
Since this equivocality is original and irreducible, perhaps philosophy must
adopt it, think it and be thought in it, must accommodate duplicity and
difference within speculation, within the very purity of philosophical meaning.
No one, it seems to us, has attempted this more profoundly than Hegel [WD
113 / 167],15
The reference to Hegel later in the essay confirms that just as Derrida does not think 'true'
exteriority can be thought except as 'non'-exteriority, so he does not think that pure
difference can be thought by any attempt at a heterology.16 Such a thought of pure dispersal
would be the object of the empiricism he attributes to Levinas, and only possible as 'a
15 Hegel is famously described in Of Grammatology as 'the last philosopher of the
book and the first thinker ofwriting' [Gra 26 / 41 ].
16 On the difficulty of heterology, see Rodolphe Gasche. The Tain of the Mirror. 79-
105.
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dream' [WD 151 / 225]. Moreover, for the same reasons, we cannot think philosophically the
absolute alterity which Levinas calls the Other, and with which the self can enter into an
ethical relation. As pure difference can only be impure in Hegel, so Derrida claims, absolute
alterity can only be finite or non-absolute alterity. The positive infinity invoked by Levinas
remains a prisoner of the traditional opposition: 'I cannot designate the (infinite) irreducible
alterity of the Other [autrui] execpt [sic] through the negation of (finite) spatial exteriority'
[WD 114/ 168]. Alterity cannot be made present — or cannot be named, and the distinction
is perhaps not as clear as it might seem — except as the 'unthinkable-impossible-unutterable
beyond (tradition's) Being and Logos' [WD 114 / 168]. Incapable of being brought to
presence, alterity (if there is any) would appear as its own disappearance within totality: a
structure, that is, whose effects in Derrida's work would be common to those of several other
concepts I have already discussed — the re-mark, the re-trait, difference, and the speciality
of the decision, for example.
This crucial distinction between what we might call finite alterity (inscribed within
totality) and infinite alterity (as the excess over totality) is brought out by Derrida as a
confrontation with Levinas over the name of God. In Totality and Infinity Levinas invokes
religion as a name for the transcendence of the relation to the other. Derrida argues in return
that God can only be thought within philosophy as a positive infinity, and cannot then be
opposed to history or totality as Levinas would wish it to be. If God is taken to be the name
of alterity (exteriority, transcendence, infinity) would not God then be 'nothing (determined)
[...] because he is everything? and therefore is at once All and Nothing, Life and Death.
Which means that God is or appears, is named, within the difference between All or
Nothing, Life and Death. Within difference, and at bottom as Difference itself. This
difference is what is called History. God is inscribed in it' [WD 115-6 / 170]. Just as Jewish
thought cannot be simply opposed to Greek thought, so God cannot be opposed to
philosophy. However there is a further displacement to be undergone. If Derrida insists that
infinite alterity as the excess over totality can only be thought as finite alterity considered to
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be within totality, he does not understand totality in quite the same way as Levinas does.
Absolute difference cannot be thought except within an infinite series of finite attempts to
think difference, and would not escape its own inscription as a possibility within finitude,
within language, and within the world; or, to borrow Derrida's words: 'Within history which
the philosopher cannot escape, because it is not history in the sense given to it by Levinas
(totality), but is the history of the departures from totality, history as the very movement of
transcendence, of the excess over the totality without which no totality would appear as
such' [WD 117 / 173]. There is an originary complication and co-implication of totality and
infinity which cannot be reduced to any form of dialectical opposition, however
sophisticated.
The third and fourth of the problems into which Derrida shapes his general concerns
about language are established in parallel, in two sections entitled 'Of Transcendental
Violence' and 'Of Ontological Violence.' The first concerns Levinas's reading of Husserl,
and the second his relation to Heidegger. In both cases, Derrida is concerned to demonstrate
the argument we have just discussed from its reverse side. Having argued for totality as itself
the history of its own departures from totality, Derrida now goes on to bring to light these
departures within the totality, and precisely within the phenomenology and fundamental
ontology with which Levinas has sought to break. In the terms of the distinction between
Jewish and Greek thought which I have been following, having shown that Levinas's
'Judaic' writing was more Greek than it claimed, Derrida goes on to argue that the 'Greek'
writing of Husserl and Heidegger is already more 'Jewish' than Levinas would give them
credit for. The material on Husserl largely repeats work published elsewhere,17: that the
notion of horizon signalled by the place of the 'Idea in the Kantian sense' in
phenomenology, of horizon as both an opening and a limit, makes phenomenology itself
17 For example in Speech and Phenomena, trans. David B. Allison. Evanston:
Northwestern UP, 1973; 'Introduction to Husserl's Origin of Geometry.' trans. John P.
Leavey, Jr. Lincoln: U Nebraska P, 1989.
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already the site of an opening to alterity [WD 120 / 177]; and that the notion of the living
present, as the movement of temporalization, is 'the absolute form of the opening of time to
the other in itself' [WD 133 / 195], The section on Heidegger corrects Levinas's rather
brutal reading of the ontic-ontological difference. Derrida argues that since the difference
between Being and beings is not, Being cannot appear except as already dispersed,
disseminated amongst beings, in difference. Heidegger cannot simply be said to have
subsumed beings under being, or more precisely in Levinas's terms to have subsumed the
relation with the other (ethics) to the Being of the other (ontology) [WD 135 / 198]. Without
the 'dissimulation of Being by the existent there would be nothing, and there would be no
history' [WD 144 / 213], Derrida argues that the ontic-ontological difference which the
thought of Being seeks to think is presumed by Levinas, even as he disowns it. The
"'inversion of the terms" ontology and metaphysics that Levinas proposes' leaves the
thought of Being 'forever out of reach.' Turning Levinas's argument on its head, Derrida
claims that Levinas's text is the more traditional one: 'the question of Being cannot budge
the metaphysical edifice of Totality and Infinity (for example)' [WD 143 / 211]. Ontology
cannot be exchanged for ethics, the thought of Being for the thought of the relation to the
other, because Being has nothing opposed to it: neither ethics, nor infinity, nor God. God can
be an example of an existent— whether the most elevated or the most typical — because the
name of God is written within the field opened by the question of Being.18
I suggested above that Derrida might have been somewhat impertinent in framing
Levinas's text in terms of the distinction between Judaism and Greek. Yet in reading
'Violence and Metaphysics' it is clear that the distinction is appropriate to describing the
structure of Totality and Infinity as Derrida understands it. For Derrida, at least, the ethical
relation to absolute alterity can only be thought of in terms of non-absolute alterity. The
18
Rodolphe Gasche considers this argument in 'God, for example' in Inventions of
Difference: On Jacques Derrida. Cambridge MA : Harvard UP, 1994. 150-70.
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absolute other can only be thought of by a return to the same. Levinas's attempt to refound
metaphysics as ethics must fail, since 'Jewish' alterity cannot escape 'Greek' alterity. It is
however, unclear as to whether Levinas is not himself aware of this in writing Totality and
Infinity. As I suggested briefly above, there is a way of looking at his analyses which already
presupposes a more complex relationship between philosophy and the ethical relation,
between transcendence and totality, than that of simple opposition. This in no way refutes or
makes Derrida's essay irrelevant. But it would mean that we would have to interpret his
claim to be asking questions from within Levinas's own trajectory quite carefully. For the
question would then no longer be whether the problems to which Derrida draws attention are
ones of which Levinas is aware and with which he is seeking to come to terms, or whether
they are structural problems of which he is unaware. Nor would it be a case of deciding
which of the two thinkers could most effectively claim to have solved the problems. Instead
the question would be whether these are problems which can be solved or not: whether they
are problems which Derrida claims to have dealt with, or whether his complex repetition and
analysis of Levinas has only proposed a different way of dealing with problems which must
necessarily occur within such attempts to exceed philosophy but which cannot be reconciled
within them, and which it will be the virtue of Levinas (and Derrida in his turn) to have
highlighted for us. The difference is perhaps that between a critical reading, which claims to
have revealed previously unseen difficulties in a text, and a deconstructive reading which
unsettles the possibility of saying in what sense the problems have been uncovered.19 In any
case, since the focus of my argument here is on how Derrida's work differs from that of
Levinas, I will develop his own understanding of those differences, rather than assessing
whether his reading of Levinas is 'correct' or not: moreover to answer the latter question
would require being able to attribute a stable meaning to Totality and Infinity.
19 This is Robert Bernasconi's suggestion in 'Derrida and Levinas: The question of
the closure ofmetaphysics.'
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1.2.3 Two Concepts of Economy.
Having considered Derrida's four key criticisms of Levinas in 'Violence and Metaphysics,' I
now turn to their implications for the question I am pursuing in this chapter of ethics and
politics. 1 have argued that the focus of Levinas's argument in Totality and Infinity is on
what he calls the ethical relation in terms of transcendence and infinity encountered in the
face of the Other [Autrui], Derrida's questioning of Levinas's concept of transcendence can
hardly leave the ethical relation unaffected. For a start, the ethical relation can no longer be
simply opposed to totality, nor to the State, as Levinas appears to suggest it can be —
although as I have also tried to suggest above, this issue is complex. In which case, wouldn't
Derrida's argument imply the possibility of a re-evaluation of the State in parallel with his
re-evaluation of totality? Does Derrida reject Levinas's ethical imperative out of hand on the
basis of his criticisms of the ethical relation as transcendence? I will approach these complex
questions through a consideration of the conclusions that Derrida draws for his own work,
rather than those which concern that of Levinas, in 'Violence and Metaphysics.' By focusing
on the way in which Derrida's use of the term 'economy' must be distinguished from the
meaning which Levinas gives to it, and in keeping with Derrida's general aims in Writing
and Difference, I will open the possibility of a broader comparison of their positions.
There is a key structural device in 'Violence and Metaphysics' which has been
curiously effaced in the English translation. In both the final two sections of the essay, in
which Derrida compares Levinas with Husserl and Heidegger respectively, the argument
takes a parallel turn, as is already perhaps suggested by the similarities between their titles:
'Of Transcendental Violence' and 'Of Ontological Violence.' This turn is signalled in each
case by a similar sentence, each of which begins a paragraph and is further emphasised in the
revised version of the text by being italicised. (The English translation, for no apparent
reason, removes the paragraph break preceding the first of these sentences.) At both points in
the text Derrida has been concerned to show that the thought of Husserl and Heidegger
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respectively, is not as violent as Levinas has claimed (as a form of respect, and as
Gelassenheit, or letting-be, respectively), which makes Levinas's reading in its turn appear
violent, forced and intrusive. However Derrida then specifies, of phenomenology and
ontology:
We do not say absolutely peaceful [WD 128 / 188, cf. VM 444],
We do not saypure nonviolence [WD 146 / 218, cf. VM 466].
By this manoeuvre Derrida avoids returning to the argument which he is opposing in
Levinas. For as I pointed out in my discussion of Totality and Infinity, Levinas specifies that
the relation with the face of the other is one of a fundamental peacefulness. The
transcendence of absolute alterity is peace. Just as Derrida does not believe absolute alterity
can be thought, nor that difference can be considered absolute, so he will oppose the
possibility of a pure peace. Philosophy as ontology cannot be opposed to metaphysics as
ethics in the manner Levinas wishes, or even as violence to peace. Derrida's demonstration
that Levinas's readings of Husserl and Heidegger are somewhat impatient appears to confirm
that such an opposition can itself only be made violently.
Consequently, the subject of philosophy is situated in an economy of violence, and
within 'the infinite passage through violence [which] is what we call history' [WD 130 /
191], providing that these terms are understood to be extended beyond the use Levinas
makes of them in Totality and Infinity. The clearest statement of this situation and the
possibility of response to it is worth quoting at length:
There is war only after the opening of discourse, and war dies out only at the
end of discourse. Peace, like silence, is the strange vocation of a language
called outside itself by itself. But since finite silence is also the medium of
violence, language can only infinitely tend towards justice by acknowledging
and practicing the violence within it. Violence against violence. Economy of
violence. An economy irreducible to what Levinas envisions in the word. If
light is the element of violence, one must combat light with a certain other
light, in order to avoid the worst violence, the violence of the night which
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precedes or represses discourse. This vigilance is a violence chosen as the least
violence by a philosophy which takes history, that is finitude, seriously; a
philosophy aware of itself as historical in each of its aspects (in a sense which
tolerates neither finite totality, nor positive infinity), and aware of itself, as
Levinas says in another sense, as economy. But again, an economy which in
being history, can be at home neither in the finite totality which Levinas calls
the Same nor in the positive presence of the Infinite [WD 117/ 172-3].
Derrida makes explicit at two points in this passage that his understanding of 'economy' is
not one that he shares with Levinas. [1.6,1.12-3] By asking about the difference between their
respective understandings of 'economy' we may be able to better understand what Derrida
means by violence here, and its relation to the question of ethics and politics. For Levinas,
'economic existence' is thought alongside 'terrestrial existence' as the site of a 'relationship
with the other that [...] is not a totalization of history but the idea of infinity' [TI 52 / 44],
Metaphysics would be given a place within economic existence, but would also be the
transcendence of that existence. Similarly, when Levinas comes to discuss labour, which he
claims depends on the metaphysical relation, labour 'remains economic; it comes from the
home and returns to it, a movement of Odyssey where the adventure pursued in the world is
but the accident of a return' [TI 176-7 / 192]. Economy for Levinas names the return to the
same rather than exposure to the other, and he continues the reference to the Odyssey in his
essay 'La trace de I'autre': 'To the myth of Ulysses returning to Ithaca, we would prefer to
oppose the story of Abraham leaving his country forever.'20 Derrida takes up the reference to
the Odyssey in a footnote to his conclusion to 'Violence and Metaphysics.' 'Levinas,' he
writes, 'does not care for Ulysses, nor for the ruses of this excessively Hegelian hero, this
man of nostos and the closed circle, whose adventure is always summarized in its totality'
[VM 320n.92 / 228n.l], However for Derrida, who quotes Joyce's 'Jewgreek is greekjew' as
the final line of his essay, Joyce and Hegel are on his side, since they also acknowledge that
20 cited at WD 320n.92 / 228n. 1.
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there can be no pure opposition between the Greek and the Jew, between the return and the
non-return, between the economic and the non-economic.21
So in the long passage I have just quoted, 'economy' comes to stand for something
like the principle of contamination which will prevent totality being opposed to infinity, and
an ethical relation to absolute alterity being opposed to the temporal and terrestrial order of
the State and of politics. This 'economy of violence' is being contrasted with Levinas's
attempt to think metaphysics as pure peace. Derrida exaggerates the point when he
comments later in the same paragraph that 'metaphysics is economy' [WD 117 / 173. cf. the
original version: 'L'economie est metaphysique.' VM 433], This is either scandalous in
ethical terms or unacceptable in philosophical terms from the point of view advanced in
Totality and Infinity in which metaphysics is neither economy nor violence, but opposed to
both. Derrida's aim is to reinscribe Levinas's philosophical strategies, which claim to
describe the origin and ground of metaphysics, within the system which they seek to
describe, as one strategy amongst others, as one form of violence in an economy of violence.
In doing so Derrida need not necessarily be read as passing judgement on Levinas; either for
the violence of his work (which is inevitable anyway on Derrida's account) or for naivity,
since elsewhere, as we saw, Derrida acknowledges both the ruse necessary for Levinas to
'speak Greek' and that Levinas contradicts his own previous rejections of the language of
ontology, suggesting that his own work operates on a strategic basis. Derrida's economy,
then, is neither finite totality or infinite alterity, but the circulation between the two, which
he names history. As he writes in his conclusion: 'we live in the difference between the Jew
and the Greek, which is perhaps the unity ofwhat is called history' [WD 153 / 227],
In restoring philosophy to its inscription in history Derrida insists that both
philosophy and history must be thought differently and the use of terms such as economy,
21
Joyce's work also appears in a somewhat Hegelian light in Derrida's 'Introduction
to The Origin ofGeometry.' 102-3.
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inscription, and writing are all attempts to describe this situation. However, ethics and
politics would also require to be re-worked. In Totality and Infinity, as we have seen,
Levinas makes use of the opposition between history (totality) and metaphysics
(transcendence) in terms of the relation between politics and ethics. Within history, is the
State, whose accomplices include ontology, the economic relation which returns the other to
the same, and the violence of politics. Outside history, but 'reflected within' it [TI 23 / 7], is
the ethical relation to the Other, which is peace itself, while justice is somewhere between.
The existence ofwar does not refute these arguments because it 'presupposes peace' [TI 199
/ 218]. Peace, and the ethical relation, come first. Politics, Levinas argues in his Preface, is
'the art of foreseeing war and of winning it by every means' and 'the very exercise of
reason' [TI 21 / 5]. So while Levinas cannot be straightforwardly accused of withdrawing
from 'concrete' politics — as I have argued his work locates the evidence of transcendence
in the finite totality — there is a sense in which this dynamic remains within his work. The
priority granted to the ethical relation lends itself very easily to a prioritising of 'ethics' over
politics. For Derrida, this opposition cannot be sustained. Indeed, his argument can be read
as a specific contestation of this point. By refusing to deduce politics (totality, violence) on
the basis of ethics (the relation to the Other, transcendence) but by showing both gestures to
be possibilities inscribed within the (non-finite) totality, Derrida insists instead on the
irreducibility of violence. Meanwhile, for Levinas there is already a name for this violent
contestation of the ethical relation to absolute alterity: politics.
Another way to phrase the question at issue would be to ask whether ethics or
politics comes first? For Levinas, ethics can clearly be said to come first. Even if only
reflected in, rather than present within, the finite totality, the infinity of the ethical comes
first, whether that priority is understood as a logical dependence or an ethical value. For
Derrida the situation is rather more complex. By seeking to think both politics and ethics —
or totality and infinity— as inscribed within the same economy, Derrida refuses to prioritise
one over the other. There is no 'first' place for Derrida in quite the same way as there is for
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Levinas. We might focus this by saying that any original will always come second for
Derrida; or that what he is seeking to describe is a relation in which there are only secondary
terms, rather than a first term and a second term or terms. Furthermore, when Derrida
elaborates his own account of the trace, there is also a key difference from the trace as
Levinas understands it. The trace within the totality for Levinas is of something which has
come first, even if it is 'a past whose meaning could not be thought in the form of a (past)
present' [WD 132 / 194], Derrida takes up this notion of the trace, for example in
'Differance,' but gives it no particular priority in relation to the other examples in that essay.
The Levinasian formula of the trace as 'a past that has never been present' [mar 21 / 22] is
juxtaposed to the concepts of trace in the work of Freud [Mar 18-21 / 19-22] and Heidegger
[Mar 23 / 24], This is again unacceptable to Levinas, for whom the transcendence of the
absolute Other has a metaphysical priority, indeed is metaphysics. For Derrida the trace is
not a second term which alludes to a non-present first term. Instead, it needs to be thought of
as a second term which alludes only to its own secondariness, and its relative equivalence
with, or its differance from, an infinite number of other second terms. There is no 'first'
term. Levinas, however, can be read two ways. Either he is simply proposing a
transcendental term, which must be problematic from Derrida's point of view; or he is aware
that this manoeuvre is unjustifiable, but chooses to reinscribe certain terms for strategic
reasons. Whichever of these is the case— and it may not be possible to decide between the
two interpretations — Derrida can be seen to be undertaking a distinctly different operation.
In fact, this basic structure will continue to determine the relationship between Derrida and
Levinas, as I demonstrate in the remainder of this chapter, before expanding and confirming
the suggestion I have just made, that Derrida opposes Levinas's ethics with a rethinking of
politics.
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4.3 The Ethics and Politics of Deconstruction.
The importance of the relationship between ethics and politics for the argument of my
thesis can be seen from the fundamental question which Derrida poses in Adieu, of the
relationships between 'an ethics of hospitality (an ethics as hospitality) and a law or a
politics of hospitality [...] whether the ethics of hospitality that we will try to analyze in
Levinas's thought would be able to found a law and a politics, beyond the familial dwelling,
within a society, nation, State, or Nation-State' [ADI 19-20 / 45], It is precisely this form of
question, but posed instead to 'the impasse of the political in Derrida's work,' that Simon
Critchley has answered in the negative: 'in the rigorous, quasi-transcendental delineation of
undecidability as the dimension of political responsibility, is there not an implicit refusal of
the ontic, the factical, the empirical — that is to say of the space of doxa, where politics
takes place in a field of antagonism, decision, dissension, and struggle? In this sense might
one not speak of a refusal of politics in Derrida's work?' [ED 200], Even in Critchley's later
texts, in which his reading of Derrida is more subtle and nuanced, he is still demanding a
political supplement to deconstruction, and in particular a reconciliation with the work of
Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe:
The logics of deconstruction and hegemony need to be soldered at this point, I
think, in a reciprocal relation of supplementarity. For if what deconstruction
lacks in its thinking of the political is a thematization of democratization as
hegemony, then what the theory of hegemony lacks is the kind of messianic,
ethical injunction to infinite responsibility that prevents it collapsing into a
voluntaristic decisionism. If ethics without politics is empty, then politics
without ethics is blind.22
By over-simplifying the relationship between Levinas and Derrida, Critchley is able to
identify deconstruction with 'ethics' understood in opposition to 'politics' and then to
condemn deconstruction for failing to supply the 'politics' which by his own definition of
22 Simon Critchley. Ethics— Politics— Subjectivity. London: Verso, 1999. 283.
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deconstruction it cannot. Yet neither the relationship between Levinas and Derrida, nor the
relationship between ethics and politics — in general, or in the work of either — can be so
boldly stated. In this section I begin by putting Critchley's argument into question, with
reference to Levinas's second major work, Otherwise than Being, and Derrida's later
responses to Levinas. I then extend my argument to suggest that the distinction between an
ethics of hospitality and a law or politics of hospitality is central to Derrida's project in these
texts, read alongside Politics ofFriendship.
.3.1 Levinas and Derrida: Is There an Ethics of Deconstruction?
In this section my aim is to see if the apparent differences I have set out between the
positions of Levinas and of Derrida are maintained in their subsequent work. I will look first
at Levinas's response to Derrida, in his essays 'Wholly Otherwise' and 'God and
Philosophy' and in his next major work Otherwise than Being: Or Beyond Essence, before
turning to Derrida's comments on Levinas in Alterites, on which Simon Critchley relies
heavily. The question remains whether Derrida and Levinas are saying the same thing, but in
different ways, or whether there is a significant difference between their work, and how this
will affect the way in which they each think the relationship between politics and ethics.
Concluding this section I discuss the basis of Simon Critchley's argument that the two
thinkers can both be considered to share a common 'ethical imperative' within their work.
Most commentators on the relationship between Derrida and Levinas have focused
on the extent to which Levinas can be seen to be responding to Derrida's criticisms in his
work following the publication of 'Violence and Metaphysics,' and particularly in Otherwise
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than Being,23 In his essay on Derrida, 'Wholly Otherwise,' Levinas himself suggests one
framework for approaching this question: of turning Derrida's arguments against him.
Levinas comments that he is tempted to question Derrida's own recourse to logocentric
language in resisting logocentrism, noting ambiguously that this 'is a course Derrida himself,
perhaps, has not always disdained to follow in his polemics.'24 It is hard not to interpret this
as a comment on Derrida's treatment of Levinas's own work. It would appear from this that
Levinas believes that he and Derrida share a common aim, but employ different strategies.
We would then have to interpret the development of the concepts of 'the saying' and 'the
said' between the publication of Totality and Infinity and of Otherwise than Being on this
basis: as a refinement of Levinas's own strategy in response to Derrida, around the question
of language. What Levinas refers to as the 'chiasmus' between his thought and Derrida's
would involve a difference in strategy rather than in their fundamental aims. In which case,
the only one of Derrida's complaints to which Otherwise than Being responds would be the
problem of the language of ontology. That this is certainly the major shift in his work is
confirmed by Levinas's own comments on his career in an essay called 'Signatures'
published in Difficult Freedom. There he notes that 'the ontological language which Totality
and Infinity still uses in order to exclude the purely psychological significance of the
proposed analysis is henceforth avoided.' Recognising that Totality and Infinity was still
structured around the experience of a subject, Levinas adds: 'the analyses themselves [in
Otherwise than Being] refer not to the experience in which a subject always thematizes what
he equals, but to the transcendence in which he answers for that which his intentions have
not encompassed.'25 If Levinas thinks he has responded to Derrida by dealing with the
23 Bettina Bargo gives a useful survey in her Levinas Between Ethics and Politics:
For a Beauty that Adorns the Earth. Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1999. 135-147.
24 Emmanuel Levinas. 'Jacques Derrida: Wholly Otherwise.' in Proper Names, trans.
Michael Smith. Stanford: Stanford UP, 1996. 58
25 Emmanuel Levinas. 'Signatures.' in Difficult Freedom, trans. Gary Mole. London:
Athlone, 1993. 195.
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question of language, we should be able to find no other significant change in the structure of
his thought between Totality and Infinity and Otherwise than Being. 1 will look at these two
questions in turn. The question remains not whether Derrida is 'correct' about Levinas, but
whether there is any reason for him to revise his position after Otherwise than Being.
It is the new emphasis placed on the terms 'the saying' and 'the said' which
constitutes the biggest change between the two books. (They first appear in the closing pages
of Totality and Infinity [TI 260 / 291].) They orient the attempt to resolve the difficulty
which Levinas perceives within the earlier book — that the language of metaphysics cannot
simply be used against itself. Transcendence is no longer discussed in terms of 'exteriority'
nor in terms of any experience given to a subject. Instead the subject is more emphatically
located as an effect of transcendence, and transcendence itself is located beyond the reach of
ontology. Rather than something which can be approached in language, but not in
philosophical terms, the ethical relation to the infinite becomes something which escapes
language as such. Anything which could be thematized within language would be inadequate
to describe the transcendence which precedes the subject. To formalise this situation,
Levinas uses 'the said' to refer to the ontological order of the world, including language, and
'the saying' to refer to the pre-ontological dimension. The problem of the 7/ y o' which
Levinas formulates in his work prior to Totality and Infinity, that being cannot be opposed to
non-being, because non-being would still be a modification of being, non-presence would be
the presence of an absence, is reformulated in linguistic terms.26 The 'saying' of the
utterance is never exhausted in the 'said': 'Is not the inescapable fate in which being
immediately includes the statement of being's other not due to the hold the said has over the
saying? [OB 5 / 16]. This distinction can be seen to lie behind another major shift in
26 'What remains after this imaginary destruction of everything is not something, but
the fact that there is [// y a\. The absence of everything returns as a presence, as the place
where the bottom has dropped out of everything, an atmospheric density, a plenitude of the
void, or the murmur of silence.' Emmanuel Levinas. Time and the Other, trans. Richard A.
Cohen. Pittsburgh: Duquesne UP, 1987. 46.
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vocabulary between the two books. Where previously Levinas had spoken of the face, now
he tends to refer to the skin. The exposure of the self to the other doesn't begin in the
situation of face to face communication, but in the very exposure of the skin to the world.
This exposure is itself signification, the saying which testifies to the transcendence of the
ethical relation. Responsibility begins not so much with 'the face which the Other turns to
me' [TI 215 / 237] as in the experience of 'a passivity more passive than all passivity, an
exposure to the other.' Saying as exposure is not 'dissimulating and protecting itself in the
said, just giving out words in the face of the other, but saying uncovering itself, that is
denuding itself of its skin, sensibility on the surface of the skin, at the edge of the nerves,
offering itself in suffering' [OB 15/31].
However, despite a change in vocabulary and methodology, it is not immediately
clear that the structure of Levinas's thought has changed significantly at all. While Adriaan
Peperzak has claimed that this shift turns Levinas from an existentialist phenomenology to a
approach not dissimilar to that of Derrida's,27 and Jacques Rolland interprets the break with
Totality and Infinity as being so radical that in his Parcours d'Autrement he does not discuss
the earlier book at all,28 it is worth pausing to consider the relationship between the two
works. Nowhere does Levinas suggest, for all the change in his approach, that Otherwise
than Being is intended to replace Totality and Infinity. Levinas in no way implies that the
earlier work has been simply superseded, and that study is referred to by name three times in
the notes [OB 191n.42; 191n.8; 199n.23]. But since most of Levinas's other philosophical
studies are also cited in this way, perhaps we could read Otherwise than Being as a
finalisation of his system, in which the place of all the other texts is accounted for; or
perhaps just as further reflections on the developments which occur in the final stages of
Totality and Infinity. While the relationship between being and that which is 'other than
27 See Bargo. Levinas between Ethics and Politics. 146-7.
28
Jacques Rolland. Parcours DAutrement. Paris: PUF, 1999.
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being' [OB 3 / 14] may substitute for the relationship between totality and infinity, the
structure of this relationship remains the same, despite the increasing sophistication of the
description of a relationship which by definition resists thematization. Levinas's object
remains the thought of a beyond, an outside of being, which can be associated with the
Platonic Good beyond being, with God, and with the ethical relation. His account of
responsibility as substitution for the other, in which the subject is described as a hostage to
the other, as well as his appreciation for the work of Husserl and Heidegger, are deepened in
Otherwise than Being, but not fundamentally altered.
This claim can be confirmed by a reading of 'God and Philosophy,' an essay in
which Levinas responds explicitly to 'Violence and Metaphysics.' Without mentioning
Derrida by name, he begins with a reference to one of Derrida's conclusions, that 'not to
philosophize, is still to philosophize.'29 Levinas argues that the opposition between faith and
ontology does not hold. So while the God of the Bible can only signify something
philosophically unverifiable within philosophy, and religion has to resort to the language of
ontology (adverbs of height) to express the 'beyond' of ontology as the 'most high,' Levinas
asks: 'Over and beyond being does not a meaning whose priority, translated into ontological
language, would have to be called antecedent to being, show itself?'30 Alongside terms
which are recognisably those of Otherwise than Being— disinterestedness, substitution —
Levinas clearly restates the basic premises of Totality and Infinity. Infinity, he argues, is not
subject to an oppositional dialectic:
29 Emmanuel Levinas. 'God and Philosophy.' in The Levinas Reader. Sean Hand ed.
Oxford: Blackwell, 1989. 167. The reference is to Derrida's citation: 'It was a Greek who
said, "If one has to philosophize, one has to philosophize, if one does not have to
philosophize (to say it and think it). One always has to philosophize'" [WD 152 / 226].
30 'God and Philosophy.' 168.
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not-being-able-to-comprehend-the-Infinite-by-thought would signify the
condition — or the unconditionally — of thought, as though to speak of the
non-comprehension of the Infinite by the finite did not amount to simply
saying that the Infinite is not finite, and as though the affirmation of the
difference between the Infinite and the finite had to remain a verbal
abstraction, without consideration of the fact that through the non-
comprehension of the Infinite by thought, thought is posited as thought, as a
posited subjectivity, that is, is posited as self-positing.31
This passage becomes much clearer if it is read as a response to Derrida. The difference
between the Infinite and the finite is not simply given in language ('a verbal abstraction') but
is the difference between what conditions and makes possible, and what is made possible but
is unable to think its own conditions of possibility. When Levinas continues to write of the
Infinite, in the same terms as those of Totality and Infinity, as 'a desire beyond satisfaction'32
it seems clear that he considers Derrida's essay to be posing a question of language only, and
not querying the very basis of Levinas's thought, and that the frameworks of Totality and
Infinity and of Otherwise than Being are roughly interchangeable. Certainly Levinas's
conclusion to 'God and Philosophy' would suggest that he believes himself to have refuted
Derrida. Referring to Derrida's charge, from which he began, he comments that 'not to
philosophize would not be 'to philosophize still.'33 As I have argued however, Derrida
suggests that the differences between his thought and that of Levinas are not simply
linguistic or terminological. If he is hesitant in ascribing a definitively critical position it is
not so much because he recognises a kindred project to that of his own work in Levinas but
because of the unusual nature of his own work; like all his work his reading of Levinas seeks
to affirm rather than oppose. Geoffrey Bennington gives a useful summary of the difficulties
that have attended the attempt to distinguish the two thinkers:
31 'God and Philosophy.' 176.
32 'God and Philosophy.' 177.
33 'God and Philosophy.' 186.
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[Derrida's] ' radical isation' [of the concept of alterity] can always look (and to
Levinasians has often looked) like just the opposite, a reduction of the
radicality of Levinas's own thinking, insofar as it seems to protest against
Levinas's absolutising of the other, and to that extent to make the other less
other than is the case in Levinas. But in this paradoxical domain we should be
wary of such a linear logic. Derrida's construal of alterity as always less than
absolute in fact constitutes a thought of the other as more other than the
absolute other,34
I can find little to disagree with in Bennington's account of the relationship. In the same
article he goes on to draw out the challenge deconstruction presents for thinking ethics; I will
take a different approach here, and argue that the specificity of Derrida's later work is not to
be found in a rapprochement with Levinas, but in its explicit contestation of ethics in the
name of politics.
In making this argument I am aware that I am more or less directly contradicting that
which has been put forward by Simon Critchley in his Ethics of Deconstruction and
defended elsewhere, that Derrida's reading of Levinas cannot be like his other readings,
because there is a privileged relationship between Derrida and Levinas which amounts to the
uncovering of an ethical imperative in deconstruction. His reading of this relationship has
been influential if not definitive, so it is worth spending a little time analysing why my
conclusions here should be so different. Critchley's reading is largely based around Derrida's
second essay on Levinas, 'At this very moment in this work here I am'35 but the major
authorization for Critchley's argument comes from Derrida's statement in a seminar
discussion published in Alterites, that 'faced with a thought like that of Levinas, I never have
an objection. I am ready to subscribe to everything that he says' [ALT 74, cited ED 10].
While Critchley acknowledges Derrida's qualification that 'that does not mean that I think
34
Interrupting Derrida. 44. cf.: 'Levinas opposes to Husserl's difficulties in the
Cartesian Meditations with the problem of the other the sense that the is absolutely other
than me, and Derrida defends Husserl on the grounds that that other is in some sense the
same as me.' 204n.8.
35 'At this very moment in this work here I am.' trans. Ruben Berezdivin. in. Robert
Bernasconi & Simon Critchley ed. Re-Reading Levinas. Bloomington: Indiana UP, 1991. 11-
48.
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the same thing in the same way' [Alt 74, ED 10] and the possibility that the 'differences of
idiom, language or writing' [Alt 74, ED 11 ] Derrida refers to might be significant ones, he
insists that these comments 'do make the point rather well that the privilege accorded to
Levinas in the discussion of Derrida's work is not without foundation' [ED 11], Without
minimizing the differences between the two thinkers, Critchley's claim is broadly that
something happens in both Levinas and Derrida's texts which makes their relationship
different to that between Derrida and the other writers on whom he works: most tellingly
perhaps, what Derrida calls his 'point of almost absolute proximity to Hegel.'36
It is not however clear to me that Critchley is correct in deducing what he does from
the comments he cites. The discussion is reasonably extensive, and Derrida is at great pains
to distinguish his thought from that of Levinas, and he is particularly keen to emphasise his
reservations with regard to the word 'ethics.' He begins by referring to Heidegger's 'Letter
on Humanism,' in which Heidegger argues that the question of being is prior to the question
of ethics, and that an ethics can never radically put into question the meaning of being.37
Derrida calls for a genealogical questioning of the history and meaning of the word 'ethics'
in the name of a responsibility which comes before any determined 'ethics.' He
acknowledges that Levinas, thinking of a similar responsibility, speaks of ethics in a wholly
other manner, but, he reminds us, 'it is the same word' [alt 71]. He imagines Levinas's
response: 'this semantic transformation of the word 'ethics' reconstitutes or restitutes that
which was the hidden condition of possibility of ethics, dissimulated in some way by Greek
and German thought' [Alt 71]. While he has less difficulty with this use of 'ethics' he
wishes instead to think the singularity of the coming of the other which would 'exceed the
limits of ethics' [alt 71], He concludes that 'whatever the complexity of the relations
36 cited by John Llewelyn. 'A Point of Almost Absolute Proximity to Hegel.' in John
Sallis ed., Deconstruction andPhilosophy: the texts ofJacques Derrida. Chicago: U Chicago
P., 1987. 87.
37 Martin Heidegger. 'Letter on Humanism.' trans. Frank A Capuzzi. in Pathmarks.
Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1998. 269-71
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between ethics and law, for example in Kant, the problem remains, as much for one as for
the other, that one risks reinscribing the relation to the other within the general, within
calculation. It is this worry before this generality that, without having anything against
ethics, I have too much reticence to use the word easily' [Alt 72]. From the perspective of a
reader of Politics of Friendship it is clear that this worry concerning ethics has not
subsequently been displaced. When Derrida sets out what he seeks to do in the book, it
seems highly significant that it is 'to think and live a friendship, a politics, a justice' [PoF
105 / 128]. Not, it would appear, an ethics. If for Derrida, Levinas's attempt to think the
relation to the other risks remaining caught within a metaphysical account of transcendence,
so the word 'ethics' is also hazardous.
Derrida's reservations about an 'ethics' of deconstruction are made more explicit in
'Passions.' There he warns against the 'remoralization of deconstruction, which naturally
seems more attractive than that to which it is rightly opposed, but which at each moment
risks reassuring itself in order to reassure the other and to promote the consensus of a new
dogmatic slumber' [PAS 15 / 38], In the face of criticism, in other words, deconstruction
should not seek to present itself as moral or responsible, when to do so would be to disable
the possibility of responsibility. Even to act out of a sense of duty would be to fail to act
responsibly since it would be a response based on an obligation: 'it would be too easy, and
precisely, natural, programmed by nature: it is hardly moral to be moral (responsible, etc.)
because one has the sense of the moral' [PAS 16 / 39]. Instead Derrida is responding to that
which 'still remains open, suspended, undecided, questionable even beyond the question,
indeed to make use of another figure, absolutely aporetic. What is the ethicity of ethics? The
morality of morality? What is responsibility?' [PAS 16 / 40]. There seems little in this that
Levinas would disagree with, but Derrida makes their difference clear: 'let it not be said too
precipitately that these questions or propositions are already inspired by a concern that could
by right be called ethical, moral, responsible, etc.' [PAS 17 / 41], In the situation in which we
find ourselves, we should not presume to use the word 'ethics' any more than any other
240
word.38 In Critchley's own response to this argument he takes the same tack that Levinas did
in responding to Derrida, and argues that if it is a question of words, there are good reasons
for returning to the word 'ethics,' stressing in particular the polemical context of the book, in
the debate over the value of deconstruction.39 However Critchley, following Levinas,
continues to miss the other difference in Derrida's account of Levinas, which is not merely a
matter of names, but of the structure of the attempt to think absolute infinity within the finite.
That these questions remain at issue can be confirmed from Derrida's most recent book on
Levinas, Adieu; as can my proposition that they make a critical political difference.
L3.2 Ethics, Politics and Hospitality
Adieu contains both Derrida's funeral oration for Levinas, and a lengthy paper delivered a
year later to a conference on Levinas, called 'A Word ofWelcome.' It is the latter on which I
will focus here, since in it Derrida gives a complex account of Levinas's work, which
reinforces all the points I have made so far. Most importantly, the central question of the text
is the one which underlies this whole chapter. Derrida states:
,8 Robert Bernasconi has suggested that Levinas himself began to respond to
Derrida's concerns about the use of the word 'ethics' in his later work. See 'Justice without
ethics.'
39 'The Ethics of Deconstruction: an Attempt at Self-Criticism' in Pli. vol.6. (1997).
87-101.
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I will be guided by a question that I will in the end leave in suspense, being
content simply to situate some of its premises and points of reference. It would
concern, on first view, the relationships between an ethics of hospitality (an
ethics as hospitality) and a law or a politics of hospitality, for example, in the
tradition of what Kant calls the conditions of universal hospitality in
cosmopolitical law. 'with a view to perpetual peace.'
The classical form of this question would perhaps be found in the
figure of a founding or legitimating foundation. It might be asked, for example,
whether the ethics of hospitality that we will try to analyze in Levinas's
thought would be able to found a law and a politics, beyond the familial
dwelling, within a society, nation, State or Nation-State [ADI 19-20 / 44-5],
The essay can be roughly divided into two parts on the basis of this passage. Derrida will on
the one hand 'analyze' what he calls 'the ethics of hospitality' in Levinas's thought; and on
the other hand, he will pose some political questions of this ethics. In this section I focus on
Derrida's discussion of Levinas's work in terms of hospitality, while in the next I turn to
look in more detail at the question of politics: both at Levinas's later essays on political
problems, and at Derrida's response to them. Once again it is necessary to try to disentangle
Derrida's commentary on Levinas from the points at which he objects or queries Levinas's
trajectory; it seems to me, however, that in Adieu Derrida voices once more the same
concerns he first set out in 'Violence and Metaphysics.' By pursuing the question of
hospitality in Levinas's work, Derrida is able not only to link Totality and Infinity and
Otherwise than Being, but also to pose a crucial question to Levinas.
Totality and Infinity, Derrida suggests, may be read as the description of a work of
hospitality. Even if the word 'hospitality' itself rarely appears, the word 'welcome' does.
Levinas, Derrida claims, re-describes intentionality as hospitality: as the welcome offered to
the other, on the basis of the other's welcome. The welcome of the other should be heard as a
double genitive. It is both a welcome given to the other, and a welcome that has been made
possible by the pre-original welcome by the other. Receptivity and reason themselves are
both to be thought of in terms of a welcoming which precedes any reception (the play is on
accueil and recueil). What appears to be simply a commentary on Levinas is in fact designed
to bring out a critical difference. From the first chapter of 'A Word of Welcome,' Derrida is
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asking whether we can speak of a pre-original welcome. Derrida states: 'if it is the other
alone who can say yes, the "first" yes, the welcome is always the welcome of the other. One
must now think the grammars and the genealogies of this genitive. If I put quotations marks
around the "first" of the "first" yes, it was to accede to a scarcely thinkable hypothesis: there
is no first yes, the yes is already a response' [Adi 24 / 53], We could make Derrida's point
more dramatically by saying that the accueil of the other will always be a recueil. Now this
is a fine distinction, but crucial to understanding Derrida's argument. The difference between
a first 'yes' and a 'yes' that is already a response would be of the same order as the
difference between an absolute alterity, which precedes the economy of the same, and the
alterity which Derrida is interested in, which is already inscribed into a different economy, of
same and other. It is also a difference to which a long passage is devoted in the ninth chapter
of Politics ofFriendship, but which is central to both of the shorter versions published before
the book as a whole [PoF 250-2 / 280-2; PoF (a) 638-41; PoF (b) 377-80], Derrida links
responsibility to the response to the other. He stresses that 'one answers for [...], before, by
first responding to: this last modality thus appearing more originary, more fundamental and
hence unconditional.' Accordingly, when discussing the question of 'answering before,' he
notes 'this expression seems first to modalize the 'responding to.' One answers before the
other, because first of all one responds to the other.' This would accord with the usual
reading of responsibility in Levinas, in which responsibility comes in my response to the
face of the Other. However Derrida appears to disagree, gently but critically:
But this modalization is more than and different from an exemplary
specification. And it plays a decisive role whose effects we should register.
The expression 'before' marks in general, right on the idiom, the passage to an
institutional agency of alterity. It is no longer singular but universal in its
principle. One responds to the other, who can always be singular, and must in
one respect remain so, but one answers before the law, a court, a jury, an
agency authorized to represent the other legitimately, in the institutional form
of a moral, juridical, political community [PoF 252 / 282].
By underlining the legal and institutional apparatus implied within the very structure of
responsibility, Derrida stresses that the relation to the other is always mediated.
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The consequences, as in 'Violence and Metaphysics,' are that it would not be
possible to think a pure peace outside the totality of what for Levinas is the realm of
violence, the judicial system and the State. Turning to the question of justice, broached in
Totality and Infinity and expanded in Otherwise than Being, Derrida makes precisely this
point. Derrida notes the ambiguity in Levinas's account of justice. On the one hand the
necessity ofjustice is dictated by the arrival of the third, who interrupts the ethical relation of
the face-to-face. But on the other, this interruption is necessary. Infinity as pure peace cannot
be thought except from within the conditions of violence. Derrida suggests that this apparent
equivocation can be explained on the basis that the ethical relation is already violent. It is not
the coming of the third that introduces violence, but which brings justice, and the possibility
of negotiating with the violence of being face to face with the Other. When Levinas
approaches all these issues in another essay, 'Peace and Proximity,' he still thinks of a
responsibility which is 'in its immediacy, anterior to every question' and of a question of
justice which is necessary, and immediate, but still somehow secondary [Adi 32 / 64-5]. For
Derrida, justice comes first, since the third 'would protect against the vertigo of ethical
violence itself.' This is a warning that pure peace is also already violence and that 'ethics
could be doubly exposed to such violence: exposed to undergo it but also to exercise if [Adi
33 / 66], Derrida feels (and it is no stronger than that) that Levinas 'would be tempted to
appeal not to justice but against if [Adi 30 / 62], Where for Levinas peace can be opposed
to violence, for Derrida pure peace is only thinkable as the worst violence. Derrida speaks
here of perjury \parjure]: 'Like the third who does not wait, the proceedings that open both
ethics and justice are in the process of committing a quasi-transcendental or originary,
indeed, pre-originary, perjury. One might even call it ontological, once ethics is joined to
everything that exceeds and betrays it (ontology, precisely, synchrony, totality, the State, the
political, etc.)' [Adi 34 / 69], Derrida is again pushing Levinas's thought to propositions
which he might not accept. The reduction of the (pre-ontological) ethical relation to
ontology, of infinity to totality, and to the State is the scandalous truth which Levinas wishes
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to forget. It is, with reference to 'At this very moment in this work here I am,' the originary
contamination of the ethical relation by ontology from which ethics cannot simply be
abstracted. For my argument here what is most important to note is that the legal and
political mediation of the relationship to the other is effaced by Levinas's prioritization of
the relation with the singular Other \Autrui\.
As in his earlier essay 'At this very moment in this work here I am,' Derrida once
again links his account of Levinas to the question of gender. Levinas's definition of alterity,
the welcomingpar excellence is the feminine: 'This absolute precedence of the welcome, of
the welcoming, of the welcom/wg [accueillance], would be precisely the femininity of
"Woman," interiority as femininity — and as "feminine alterity'" [ADI 43 / 81]. While
referring to his earlier reading of Levinas, in which he had stressed 'the traditional and
androcentric attribution of certain characteristics to woman (private interiority, apolitical
domesticity, intimacy of a sociality that Levinas refers to as a "society without language,"
etc)' [ADI 43 / 82] Derrida suggests a different approach this time. For it would be possible
to argue that what Levinas does is not to obliterate sexual difference in the name of a
neutrality before ontology or empirical sexual difference, but to mark the very opening of
ethics itself ('even if silently' [Adi 44 / 84]) with sexual difference. Derrida's point is that
sexual difference is 'indissociably linked' to 'the experience of pervertibility [...], which at
once calls for and excludes the third' [Adi 43 / 81]. Again this is a subtle disfiguration of
Levinas. Derrida comments in 'Choreographies' that 'Levinas indeed senses the risk factor
involved in the erasure of sexual difference. He therefore maintains sexual difference: the
human in general remains a sexual being. But he can only do so it would seem, by placing
(differentiated) sexuality beneath humanity which sustains itself at the level of the Spirit.'40
In 'A Word of Welcome' Derrida appears not to be simply reversing the priority accorded to
40 'Choreographies' in The Ear of the Other ed. Christie MacDonald. Lincoln: U
Nebraska P, 1985. 178.
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each — putting sexual difference before humanity — which would re-essentialise sexual
difference, and make it potentially a founding discourse (of an ethics, a politics, an ontology)
but to dissolve the possibility of thinking a priority. He does this on the basis of the
possibility opened up by Levinas's reinscription of sexual difference on absolute alterity, the
ethical relation. Even if Levinas, and this is Derrida's suspicion, is wary of justice, and of
sexual difference, both justice as calculation and humanity as sexually differentiated are such
as to form the indissoluble medium or matrix within which an argument for or against either
could find its place. It would be possible to argue once more that this marks the shift from
the critical reading of gender in Levinas to a deconstructive reading, in which it is no longer
possible to ascribe one interpretation either to Levinas or to Derrida. It is not a relevant
question to ask whether this is Levinas's intention, or whether it is simply an effect of sexual
difference itself, once marked in a text. Instead Derrida affirms a movement or a possibility
which exceeds both his own text and that of Levinas.
It is the introduction of the terms Derrida has developed in his seminar on hospitality
that most clearly marks out 'A Word of Welcome' from his earlier considerations of
Levinas. Derrida uses the motif of hospitality for two purposes. Firstly, he is able to link
Totality and Infinity to Otherwise than Being, despite the reformulation of the situation of the
subject between the books. The transition from the subject called upon to welcome the other
to the subject considered as hostage to the other seems almost inevitable or predictable, on
the basis of the ambiguity of the word hote in French: 'The host [hole] is a hostage in so far
as he is a subject put into question, obsessed (and thus besieged), persecuted, in the very
place where he takes place, [an] emigrant, exile, stranger, a guest [hote\ from the very
beginning [...]' [ADI 56 / 103]. The reversibility of the relation between host and guest
which is illuminated by the etymology of hote is a prior function of the structure of
hospitality. Secondly however, the concept of hospitality will form the hinge on which
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Derrida will link his reading of the ethical relation in Levinas to the problem of Levinas's
own messianic politics. As 1 discussed in my second chapter, Derrida's understanding of
hospitality involves distinguishing an absolute hospitality from any actual customs, codes,
ethics, laws or politics of hospitality, to which it must be heterogeneous. When Derrida
describes Levinas's work as an ethics of hospitality he implies that it must by definition be a
limited hospitality, and thus transgress unconditional hospitality: similarly, we saw that
Kant's cosmopolitical hospitality between states could never be hospitable enough for
Derrida. This suggests that Derrida's attribution of an 'ethics of hospitality' to Levinas is
more than a neutral act of description, but the ascription of a failure to think hospitality
responsibly enough. In a note which links Adieu to the concerns of Politics of Friendship
Derrida implies as much. Derrida reminds us that in the earlier text he has tried to 'suggest
that "the determination of friendship qua fraternity [...] tells us something essential about
ethics'" [Adi 144-5n.69 / 122-4n. 1], While Derrida often refers to his own texts, it is unusual
for him to have cited his own words here and implies an acknowledgement of the
awkwardness of advancing a highly critical argument in an essay which is generally a
gesture of approval. In this footnote, Derrida proposes a reading of Levinas which would
focus on the relationship between humanity as fraternity, the figure of the father of mankind
and filiality as 'the father-son relationship' in his work [cf. PoF 304-5 / 338-9], Given the
similarities of vocabulary and interests between Levinas and Derrida, I read this as strong
suggestion that one way of reading Politics ofFriendship would be as a critical response to
Levinas, above and beyond any of those thinkers who receive more explicit attention in the
book. In which case, the important question within both Adieu and Politics of Friendship
would become that of the distinction between the respective 'messianic' politics of the two
thinkers: perhaps even that Derrida might be opposing his own politics of hospitality to
Levinas's ethics of hospitality.
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.3.3 Two Forms of Messianic Politics.
Before looking at Derrida's comments on the subject, it is worth reviewing what Levinas
himself has to say about politics. The basic framework is once again dictated by the
ambiguity of the relationship between the infinite and the finite. For Levinas the infinite
precedes and makes possible philosophy as ontology, violence and the State as such. Yet the
infinite can only be thought through the finite. In theory at least, the State itself, despite
Levinas's violent attacks on it, should testify to the priority of, and bear the trace of, the
Infinite peace of the ethical relation. Levinas does indeed argue something very close to this
in his essay 'Politics After,' with reference to Israel. He is suggesting that there is a way to
think the state of Israel which does not on the one hand reduce it to politics — 'recourse to
unscrupulous methods whose model is furnished by Realpolitik' — and on the other to 'the
irritating rhetoric of a careless idealism, lost in Utopian dreams, but crumbling into dust on
contact with reality or turning into a dangerous, impudent and facile frenzy which professes
to be taking up the prophetic discourse.'41 There is a path, in other words, between politics as
an economy of violence (in Levinas's sense) and the infinite peace of the ethical relation.
Levinas insists that 'beyond the State of Israel's concern to provide a refuge for men without
a homeland and its sometimes surprising, sometimes uncertain achievements, has it not,
above all, been a question of creating on its land the concrete conditions for political
invention?'42 Politics in Israel, we are to understand, may not have always been guided by
ethical principles, but Israel itself marks the possibility of an ethical invention of politics, or
the invention of an ethical politics. What suggests this for Levinas is the visit in 1977 of
President Sadat of Egypt to Jerusalem, which signifies something which neither Israel's
enemies in the Middle East nor Israel's friends in the West can see. This would be something




like the suspension of the choice to be made between ethics and politics in favour of some
wholly other logic, the possibility of peace as such. Sadat's visit could be compared, one
imagines, to a trace of infinite peace, a Messianic intimation of God beyond being, peace
beyond war. As is clear from this one example, Levinas's messianic politics is inextricably
tangled with his own Zionism. It cannot fail to pass through this one example, the State of
Israel. The important issue here is how far Levinas's politics might be said to pass through
this example, or whether the politics of ethics as first philosophy begins and ends in Zionism.
It is Levinas's own political engagements that seem to cause Derrida the greatest
difficulty in Adieu and in a number of places he records his own disagreement with specific
statements made by Levinas. With reference to the passage from Levinas 1 have just
discussed, Derrida asks, 'Has this political invention in Israel ever come to pass? Ever come
to pass in Israel?' and continues T am among those who await this "political invention" in
Israel, among those who call for it in hope, today more than ever because of the despair that
recent events, to mention only them, have not attenuated' [Adi 81 / 147].43 Derrida plainly
does not agree with Levinas that Israel can be taken as a privileged place of political
invention. Elsewhere, Derrida also objects to Levinas's characterisation of Christianity in
terms of a '"political indifference'" which would explain why it "'has so often become a
State religion.'" This thesis, Derrida notes, is 'rather confidently advanced, if I may say so,
and rather quickly asserted' and in particular rules out any examination of a State religion in
Islamic lands or in Israel itself [Adi 75 / 137], In general however, Derrida's reading
maintains the same form as that of the first part of his essay, and consists in advancing two
readings of Levinas's messianic politics, one ofwhich seems more satisfying to Derrida than
the other, but neither ofwhich can be quickly or easily attributed to Levinas himself.
43 See also Derrida's comments on the situation in Palestine when speaking at a
conference in Israel [KJG 39-40].
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Derrida is generally sympathetic to that dimension of Levinas's thought which seeks
to think a messianic politics — or to think beyond politics — which is attested to within the
everyday political realm. Just as Derrida was keen to revalue the notion of justice in Levinas,
which rather than coming second (but at the same time) to the face-to-face ethical relation
might be seen as in some sense primary, so he is keen to revalue politics. All those elements
of Levinas's writing which emphasise that we start within politics, and that ethics is not
simply exterior to that order, can be taken up. So for example, Derrida approves strongly of
the title of one of Levinas's Talmudic readings: 'beyond the state in the state': 'Beyond-in:
transcendence in immanence, beyond the political, but in the political' [Adi 76 / 138]. The
difficulties for Derrida begin when Levinas turns to a specific state. The general form of this
objection may be imagined if I quote a further line from the first example of this section, on
the messianic politics of Israel which are witnessed by the visit of Sadat: 'That is the
ultimate culmination of Zionism, and therefore probably one of the great events in human
history.'44 Levinas here inscribes a messianic potential within an exceptional political
moment, and the possibility of going beyond-the-state-in-the-state within the borders a
particular state. He makes Israel an exception to the general rule. Derrida interrupts a
quotation from another essay of Levinas, following the claim that 'Israel is no less isolated in
its struggle to complete its extraordinaiy task than was Abraham, who began it four thousand
years ago' to comment that 'this passing remark on the isolation of Israel can be disputed,
indeed it is to my mind disputable' [Adi 78 / 141]. It is the election of Israel within
Levinas's political thought about which Derrida is most concerned: and which we would
have to link to what he says of election in general in Levinas's thought: that 'illeity'
designates 'sometimes the interruption of the face to face, sometimes the very transcendence
of the face to face' [Adi 60 / 110]. Sometimes, in other words, illeity is the mediation of the
44 'Politics After.' 194.
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election of absolute responsibility by the question ofjustice and the intervention of the third,
sometimes it is absolute responsibility, or election itself in the face to face.
Derrida is sketching out the structure ofwhat in my second chapter I followed him in
calling the logic of exemplarity at work in Levinas's ethical thought and his political
writings. Levinas may be using a particular engagement with the political situation of Israel
and of Judaism generally to open up the possibility of thinking beyond the politics of the
nation-state as such. By making Israel the exemplary site of this transformation of politics,
however, Levinas risks taking the path of greater violence within the economy of violence,
of returning a messianic politics beyond politics to a violent particularism. This ambiguity
can be found within Levinas's Talmudic readings and in particular Derrida refers to
Levinas's phrase 'a recognition of the Torah before Sinai': 'It is not a question, for Levinas,
of calling into question the election of Israel, its unicity or its universal exemplarity, but,
quite to the contrary, a question of recognizing a universal message for which it has
responsibility before or independently of the place and the event of the gift of the law' [Adi
66 / 119-120]. When Levinas explains his own work, Israel always takes on a universal
significance. The state or person on whom Levinas is writing is always a figure of a
universal state or person, of any state or person. As John Llewelyn puts it: '"Israel" refers
both to the particularity of a people and the particularity of a person, no matter to what
people that person does or does not belong.'45 Yet this cannot erase the fact that the name of
Sinai is 'a metonymy for the border or frontier between Israel and the other nations, a front
and a frontier between war and peace' [Adi 64 / 117]. In which case what would it mean for
there to be a 'recognition of the Torah by the peoples or the nations for whom the name, the
place, the event Sinai would mean nothing?' [Adi 65 / 119]. There is an undeniable
45 John Llewelyn. Emmanuel Levinas: The Genealogy ofEthics. London: Routledge,
1997.211.
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oscillation in Levinas's writing between this universalist appeal and the particularism of his
Zionism.
The contradiction here derives from the very structure of Levinas's thought: the
announcement of the Infinite in some finite place. However, within the economy of violence
which Derrida calls difference, there is a certain political danger which comes from attaching
a priority to one element, even as a figure for all the others, whether this be a figure of
absolute responsibility, or of ethics — or the ethicity of ethics. This danger is one which
thought as such is subject to. In my second chapter 1 argued that Derrida is expressly
concerned with the discursive enactment of the politics of brotherhood rather than the
politics of friendship: of the impossibility of evading political decision which prefers the
same rather than the other, if only by speaking in one language, one idiom, rather than
another. Derrida is thus somewhat less sanguine about the possibility of assigning a political
irresponsibility to Levinas than those, like Richard Beardsworth, who have condemned his
Zionism as a nationalist particularism: 'his ethical justification of the politics of Israel,
Levinas reproduces the same "logic" as Heidegger's attempt to ground National Socialism
on fundamental ontology.'46 As I have shown in the preceding chapters, the burden of
deconstruction is to demonstrate that any political thought will of necessity have this form.
No politics will not collapse the politicizing decision into a programmed rule. So from
Derrida's point of view the important question becomes how this is handled: is it by
privileging one state or one language as the authentic site of a repoliticization, or is it by
seeking to describe this problem as the very basis of politics. Rather than condemning
Levinas, Derrida works to determine two movements within his work, one of which is a
determined messianism, the other of which is something else sheltered within that thought. If
the law (the Torah) can be unbound from the moment of its revelation (made available
before Sinai), 'this thinking of substitution leads us towards a logic that is hardly thinkable,
46 Beardsworth. Derrida and the Political. 144.
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almost unsayable, that of the possible-impossible, the iterability and replaceability of the
unique in the very experience of unicity itself [Adi 70 / 128]:
What announces itself here might be called a structural or a priori
messianicity. Not an ahistorical messianicity, but one that belongs to a
historicity without a particular and empirically determinable incarnation.
Without revelation or without the dating of a given revelation. The hypothesis
I am venturing here is obviously not Levinas's, at least not in this form, but it
seeks to move in his direction— perhaps to cross his path once more. "At the
heart of a chiasm," as he said one day [Adi 67/121-2],
What is the difference between these two messianisms? Perhaps that where for Levinas the
promise of another politics can be found in one place rather than another, for Derrida the
promise shows up nowhere and everywhere, but absolutely not ever here, in one place. By a
strange kind of logic the absolute difference of Levinas seems to turn into a particular finite
politics whereas the non-absolute difference of Derrida turns into a non-finite politics, a
politics of non-place rather than a politics of place. Yet the form of Derrida's reading is such
that we cannot simply separate the two. For by the logic of deconstruction as itself
hospitality, Derrida both affirms this difference, but effaces his own place. There is no
possible return to good conscience, in which Derrida's choice is good and Levinas's is bad.
So when considering an essay in which Levinas opposes the State of Caesar to the
State of David, Derrida maintains both the force of his objection to such oppositions in
'Violence and Metaphysics' and the sophistication of a reading strategy which refuses to
assign such an opposition to Levinas. At first sight, Levinas appears in this essay to be
opposing Judaic and Greek thought as Derrida claimed he did in Totality and Infinity. So
much so, in fact, that Derrida asks:
If one took it as a rule to speak of 'politics' as soon as the word 'State'
appears, in a more or less rigorous translation of Polis, then one would have to
ask if this rule applies in the expression 'State of David,' or if the alternative
between the State of Caesar and the State of David is an alternative between a
politics and a beyond of the political, or an alternative between two politics, or,
finally, an alternative among others, where one could not exclude the
hypothesis of a State that would be neither Caesar's or David's, neither Rome
nor Israel nor Athens [Adi 74 / 136].
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If the politics of the 'State of David' is entirely heterogeneous to that of the 'State of
Caesar,' is it still a concept which we would recognise as political? The choice, Derrida
suggests, might be that between two politics, both of which would transgress the pure ethical
relation, but one of which would be less violent than the other. Or it might be between
politics and ethics as such, in the senses in which Levinas understands the terms, and which
we have seen to be relatively consistently opposed in his work. Or it might be between two
alternatives 'among others,' and in which the choice between a Roman or Jewish politics
would not be absolute and nor, one presumes, would the opposition between them.
It is essential in other words, that when Derrida writes of two forms of messianic
politics, we do not rush to assign one to him and the other to Levinas. The relationship is
more complex. The messianism without any determinable messiah opens up the possibility
of any determined messianism. Derrida writes of a difference that he wishes to 'sharpen
[aiguisery [Adi 101 / 175] between what he calls in his introduction 'two very close, but
perhaps heterogeneous, paths' [Adi 21 / 47], This difference does not necessarily pass
between Levinas and Derrida, but between a messianic politics and the politics of a
messianism without messianism: 'a structural messianicity, an irrecusable and threatening
promise, an eschatology without teleology, [dissociated] from every determinate
messianism: a messianicity before or without any messianism incorporated by some
revelation in a determined place that goes by the name of Sinai or Mount Horeb' [Adi 118-9
/ 204], It seems to me that these arguments in Adieu belong with those Derrida advances
elsewhere. Without assigning a definite position to Levinas — but not without making his
own judgement on some of Levinas's particular engagements — Derrida poses one key
distinction to be made when discussing either Levinas or his own work. The distinction is
that between a messianism in which something is presumed, or known to be coming, or at
the very least that what is coming will be recognised as such when it arrives, and a way of
thinking a messianic arrival which could be totally unexpected, a complete surprise. What
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kind of messianic coming would it be if the Messiah were only recognised some time later
— or not at all?
This would also be the distinction which Derrida has already considered in Politics
of Friendship, in terms which recall unmistakably his queries about Levinas's thought
elsewhere. Derrida comments on the concept of revelation that 'the event of revelation
would reveal not only this or that — God, for example — but revealability itself [PoF 18 /
36], The phrase is borrowed from 'Violence and Metaphysics' and the implied argument is
that of all three of Derrida's major essays on Levinas. Derrida continues by asking Ms there
an alternative here? Must one choose between these two orders? [...] Must one choose
between the priority of revelation (Offenbarung) and that of revealability (Offenbarkeit), the
priority of manifestation and that ofmanifestability, of theology and theiology, of the science
ofGod and the science of the divine, of the divinity of God?' [PoF 18-9 / 36]. Derrida adds a
note which includes the comment: 'What I called elsewhere iterability might not dissolve
this alternative but might at least give access to a structure of experience in which the two
poles of the alternative cease to oppose one another to form another node, another "logic,"
another "chronology," another history, another relation to the order of orders' [PoF 25n.29 /
36n.l], Since to claim to choose revealability over revelation would be to turn revealability
into a revelation, there can be no question of choosing. Instead the problem must be
approached in terms of a double logic, which recognises this paradox, and seeks to enact and
acknowledge that to name revealability returns it to revelation. Both Derrida and the later
Levinas can be seen to be operating within the grip of this paradox. Derrida's implication
however, is that not only does he dispute the fact that Levinas names the revelation of
revealability in traditional terms, as God, but that he maintains a priority for one or the other,
rather than attempting to think beyond the possibility of attributing priority. Or to put it in
the terms I used earlier, that Levinas still thinks of ethics as coming first, and certainly
before politics, when Derrida is concerned to show that both politics and ethics come second.
This is what makes Derrida's own political thought a messianism without messiah.
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4.4 Conclusion
I CONCLUDE THIS chapter with a short illustration of the kind of political problems which
attend Levinas's work. Without presuming to judge Levinas's own response, it is possible to
see that Derrida's work avoids this particular difficulty. Following the Israeli intervention in
Lebanon and the massacres of an unknown number of Muslim Palestinian refugees in the
camps of Sabra and Shatila in Beirut by Christian Phalangist militia men who had been
ordered into the camps by the Israel Defence Forces, Levinas and Alain Finkielkraut gave a
radio interview in France. Certain of Levinas's comments betray the complexity of the
problems here, and in particular of the relationship between ethics and politics. These
comments betray those problems in both senses of the word, however; they mark them out in
the starkest terms, but they also fail to do the questions justice. While Levinas argues that
there are no limits to responsibility, he also notes that 'there is certainly a place for defence,
for it is not always a question of "me," but of those close to me, who are also my
neighbours.'47 In other words, there must always be a calculation of responsibility, and there
must therefore be instances in which the (primary) ethical imperative be transgressed in the
name of (secondary) political imperatives. Levinas specifies 'I'd call such a defence a
politics but a politics that's ethically necessary. Alongside ethics, there is a place for
politics.'' All the problems 1 have discussed in this chapter are present here in miniature.
Although Levinas recognises 'a direct contradiction between ethics and politics, if
both these demands are taken to an extreme' their co-existence is more ambiguous.48 On the
one hand ethics transcends politics, 'there is also an ethical limit to this ethically necessary
political existence'49; but on the other hand, as soon as there is ethics there must also be
47 'Ethics and Politics.' transcript of interview by Shlomo Malka with Emmanuel
Levinas and Alain Finkelkraut on Radio Communaute, 28 September 1982, trans. Johnathan
Romney, in Sean Eland ed. The Levinas Reader. Oxford: Blackwell, 1989. 292.
48 'Ethics and Politics.' 292.
49 'Ethics and Politics.' 293.
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politics 'alongside' [my emphasis] — this relationship is 'necessary.' While ethics and
politics must co-exist, politics must still be judged against ethical criteria. Levinas appeals to
'the old ethical idea which commands us precisely to defend our neighbours. My people and
my kin are still my neighbours. When you defend the Jewish people, you defend your
neighbour.' The political problematization of the 'old ethical idea' (and politics occurs
alongside ethics) begins when there are no longer reliable grounds on which to decide who
my neighbour is. As Levinas writes: 'The other is my neighbour, who is not necessarily my
kin, but who can be. But if your neighbour attacks another neighbour or treats him unjustly,
what can you do?' While Levinas is clearly not condoning the events in the Beirut camps, he
does seem to ascribe a priority to 'my people and my kin' who happen to be 'my
neighbours.' Richard Beardsworth has argued that in doing so, 'the unjustifiable sacrifice of
one other against an other has become a justifiable defence of the "Other" of the Jewish
neighbour against the homeless Palestinian.'50
What is at stake in this problem is precisely that which Derrida raises: the possibility
of either founding a politics on an ethical basis or of questioning politics from an ethical
standpoint. Levinas appears to give priority to the 'old ethical idea which commands us
precisely to defend our neighbours'51 [My emphasis]. Yet he gives no indication of how we
are to decide when our neighbours are our kin, and when they are just our neighbours. It
seems to me that this bears out the ambiguity of the ethical structure of Levinas's thought. If
the 'ethical' is given a priority over juridical and political laws, there is a danger that ethics
— even an ethics of hospitality — will dictate the priority of the same over the other, of the
family over the stranger, of my nation over another nation. This seems to me to reinforce
both Derrida's concerns over the structure of Levinas's philosophy and his reservations
about the name of ethics. On the basis of a reading of 'Violence and Metaphysics' I have
5(1 Derrida and the Political. 144.
51 'Ethics and Politics.' 292.
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shown that there is a consistent objection in Derrida to the priority given by Levinas to the
ethical relation as the beyond of being, which goes beyond the question of names. There can
be no question for Derrida of putting ethics first, and politics second: for Derrida there is
only the mediated regime ofjustice, of politics, and of ethics as code, within which a 'pure'
peace, God, or an 'ethics beyond ethics' will appear as a calculated possibility, rather than
being what precedes, surpasses and makes possible any calculation. It is clear that, as I have
argued throughout this thesis, Derrida is interested in a structure for which ultimately no
name can be given, since every possible name is already implicated within the structure — a
principle of relationality, not some secret thing which could be revealed. But does this mean
that 'ethics' and 'politics' are equally good names for this situation? My suggestion is that it
does not. If the reinscription of a name is strategic, we would be looking for names which
play to the emancipatory moment of 'democracy-to-come' rather than the naturalising
moment of fraternization. Politics is already the name of dissensus and dispute — ethics is
rooted in a community, or a presumed consensus of some sort, even if not in a thinking of
blood or race.
There is a precedent for this strategic reinscription of politics against ethics within
Derrida's work itself. His famous early analyses sought to demonstrate a consistent priority
given to speech over writing in the history of philosophy. This priority is never absolute, but
recurrently appears. Writing, as the sign of a sign, is seen as secondary compared with
speech, which in turn is often seen as an enfeebled representation of some interior sign.
When Derrida seeks to rethink this system, he only has the words ofmetaphysics with which
to do it. The idea of a generalised textuality which he is interested in is one in which there
would be no unique self-presence, no first term from which another term would be derived.
No first place in other words, only second places. But rather than invent another term to
describe this peculiar economy, Derrida returns to the word which he already has available,
the word which already names a secondary sign, and which he generalises to encompass
signs in general. That word is of course writing. In Of Grammatology, where Rousseau
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condemns writing as 'representative, fallen, secondary, instituted' [Gra 17/29] Derrida
takes writing, as the 'signifier of a signifier' to describe 'the movement of all language'
[Gra 7 / 16].521 believe that the same argument could be made about the relation between
ethics and politics. If the word ethics comes naturally to Levinas at the point where he tries
to think the 'Good' 'beyond' 'being' is this not in itself the return of a metaphysical value?
We are perhaps not even so very far from a particular trajectory within Levinas's own
thought here. Robert Bernasconi has argued that Levinas himself comes to realise this, at
Derrida's prompting, and begins to suggest other words for the ethical relation, even after he
has stripped away the language of ontology in Otherwise than Being.57, But if there is a
traditional priority ascribed to ethics over politics, and if not throughout the tradition, at least
in the work of Levinas, there not already a 'second' term to describe the general economy of
violence which Levinas has tried to save ethics from? And would that word not be politics?
However the point goes beyond a simple linguistic quibble. Everything I have been
concerned to argue in this thesis has led to the conclusion that not only is Derrida's work
political, and perhaps 'first' and foremost political, but that it must also lead us to a
revaluation of politics itself. In the last chapter I argued that Derrida's account of the
decision affirms every decision as the potential site of an opening to the other, of something
else happening. Every decision, whether it leads to 'better' or to 'worse,' whether it is
emancipatory or not, testifies to the possibility of that 'better,' in attesting to the possibility
of something else. I don't think it is an oversight on Derrida's part that throughout the texts I
have been considering, he regularly discusses law, politics and justice, but only rarely does
he mention ethics.
This is also a question of the polemical context in which I have been concerned to
argue against Simon Critchley's understanding of the ethics of deconstruction. By equating
521 owe this point to Bennington. Legislations. 27-28; 56n.43.
53 Bernasconi. 'Justice without Ethics.'
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Levinas and Derrida, Critchley's reading not only blurs the important difference to be
thought between them (if not assigned to either one of them) but reduces the strangeness of
the pre-original response in Derrida's work by treating it as ethical and personal rather than
political and inter-subjective. In doing so, Critchley avoids acknowledging the necessary
complicity and irresponsibility which Derrida has been trying to bring into focus. Derrida
takes an austere path towards the possibility of the political. As I argued in my second
chapter, this also involves a rigorous self-interrogation in order to try and acknowledge the
necessary violence of any discursive utterance, for example the national exemplarism of
philosophy. However Critchley fails to appreciate this point. Reading Specters ofMarx, and
Derrida's call for a New International, Critchley allows himself this criticism, in parenthesis
(paradoxically, set in the body of a commentary on Derrida, such an aside gains far more
weight than it could have done as an argued point):
[...] who would be the enemy of such a New International? The logic of
Derrida's argument would seem to entail that the enemy would be any form of
nationalism, whether French, Israeli, British or whatever. [...] An open
question for me would be as to the sufficiency of this notion of 'the enemy'.
Namely, that nationalists are fairly easy enemies to have 54
On this basis, Critchley finds Derrida guilty of providing only the ineffable politics that
Critchley himself has extracted from his work. As 1 have argued, there can be no possibility
of simply opposing nationalism for Derrida. Critchley's incomprehension is not surprising if
we bear in mind both Derrida's remark that a national idiom will always come as 'a scandal'
to 'the self-styled philosopher' [ONH 3] and Critchley's appeal in the closing pages to the
'properly Socratic moment' in which politics is put into question by the philosopher: 'There
is, 1 believe, an urgent need to re-establish the political link between philosophy [...] and
citizenship' [ED 237-8]. For Derrida, the philosopher is always already on the side of their




deconstruction, Derrida's concern is to show that this imperative will always already have
been broken, betrayed, transgressed, as soon as I have begun to speak, or remain silent, in
one language rather than another. But by recognising and beginning to negotiate with this
necessary political transgression of the ethical, Derrida affirms the opening to something else
which would be neither ethics nor politics. 'Democracy-to-come' is not the name of a
political project to be initiated, nor of a regulative ethical ideal against which our
democracies are to be measured — although it is perhaps both of these to some extent.
Rather, 'democracy-to-come' is a name for a combination of both a politics of waiting
without expectation, and an incessant and impatient negotiation.
Furthermore, and perhaps most importantly, would not the de-naturalisation of
decision that I discussed in my first chapter lead us to question ethics as an ethnics. I coin the
neologism in order to suggest that any appeal to eth(n)ics repeats the naturalisation of the
political decision. The understanding of politics with which Derrida is concerned in Politics
of Friendship would be an attempt to keep the brother apart from the friend and from this
perspective would appear to be exactly directed against something like Levinas's own
thought. What Levinas's tendency to find the messianic revealed in an actual place, in the
homeland of one people rather than another, warns us is not that we should simply turn
against all nationalisms or particularisms. For there is no way we could do that without
installing a more naive nationalism in their place, in thinking we have become cosmopolitan
or universalist philosophers. Instead it is to think this inevitability through to its limit, to the
point where it opens to another politics, a new thought of friendship, a new thought of
democracy; while seeking to intervene, to the best of our ability, in the here and now. But
this intervention must not follow a rule, and will therefore not be susceptible to the kind of
theorisation that Critchley demands. No analysis of the world will adequately prepare us for
a decision as to what to do, will be able to remove the chance and the risk that is a decision,
here and now, in 'this political practice that history is' [PoF 114/ 134], this 'infinite passage
through violence' [WD 130 /191].
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Conclusion
IN THE INTRODUCTION to this thesis I announced two areas of interest. One concerned the
political dimension of Derrida's work; the other was broadly the problem of responding to or
following Derrida. On the basis of the four studies undertaken in this thesis it is evident that
these two questions cannot be rigorously distinguished. The problem of reading and
interpretation is as much a political question as it is a methodological one, while the category
of response is itself central to Derrida's political reflections. Most importantly perhaps,
theory and practice are co-implicated throughout what it has been convenient to continue
referring to as deconstruction. All of Derrida's texts must be read as a response in a certain
context, even if the limits of this context cannot be strictly delineated. This means that there
are no conclusions to Derrida's work; no generalisable rules; no political slogans or aims.
The difficulties of responding to such work are evident in an interview he gave in 1991.
After receiving a series of answers which clearly fail to satisfy him, the interviewer asks
bluntly 'Is there a philosophy of Jacques Derrida?' To which Derrida can only reply 'No.'
'There is thus no message,' prompts his interlocutor. 'No,' confirms Derrida [POI 361 / 372],
No philosophy, no message, therefore, one would presume, no politics, certainly no political
philosophy. Indeed Derrida is asked this very question shortly afterwards: 'Could one say
that between the philosophical work and the work of writing that are yours, on the hand, and
politics on the other, one should not want to establish links?' 'The links,' he states,
are not immediately identifiable, according to the codes in force. There are
links, of course, you have no doubt of that, but here or there they may pass
through trajectories that are not plotted on the map of politics. They in turn
politicize discursive zones, bodies of work, places of experience that generally
are taken as apolitical or politically neutral. There are discourses and gestures
whose code and rhetoric are apparently highly political, but whose foreseeable
submission to exhausted programs seems to me seriously apolitical or
depoliticizing. And vice versa, ifyou like [...] [POI 363 / 374-5].
It is this complex of problems I have been concerned to cast light on in this thesis. In
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concluding, 1 wish to summarise the results of my reading of Derrida; not by repeating the
endpoints of the analyses undertaken, but by recasting the terms of the question, and of the
answer. Then I will make some suggestions as to the paths which it seems this reading of
Derrida opens up: paths between deconstruction and political theory; and between
deconstruction and politics itself.
It has become a commonplace — for Derrida and for his readers — that
deconstruction is a work of infinite patience. Following Levinas and Blanchot, Derrida has
negotiated with the possibility of a passivity beyond passivity. From this stem many of the
complaints levelled at his work: deconstruction is the patience of a reading which never
takes a position in relation to the real world; a patient attention to opposing ways and paths
which cannot choose a path; the suspense of the decision in the undecidable which can never
take the necessary political decision. I will take Gillian Rose's objection to Blanchot as
emblematic of this line of criticism. In her remarkable essay 'Potter's Field,' Rose comments
on the suggestion in The Writing of Disaster (Rose does not mention this fact, but the
original version was a shorter text called simply 'Discourse on Patience'1) that what is left to
us in the face of the worst disaster is passivity:
/ will not believe it. [...] it requires a work, a working through, that
combination of self-knowledge and action which will not blanch before its
complicities in power, activity beyond activity, not passivity beyond passivity.
For power is not necessarily tyranny, but that can only be discovered by taking
the risk of coming to learn it — by acting, reflecting on the outcome, and then
initiating further action.2
Echoed in this are not only Rose's own criticisms of Derrida, but also those of many others
— I need not refer once again to Thomas McCarthy and Simon Critchley. Derrida himself
occasionally seems on the verge of formulating this same criticism:
1 Maurice Blanchot. 'Discours sur la patience (en marges de Iivres d'Emmanuel
Levinas).' Le Nouveau Commerce, nos. 30-1. (1975) 19-44.
2 Gillian Rose. 'Potter's Field: Death worked and unworked.' In Carolyn Bailey Gill
ed. Maurice Blanchot: The Demand ofWriting. London: Routledge, 1996. 204.
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[...] such a reading may perhaps seem too philological, micrological, readerly
— complacent, too, with the time it allows itself when matters are urgent, at
just the moment when one should no longer wait. At a moment when our world
is delivered over to new forms of violence, new wars, new figures of cruelty or
barbarity (and not always to this 'just' and necessary barbarity that Benjamin
sometimes called for against the other, the barbarity of the old culture), at a
moment when hostilities are breaking out, no longer resembling the worst that
we have ever known, the political and historical urgency of what is befalling us
should, one will say, tolerate less patience, fewer detours and less bibliophilic
discretion. Less esoteric rarity. This is no longer the time to take one's time, as
a number of our well-intentioned contemporaries must no doubt think [...]
[PoF 78-79 / 97],
Derrida is prepared to subscribe to this thesis up to a point. 'Absolute urgency' is not an
accident which has befallen us, but is 'the law of decision, the event and responsibility, their
structural law, which is inscribed a priori in the concept.' Infinite responsibility dictates not
having the time to take one's time: 'our answers and our responsibilities will never be
adequate, never sufficiently direct' [PoF 79 / 98], But rather than responding to the urgency
of the decision by giving in to its demand, which is not a problem of the times, but of the
concept itself, Derrida demands the right to take his time, in order not to decide in advance,
without reflecting, by presuming to know what a decision is, what politics is, or how we
might know these things. As Geoffrey Bennington has argued, that would include the urging
of this urgency — which if it is structural and unavoidable, cannot be recuperated by,
resolved by or become dependent on a historical account.' As I have suggested, theory is
always practice. To theorise is always to decide for one action rather than another, within
one language rather than another. To commend 'passivity' is already an 'activity.'
Yet to commend 'patience' does not seem to be much of an answer to that pre¬
eminent political question: 'what is to be done?' To understand Derrida's point, I believe it is
necessary to distinguish two dimensions of patience. The first would be that of the word's
original meaning— not so much waiting as enduring in the face of suffering. The political
3 Geoffrey Bennington. 'Emergencies.' Interrupting Derrida. London: Routledge,
2000. 162-79; cf. 24-5.
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practice of deconstruction would be that of suffering. There is a consistent thematic strand
throughout Derrida's political texts which would reinforce this reading. He regularly speaks
of— and to— 'chaos' itself. This is a chaos which is both 'a risk and a chance' as we have
seen; but it is also 'the worst against which we struggle' [DaP 84], Derrida's own response
seems caught between the risk and the chance. In a paper given in the United States, prior to
the delivery of the paper that would be published as Specters ofMarx Derrida goes over
many of the themes of the subsequent text. But certain passages read more like the Blanchot
of The Writing ofthe Disaster than any in the subsequent and more notorious version of the
text:
This is what one has to know: It is against the background of this disaster; it is
only in the gaping and chaotic, howling and famished opening, it is out of the
bottomless bottom of this open mouth, from the cry of the Khaein that the call
of justice resonates.
Here then is its chance and its ruin. Its beginning and its end. It will
always be given thus as the common lot \en partage], it will always have to be
at once threatened and made possible in all languages by the being out ofjoint:
aus den Fugen.4
Justice is inseparable from the disaster; of this, deconstruction is the exemplary witness. But
that is all. This is perhaps Derrida's most patient response, and his most constant. For there is
an uncanny resonance between such a claim and that of his 'Introduction' to Husserl's
'Origin ofGeometry':
If there is any history, then historicity can be only the passage of Speech, the
pure tradition of a primordial Logos toward a polar Telos. But since there can
be nothing outside the pure historicity of that passage, since there is no Being
which has sense outside of this historicity or escapes its infinite horizon, since
the Logos and the Telos are nothing outside the interplay (Wechelspiel) of
their reciprocal inspiration, this signifies then that the Absolute is Passage [...]
This movement is also Danger(ous) as the Absolute [/ 'Absolu d'un Danger].5
4 Derrida, Jacques., 'The Time is Out of Joint' trans. Peggy Kamuf in Anselm
Haverkamp ed., Deconstruction Is / In America, New York & London, New York UP, 1995.
14-38.
3
Jacques Derrida. 'Introduction to The Origin ofGeometry.' trans. John P. Leavey,
Jr. in Edmund Husserl's 'Origin of Geometry': An Introduction. Lincoln: U Nebraska P,
1989. 149.
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At the risk of completing the circle, we can turn back to Blanchot:
The disaster [...] is outside history, but historically so [...] The disaster is the
improperness of its name and the disappearance of the proper name (Derrida);
it is neither noun nor verb but a remainder which would bar with invisibility
and illegibility all that shows and is said — a remainder which is neither a
result (as in subtraction), nor a quantity left over (as in division). Patience
again.6
Deconstruction as patience is perhaps just a name for our improper dwelling in the face of
the disaster. But it also consists in the recognition that to think in the mode of the perhaps is
not only to admit a necessary and inexorable uncertainty with regard to answering the
question 'what is to be done?' but also to admit the necessary possibility that nothing can be
done; that the worst is also possible. However it would be a mistake to think that this is
Derrida's only response.
The second dimension of Derrida's response would be less patient, more hasty —
but then it seems to me less than certain that patience is in fact possible. Can patience ever be
patient enough? As soon as I am conscious that I am waiting for something, even for
something indeterminate, I am already acting impatiently. Somewhat paradoxically it would
appear that there could never be a pure patience, an absolute patience, a waiting which was
not aware of itself as waiting — for then there would be no waiting at all, not even the
possibility of the slightest patience. Patience would have to be measured in degrees of
impatience. From this point of view, certainly closer to that of Blanchot and Derrida than of
Rose, there could only be an economy of impatience, and the choice for every participant in
that economy would be between different degrees of impatience. Deconstruction, I have
argued, is an attempt to describe this economy, the theory and practice of political patience
— or impatience, but the distinction appears to be very slight, almost nothing, at this point.
'Impatience is never justified' Derrida comments while describing his own impatience
6 Maurice Blanchot. The Writing ofthe Disaster, trans. Ann Smock. Lincoln: U
Nebraska P, 1995.
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towards certain formulae in the work of Phillipe Lacoue-Labarthe and Paul de Man.7 There
can never be any justified action within this economy of impatience, neither a 'passivity
beyond passivity' nor an 'activity beyond activity.' But there is never any inaction, either.
The impossibility of choosing between different politics of impatience, different strategies of
violence, is what Derrida has described as an 'hiatus' in Adieu, while in Politics of
Friendship he says of one such choice: 'we must be patient at the crossroads and endure this
undecidable triviality. Without it — and this is the thesis and the decision — no decision
would be possible, or ever any friendship. There are we. In this very place? No, there' [PoF
123 / 145],
This does not mean that we do not choose or decide; and to some extent, that in itself
is enough, since for Derrida 'there is no ethico-political decision or gesture without what I
would call a 'Yes' to emancipation' [DaP 82]; any decision is worth something. But the
difficulty would then be of ensuring that there is a decision. But since this is something that
can't be ensured, since a decision, Derrida argues, is impossible, there can be no easy
answer. In a more general form, this is still the very problem dictated within Derrida's texts.
We 'must calculate, negotiate the relation between the calculable and the incalculable, and
negotiate without the sort of rule that wouldn't have to be reinvented there where we are
cast, there where we find ourselves; but we must take it as far as possible' [FoL 28 / 62], as
Derrida writes in 'Force of Law.' Even if, as the problem is set out in 'Psyche: Inventions of
the Other,' what is at stake is an impossible invention of the impossible, presumably there
are ways of thinking or acting which give the impossible more of a chance than other ways
of thinking or acting. My response to Derrida is to reflect on the possibility of a productive
articulation of deconstruction with political theory, precisely in order to give politicization a
chance. The remainder of my conclusion will consist of three suggestions as to what form
7
Jacques Derrida. 'Introduction: Desistance.' In Phillipe Lacoue-Labarthe.
Typography: Mimesis, Philosophy, Politics. Stanford: Stanford UP., 1989. 15.
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such an articulation might take. They are all practices of impatience; each is less patient than
the one before, and each is doubtless less patient than Derrida's own work.
[1] What Derrida calls a deconstructive genealogy of the concept would seem to have an
immediate chance when grafted into the realm of political discourse and political theory.
Derrida has himself taken some steps along this path, but the task is much wider. Such
concepts as security, sovereignty, representation, but most of all perhaps that of property call
out for deconstructive analysis; both in terms of the tradition of thought from which they
arise, but also in terms of their everyday polemical and political use. This would be an
interminable task; but it is not incompatible with the strategic use and redevelopment of the
terms in question. So for example, it would be possible to transplant deconstruction to
international relations theory. The political challenge at the border of the state — a challenge
made by and to the figure of the refugee, the asylum seeker or the economic migrant —
corresponds to one of the structural limits of politics. A political decision enforces limits,
defines the interior and exterior of a state, while showing these limits to be always already
permeable, and crossed. Such a decision already takes the realm of politics beyond the state.
Only once this has been recognised, does politics have a chance of becoming more than the
programmed distribution of goods to the citizens of a state. However the affirmation of this
chance can, and perhaps must, be articulated with various strategic interventions: for
example either the affirmation of cosmopolitan or internationalist treaties and organisations,
or their critique. The task of thought would be to judge as could best be done which moment
is most propitious for either. 1 have shown that Derrida's comments on hospitality, the
cosmopolitical, and International Law are consistent with this proposition. Two further
(local) examples: [1] To affirm multi-culturalism, a multi-ethnic vision of society, an end to
violent particularisms and nationalisms, a renegotiation of the power settlements between the
genders; but at the same time to seek to question the very nature of 'culture' or 'ethnicity' of
'gender' or of 'nation.' These are the words of a political lexicon that already dictates the
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decision by separating multiple 'cultures' at the same time as it claims to bring them
together. [2] To acknowledge devolution as the chance of a redistribution of power, the
possibility of a new politics (more female parliamentary candidates, proportional
representation) while seeking to resist the inevitable restabilizing and nationalist tendencies
that have accompanied it. This would also be a case of translating deconstruction not only
from one institutional context to another, or showing deconstruction to be already at work
there, but from one national or state context to another, and from one philosophical idiom to
another.
[2] There seems to me to be a potential for constructing a descriptive political theory on the
basis of the account 1 have sketched out in chapter three of deconstruction and
depoliticization. My analogy here is with Deleuze and Guattari's work on deterritorialization
and reterritorialization in A Thousand Plateaux. The burden of the concepts of
deterritorialization and reterritorialization is to describe the way in which entities (political,
material, biological) — or in Deleuze and Guattari's terms assemblages, or bodies without
organs — interact with each other, or are constantly constructed and departing along lines of
flight. The basic distinction comes from the French language relation of terre for earth and
territoire for the territory which is constructed upon it. The earth, Deleuze and Guattari
claim, is absolutely deterritorializing, it is a surface which precedes and makes possible its
own reterritorialization, the construction of territories, boundaries, distinctions and
differences upon or across it. The earth however is also re-territorializing, since their
dynamic materialist model sees the world in its entirety as a complex of flows of
deterritorialization and reterritorialization. All state forms for example are reterritorializing,
and establish instruments and mechanisms of territorialization: cartography, the military, the
book itself are vectors of re-territorialization. Capitalism however is a powerful
deterritorializing force. The two processes or dynamics cannot strictly be separated:
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How could movements of deterritorialization and processes of
reterritorialization not be relative, always connected, caught up in one another?
The orchid deterritorializes by forming an image, a tracing of a wasp; but the
wasp reterritorializes on that image. The wasp is nevertheless deterritorialized,
becoming a piece in the orchid's reproductive apparatus. But it reterritorializes
the orchid by transporting its pollen. [...] a veritable becoming, a becoming-
wasp of the orchid and a becoming-orchid of the wasp. Each of these
becomings brings about the deterritorialization of one term and the
reterritorialization of the other; the two becomings interlink and form relays in
a circuit of intensities pushing the deterritorialization even further.8
Deconstruction opens the possibility of an analysis of political events or policies in terms of
their relative depoliticizing and repoliticizing tendencies. These effects would be
inseparable. If deconstruction prohibits the prediction of the future, but requires some
calculation, one more impatient, more stabilising or depoliticizing version of deconstruction
might be given over to such a project. For example, within an identity politics, it would be
possible to isolate the repoliticizing impact on old institutions, settled boundaries and orders
of affiliation, but the co-original prediction of the political decision along new lines.
[3] The third, and most impatient, ofmy proposed paths for a deconstructive political theory
or a deconstructive politics concerns the shift from deconstruction as an academic concern to
the wider public sphere. This is again a matter of context. Where Derrida, for example, has
been cautious about his public gestures or interventions, given the relationship between the
institution of philosophy and the media in France, there is no reason why the same path need
be followed in the Britain.9 The spheres of law and of the media in particular seem to be pre¬
eminent sites for deconstructive political practice. Derrida himself seems to recognise this
possibility when in 'Force of Law' he compares deconstruction with the general strike:
8 Deleuze, Gilles and Guattari, Felix. A Thousand Plateaux, trans. Brian Massumi.
London: Athlone, 1988. 10
9 See Dominique Lecourt. The Mediocracy. trans. Gregory Elliot. London: Verso,
2001.
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Today, the general strike does not need to demobilize or mobilize a spectacular
number of people: it is enough to cut the electricity in a few privileged places,
for example the services, public and private, of postal service and
telecommunications, of radio and television or to introduce a few efficient
viruses into a well-chosen computer network or by analogy, to introduce the
equivalent of AIDS into the organs of transmission, into the hermeneutic
Gesprach.
Can what we are doing here resemble a general strike or revolution,
with regard to models, structures but also modes of readability of political
action? Is that what deconstruction is? Is it a general strike or a strategy of
rupture? Yes and no. Yes, to the extent that it assumes the right to contest, and
not only theoretically, constitutional protocols, the very charter that governs
reading in our culture and especially in the academy. No, at least to the extent
that it is in the academy that it has been developed. [FoL 37-8 / ]
The first theoretical site of deconstruction, its necessary (contingent) historical origin, may
have been within the academy but there is no natural or essential limit to its mutations, grafts
or reach.
However, the negotiation with any and every possible path which is demanded by
Derrida's work must also of necessity be a test of patience. 1 do not believe there is an easy
or instant solution to the problematic articulation of deconstruction with politics, either
outside or inside the academy. Since any such attempt must always be depoliticizing, we
should not perhaps leap to conclusions. But since a conclusion to a negotiation with the
impossible will always be just that— a leap — not only will no conclusion ever be possible,
of the order of the possible, but no impossible conclusion will be in and of itself without an
appeal to an emancipatory 'yes.' A yes to politics itself in the face of the disaster, to the
impossibility of patience, and the possibility of a productive impatience.
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